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Abstract
Pension Fund Evictions: Lessons for Housing and Labor

by

Marnie Brady

Advisor: Frances Fox Piven
In this dissertation I analyze an institutional investor portfolio of over-leveraged
multifamily rental housing in East Palo Alto, California to demonstrate how changing
forms of landlordism produce both new and familiar targets for tenants organizing against
displacement and for housing security. Venture capital investors in the first decade of the
2000s exploited the Silicon Valley regional conditions of racial exclusion, uneven
development, and weakened municipal rent control. I introduce the legacy of Black
political organization in East Palo Alto as a way of contextualizing the tenants’ and the
city leaders’ response to the monopoly investment purchase. The structure of this rental
portfolio demonstrates the multiple actors involved in such large-scale residential
investments, including institutional state pension funds, high-net worth individuals, local
and international lenders, money managers, and the Security and Exchange Commission.
The case study analysis considers how tenants, advocates, and a local union representing
shareholders in the country’s largest pension, the California Public Employees’
Retirement System (CalPERS), mobilized city and state officials to exert influence over
these targets, focusing on the institutional investor in particular, albeit with limited
success.
iv

This case finds that venture capital investors backed by public pension funds
exacerbated the escalating renter crisis in East Palo Alto, and elsewhere. I suggest that the
findings from this case study, particularly those detailing the points of leverage available
to tenants to target public pension funds, as well as the power of cities, bear lessons for
tenants organizing in other large-scale multifamily rental portfolios and bundled scattered
site single-family real estate owned (REO) foreclosure-to-rental portfolios. The analysis
concludes by drawing from principles of housing security and offering what a coalitional,
labor/community, racial justice politics for “the right to the city” might entail when
taking into account changing conditions of investor landlordism.
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Chapter 1. Introduction
Pension Fund Evictions: The Case of East Palo Alto

A casual observer might regard as par for the course that in 2009, in the midst of a
chaotic housing market collapse, Page Mill, a venture capital-backed firm registered in
Delaware, lost a $270 million dollar real estate portfolio to foreclosure. That year, 2.8
million U.S. properties went into foreclosure (Blomquist, 2010). The U.S. real gross
domestic product (GDP) contracted by more than 6 percent and more than 750,000 jobs
were lost each month (Executive Office of the President Council of Economic Advisors,
2010: 25). Page Mill, like many “opportunistic” investment funds, had placed its bets on
a U.S. housing market that would continue to boom, if even for a few more years.
Underpinning the Page Mill earlier prospects were pension fund managers increasingly
willing to take greater risk and, relatedly, bankers amenable to skewed debt ratios feeding
into the ever-ravenous securitization markets. At first glance, it might appear that Page
Mill’s partners simply made and lost the gamble in overestimating the market’s arc or in
timing its foreseeable collapse.
A closer look at the case of this particular loss, however, reveals that the Page
Mill gamble also rested on a widely held assumption regarding the political scaffolding
of the neoliberal economy: the dominance of corporate political power over and through
city governance.1 Page Mill executives premised their investment on plans to railroad the

1

The reference to governance here and throughout employs the definition offered by Ekers, Hamel and
Keil (2012): “the varying institutions, practices, discourses, ideologies, and representations that affect how
different spaces are produced, contested, and experienced” (24). This definition attends to the privatepublic dimensions of rule, and differs for its very broad definition that includes private enterprise. This is
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small city government of East Palo Alto, California and dislodge thousands of people,
mostly Black and Latino, from their homes. They calculated they would be able to
undermine the city’s rent control law through existing loopholes, in addition to strategic
lawsuits. Page Mill presumed, ostensibly, that the City of East Palo Alto would have
neither the capacity nor political will to effectively defend and enforce its own rental
regulation ordinance.
Through an analysis of the City of East Palo Alto’s response to the Page Mill
investment, this dissertation exposes how land and housing speculation entails a gamble
not only on the global market, as if a reified entity, but also over the municipal urban city
government as a mediating actor, complicit ally, target, or oppositional force in real estate
speculation. The City of East Palo Alto ultimately strengthened its rent control policies
and enforcement, passing a new ordinance in direct retort to Page Mill’s slew of costly
lawsuits meant to weaken city control over its regulation of rental housing.
The Page Mill portfolio also sheds light on another state-based actor commonly
involved in the private equity and private real estate fund corporate model: institutional
public-sector pension funds as limited partners. In this case the East Palo Alto speculative
venture was financed indirectly by the state through California’s public worker pension
funds. Notably, several tenant leaders, city officials, and pertinent judges reviewing Page
Mill lawsuits against the City of East Palo Alto were contributors to the very same
pension fund invested in this specific Page Mill gamble. These complexities challenged
tenants to consider their housing security through the organization of economy and state

distinct from Hall’s useful definition of government: the machinery of the state (McLennan, Held, & Hall,
1984).
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at multiple and embedded scales within and beyond the micro politics of individual
grievances or building-based landlordism.
As this study details, tenants pursued the California Public Employees Retirement
System (CalPERS) based on the tenants’ expanded power analysis of housing finance.
California advocates also exploited public information provisions regarding state
managed funds to win the release of more than two thousand pages of otherwise
proprietary documents pertinent to the Page Mill investment portfolio. Tenants’ and the
City of East Palo Alto’s efforts ultimately led to CalPERS ceasing any renewed
commitment to Page Mill, a contributing factor that pushed Page Mill into foreclosure,
and resulted in a $100 million loss for CalPERS.
This dissertation considers challenges and lessons for political actors who assert
their right to the city. The case study provides an example of the uneven practice of the
right to the city amidst the politics of increasing housing financialization and state signals
of retreat from rent protection. The analysis pays particular attention to the City of East
Palo Alto’s response to Page Mill through the city’s and tenants’ efforts to engage
CalPERS. In so doing, the case highlights how capital stakeholders may be made
vulnerable to tenant demands of the state, beginning at the leverage held by urban
claimants at the scale of the city and reaching to the regional and state political spheres.
The tenants’ efforts also led to initiatives by organized labor to scrutinize their
members’ pension investment options in CalPERS. Service Employees International
Union (SEIU) Local 521, a union that includes public service workers in California’s
Central Valley, worked in concert with tenant advocates in opposition to CalPERS’
investment in the Page Mill monopoly holding in East Palo Alto. The union subsequently
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worked together with tenants to spearhead a state legislative initiative to prevent
California public pension investment in “predatory” real estate. The local also created a
pension advisory committee to strengthen the union’s capacity to influence CalPERS
investments.
The “predatory” investment model called for creating short-term returns on what
for nearly half a century had required long term investment. Beginning in the early 2000s,
multiple rent-regulated residential portfolios were packaged as opportunistic investments
to high net worth individuals and pension fund institutional investors. An exemplary case,
the 2005 sale of NYC’s Stuyvesant Town Peter Cooper offers a similar case in-point:
CalPERS lost $500 million and CALSTERS, the California State Teachers Retirement
System, lost $100 million in that deal. CalPERS also invested in overleveraged rent
regulated multifamily complexes, Riverton Houses in Harlem and Parkmerced in San
Francisco. In New York City, the New York City Employees Retirement System
(NYCERS) and the New York State and Local Retirement System (NYSLRS)
additionally invested $85.9 million and $72.3 million, respectively, in predatory equity
purchases of five former publicly subsidized Mitchell Lama buildings (Pincus, 2007). In
fact, this dissertation research began in New York City before the study of the Page Mill
portfolio came into focus.
The dissertation raises the following questions pertinent to these various portfolio
examples, but which will be discussed through the specific details of the Page Mill
portfolio case study:

1. What is the relationship between the racialized valorization of land and housing
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and institutional investors’ risks and returns?

2. Under what conditions did opportunistic corporate landlordism become financed
by workers’ capital and the state?

3. What are the political vulnerabilities of the investment portfolio structure that
allowed renters to pry open ‘actually existing’ spaces of political leverage and
opposition?

Before presenting the dissertation framework and chapter sequence, the following
section explains how I arrived at the case of Page Mill in East Palo Alto, California. My
dissertation focus emerged following an exploration of the right to the city efforts and a
view of ‘predatory equity’ in New York City.

Research Background: Beginning at Home

This dissertation first began with an inquiry into the theory and practice of “right
to the city,” specifically the work of the U.S. anti-gentrification organizing alliance that
consciously borrows its very name from the work of the French social theorist Henri
Lefebvre, le droit a la ville (1996[1968]). I spent a year working as co-principal
investigator with Tony Samara, at that time Associate Professor at George Mason
University, conducting more than twenty interviews with U.S. Right to the City Alliance2

2

The translocal U.S. network of membership-based organizing groups that formed in 2007 in response to
gentrification and public housing demolition (See Samara, 2007).
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member organizers around questions of gentrification, criminalization/ incarceration, and
urban strategy in New York, New Orleans, San Francisco, and Washington, D.C. At the
same time I was deeply involved in the questions of right to the city at home.
When I embarked on my dissertation research, I was living in a rent-regulated
building slated for sale in Brooklyn, New York’s Bedford Stuyvesant neighborhood. For
my majority Black, community-minded, and active neighbors, the right to the city as a
right to inhabit and participate in the city and shape central city life, was not a given but a
demand, negotiation, and persistent struggle. In the year that led up to my building’s
eventual sale, speculators called on renters who were primarily seniors and harassed them
to take moving money or face their threats of building disrepair and eventual eviction,
which meant very possibly the loss of long-sustained kinships, and even destitution. The
agents dialing my neighbors represented prospective owners, not actual purchasers. The
brokers were testing the tenants’ responses. So did the broker who arrived with a fake
deed at one senior’s door saying he was the new owner and would she please let him into
her apartment. My neighbor laughed in his face. Deed or no deed, she knew her rights
and would not allow him in to size up her home.3
When the building did finally change hands, obtaining the name of the new owner
was a challenge. We wanted the name of the persons behind the limited liability
corporation who were responsible for sabotaging the boiler, cutting off the hot water, and
refusing to accept senior tenants’ rent. Eventually, we learned who was responsible when
seniors in the building successfully sued the management company for harassment and

3

A phone call to the management company that day confirmed there had not been a change in ownership,
and that the present owner had not appeared at the building.
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deferred maintenance. The “owner” was a fund of investors who had purchased the
building for a price incongruent with the rent-rolls at the time. We later learned the profit
model relied on tenant vacancy to subdivide family-sized apartments into single studios.
After interviewing housing organizers in Queens, New York, with a similar story
of what tenants were facing there, I decided to shift my research focus to investigating the
structure of speculation in what seemed to be a new rise of investor landlords. Unlike my
small building, however, in the Queens’ Vantage Realty example, the stakes were at a
mammoth scale of multiple rent- regulated buildings of thousands of units each bundled
into over-leveraged4 portfolios involving tens of thousands of residents at risk of
displacement. Vantage was a defining example of “predatory equity.”
“Predatory equity,” as housing advocates call it, refers to the marketization of rent
regulated housing through large pools of investment capital in overleveraged buildings
slated for debt exchange, securitization, and further investment. In the four years
preceding the 2007-2008 housing crash, predatory equity firms had purchased with
extraordinary sums of investment capital at least 100,000 rent-regulated units in New
York City alone, all positioned to force existing tenants to vacate their units in order to
raise rents through every means possible (Morgenson, 2008). Financing for these
purchases were based on the premise that the rent regulated units would be quickly

4

“Leverage,” a widely used concept that emerges describes all kinds of social, political and economic
relations, refers to using limited resources (in the case of real estate, borrowed capital) to maximize returns.
Over-leveraged is a relative term and refers to debt burden. The New York City Housing Preservation and
Development department began tracking over-leveraged NYC multifamily buildings in 2009 using the
criteria of debt load greater than seven times a property’s rent roll (Pincus, 2009). See Chapter 5 herein for
a discussion of this case’s measures of debt burden.
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vacated and converted to generate market rate rental income. In other words, the current
tenants would be pushed out.
Early on in my preliminary research on the role of pensions in these portfolios, I
was moved by an interview with a NYC public school teacher ready to retire, but with no
place in NYC to live in sight. Like any good teacher, she made every minute of her time
with me count. We met in Manhattan’s P.S. 3 library so I could interview her about the
private equity-backed firm that had purchased her building through her pension’s
investment in the City Investment Fund, a partner with investors Putnam LLC and Urban
America. She cut to the up-shot, “My pension made my apartment unaffordable”
(personal interview, June 19, 2012). In a confusing twist of obligation, the pension fund’s
mandate to make profits for its contributor-investors would seek to evict some of the
same investors and raise the rent for other NYC workers. Although this AfricanAmerican 30+ year public school teacher, the eldest member of P.S. 3’s faculty at the
time, was finally nearing retirement herself, she spent much of her free time in tenant
meetings and housing court.
For teachers in New York City, this use of their pension was at once tragedy and
farce that Marx could not have imagined. Years before this teacher’s career started in
1975, the public school teachers’ pension had bailed out the city and saved New York
from financial collapse. But 40 years later, there were few places the city had saved for
the teachers to call home. Rent stabilized apartments, and those once regulated by the
now-expired Mitchell Lama affordability program, were among the rental units that
remained precariously “affordable.” For this city worker who had lived in the same
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former Mitchell Lama apartment since 1987, rent was $2,400/month, half of what she
calculated Urban America Management planned to collect at market rent.
Indeed, millions of people in hundreds of thousands of families, including this
teacher and my neighbors, had remained in NYC during its “worst of times” due in part
to the opportunity of public sector employment available to people of color and state
regulated housing. Many of these same households in turn created value in the city
through their neighborhood activities and, in the case of this teacher, by educating NYC’s
future generations. In tightening housing markets like New York City, or the Bay area,
however, rent stabilization programs, including regulatory programs such as the New
York’s Mitchell Lama program, eventually became a source for and target of speculation.
In the example of investment by public pension funds in public sector workers’ housing,
it seemed as if the city had not only become entrepreneurial, the city was now eating (and
spitting out) its own.
My original research design focused on a range of organizing responses to
gentrification. After interviewing this teacher, and several more tenants in pensionfunded portfolios in downtown housing court, and in their homes uptown, in East New
York, and on Roosevelt Island, I decided instead to investigate the structuring of
speculation through the relationship of capital stakeholders and the state. I sought to
understand the role of the state as a historical development in creating racial capital
conditions of contemporary corporate landlordism, the role of the state in facilitating and
financing real estate predation, and the points of leverage vis-a-vis the political power of
the state, if any, for tenants to strategically invoke their right to the city.

9

At the time, in the years of the onset of the housing crisis, there were multiple
lines of strategy debated among housing justice organizers. One line of discussion was
around a strategic de-emphasis on the state. Some organizers from the national Right to
the City Alliance called for focus on the community-control of housing as the strategic
direction for organizing in the “new economy” and austerity politics. Leaders in Take
Back the Land, another prominent direct-action group responding to the housing crisis,
referred to this as the “third way” that provided an alternative to individual private access
to home ownership or to the public provision, or state rent regulation of housing. A few
housing justice organizers likewise referred to state-centered demands as a vestige of the
“old economy,” or industrial and state managerial economy, one in which the poor are at
the mercy of a pendulum of state supports.
Notwithstanding the call for alternative control structures, this dissertation
foregrounds questions of the state’s persistent role in both regulating affordability in the
case of rent control, and in structuring and investing in opportunities for real estate
speculation through the example of public pension funding of evictions. The study
reminds us that in addition to the regulatory political decision making of state
apparatuses, the state and workers’ contributions to public sector pensions make for
capital investment opportunity. An effective housing justice movement both engages with
the state and develops existing demonstration models of alternative control. These linked
strategies that create lived spaces of democratic participation and amplify voices of
possibility are the practice of the right to the city.

Methods and Sources

10

This dissertation foregoes my initial focus on New York City as my research site
and instead seized the opportunity to analyze the Page Mill portfolio in East Palo Alto,
California. The shift and opportunity was one of data access. The First Amendment
Coalition of California had obtained by court mandate the disclosure of thousands of
pages of pension fund documents pertinent to this predatory real estate portfolio, the Page
Mill fund. It was in my research of pension investment in NYC multifamily portfolios in
2012 that I came across this significant transparency win, which was an outcome of the
organizing of similarly situated tenants in California. The disclosure provides the public a
rare opportunity to examine decisions of individuals within institutions whose investment
strategies helped to shape the market conditions that led to the housing crisis.
This exceptional disclosure included emails between the Page Mill investment
partners, correspondence by tenants and the City of East Palo Alto to the investment
partners, and the Page Mill prospectus, or placement plan, which according to Page Mill
executives and investors, amounted to “trade-secrets.” The documentation offers a
window into the drama of large-scale institutional speculative investment in low-income
housing, including the lead-up to the Page Mill deal in the years prior to the completion
of their East Palo Alto portfolio. Terse email exchanges portend the fall of Page Mill,
which the internal Page Mill documents attribute to the tenants’ and the city’s disruptive
and obstructive plans by Page Mill executives to attract additional premium investors.
The focus of my analysis herein is the data obtained through the California
Public Employees Retirement System mandated document release. The release allowed
me to construct the ‘anatomy’ of the portfolio and the relationship of the fund to other
capital stakeholders, the city, and the state. It was through this transparency that a fuller
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understanding of the vulnerabilities of this portfolio could be made. The disclosure
allowed for a study that analyzed the files held by the fund’s largest limited partner
investor.
In addition to the primary source of the CalPERS release, this case study includes
a review of media coverage from 2004-2015 using the database Lexis Nexis, as well as
San Mateo County court findings, San Mateo Local Agency Formation Committee
reports, legislative hearing transcripts, CalPERS Investor Committee session transcripts
through use of the California Public Records Act and Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA), City of East Palo Alto Rent Stabilization and City Council meeting minutes, City
of East Palo Alto planning records, U.S. Census decennial and American Community
Survey data, Page Mill, Wachovia and Wells Fargo filings to the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission, CalPERS public pension investment annual reports, review of
tenant-led participatory action research, archival video interviews with city founders and
activists, and my own participant-observation. City incorporation documents and early
history sources were obtained during my visit to the archival collection at Stanford
University.
I also interviewed 23 subjects specific to the question of predatory equity
including five public officials and city administrators and two private equity investment
liaisons who provided background information of the industry. These interviews in East
Palo Alto and New York City were supplemental to my primary source for this
dissertation: the disclosure data. These interviews specific to predatory equity followed
20 additional interviews with housing justice organizers in the U.S. on the broader
question of renters’ rights and right to the city.

12

In my research I found no other case of public-pension investment in venture
capital funds involved in rent regulated real estate with data access to this level of detail.
In fact, venture capital funds, as I discuss in Chapter 5, are exempt from most public
reporting and disclosure otherwise typical of publicly traded funds. As I detail in Chapter
6, the particular arguments made by advocates for transparency in California
demonstrated that the public good outweighed the need for confidentiality. Also, the
CalPERS real estate asset class designation could not preclude a disclosure of the
financial terms of the investment. Following an analysis of the disclosure data, the
dissertation research brought me to East Palo Alto on four different research visits where
I gained access to local document collections and conducted the bulk of my interviews.
I also found the case study compelling because East Palo Alto was not New York
City, the latter a city that Marcuse (1999) calls in his survey of U.S. housing movements,
both “paradigmic and exceptional” (p. 71). Indeed, much of the U.S. journalistic,
advocacy (Morgenson, 2008; Waters and Bach, 2008; Bindrim, 2008; Brescia, 2010) and
subsequent scholarship (Fields, 2015; Fields and Uffer, 2016) on predatory equity in
multifamily housing has focused largely on New York City cases, albeit the role of public
pension funds investment in the NYC cases remains under-examined. The East Palo Alto
case allows for an understanding of corporate landlordism at a very different site and
scale: a sub/urban site and small municipality.
The doubling of suburban poverty in the country’s 100 largest metropolitan
regions between 2000-2010 (U.S. Census) suggests the rebounding effects of central city
gentrification and Black and immigrant suburbanization contrary to the traditional
sociological explanatory notions of ethnic succession. The police killing of Michael
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Brown, a young Black man in Ferguson, MS, is one example among many others that has
brought increased attention to the underlying conditions of the ex/sub/urban geography of
race, poverty, and inequality. The suburbanization of poverty places new demands on
fragmented municipalities to contend with shifting regional inequity. Moreover,
inequities of core versus periphery regions, and within hyper-capitalized regional nodes
such as Silicon Valley, raise the question of the right to the city in areas of capital
centrality outside the largest global cities. The case of East Palo Alto demonstrates the
path dependent but altered contours of financial expropriation, capital investment and
(re)development through the place-making of a small city in what has become a massive
regional economy.

Dissertation Framework

This case study of a corporate landlord in East Palo Alto exposes what several
critical scholars (see Chakravartty and Ferreira da Silva, 2012; Wyly, Moos, et. al 2009)
and I call “the logic of racial risk” in real estate. This mode of calculative risk has
involved both state abandonment and state intervention in shaping and enforcing the
racial dimensions of labor, land, and housing valuation. Contrary to the tenets of the
American Dream, or regional notions of California’s progressive liberalism, U.S. housing
markets are not race neutral, a point demonstrated in a vast body of research and street
level observation. Today’s politics of housing financialization must be understood
through an examination of how housing became a hyper-speculative market tied to debt,
one embedded in state sanctioned, racialized hierarchies of risk and obligation.
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The harnessing of public pension funds by venture capital firms to intervene in
state-regulated housing points to the common interests of labor and housing activists to
organize together in strategic opposition to accelerated financialization. On the one hand,
the confidence of investment firms and their ability to displace tenants by the thousands,
including public pension contributors, reflects the increased centrality of finance power.
On the other hand, overleveraged institutional investor purchases in areas with few
typical indicators of gentrification suggest an example of neoliberalism in crisis, “its
logic stretched beyond reason” (Dumenil and Lévy, 2011:126). If ever reasonable (as
opposed to rational) in risk and intent, the speculative creation of portfolios from working
class communities reflects a persistent settler modality of border-making and frontierprospecting.
Gentrification, what I call the racial property regime5 of neoliberalism in the U.S.,
emerges from and furthers the racialized uneven production of space. The resultant
fragmentation is of socio-political, material, and psychic consequence for Blacks and
Latinos in particular. Labor’s interests in urban processes as investor, producer, and
inhabitant, therefore, go well beyond an instrumentalist understanding of housing as a
component of workers’ wages. Urban contestations in the area of housing and in the fight
for the right to the city are part and parcel of labor’s decommodification. Whereas the
‘central contradiction’ of capitalism is the simultaneous growth of capital and growth of
inequality, this dissertation argues that the ‘central contradiction’ is not confined to a
singular strategic relational location, such as the work site. Rather, the ‘central
contradiction’ can be understood through the expansive relational dynamics of the city

5

Property regimes, for the purposes herein, refer to the economic, social and political relations that connect
people to the built environment and underlying land.

15

that acts at once as work site, material product, home, and future financial portfolio
through which productive capital also flows.
In this dissertation’s example of an over-leveraged, hyper-financialized portfolio
comprised of what East Palo Altans called their homes, the renters and their city fought
back. The dissertation maps the corporate structure of the portfolio, and provides a
specific view of the points of vulnerability in the structuring of speculation. The lessons
of this case demonstrate areas of strategic interest and alignment for labor and
community. By extension, the ongoing renters’ crisis calls for collective, expansive,
compassionful, radical imagination, and coalitional strategy for the right to the city as
fundamental to the decommodification of personhood, labor, and home.

Dissertation Structure

The dissertation is divided into three sections after the literature review, Control,
Decontrol and Recontrol. These terms also refer to the stages of rent regulation,
deregulation, and re-regulation based on occupancy and vacancy of rent-controlled units
in California post the states anti-rent control Costa-Hawkins Act of 1995. In broad
strokes, I borrow these terms as reflective of the processes of people-centered placemaking of East Palo Alto.

Control: Early History & Making A City
The case study begins with a depiction of the socio and political landscape of East
Palo Alto through a broad historical accounting of the racialization processes that are
constitutive of East Palo Alto’s development into cityhood. Chapter 3 demonstrates the
16

historical context to my claim that racial discourses and ideology tied to home, land, and
security contribute to the impetus, consequences, and responses involved in calculations
of urban land value. The historical overview section foregrounds how land and housing
speculation, and the ongoing rental housing crisis, have been embedded in the social
historical relationship of race and risk in the United States context.
It is important to situate this case through the iteration of race, space, and placemaking to put into view the relationship of the East Palo Alto urban scale to regionally
situated class and racial inequities. The fact that East Palo Alto had yet to follow in the
footprint of Silicon Valley’s hyper-gentrification resulted from a particular regional
history of race and housing that while reflecting the contours of national and state policy
was site particular and contingent. This history includes the organized responses of East
Palo Alto African-American and Latino residents to assert voice in San Mateo County
and to practice community control within their claimed city.
As East Palo Alto’s former mayor Carlos Romero and Rent Stabilization Board
member William Webster are quick to point out, the city’s very founding in 1988 was
based on a campaign by Black and Latino residents for rent-control. The City of East
Palo Alto’s founding assumed a right to the city, and its rent control ordinance, initially
considered to be one of the strongest in California, emphasized the related “right to stay
put” (Hartman, 1984) in an increasingly prosperous economic region.

Decontrol: Gambling on the City, Making a Portfolio out of East Palo Alto
Since the 1970s, capital innovation across U.S. primary cities followed the
contours of redlining to predatory lending, sweat equity to predatory equity and mass

17

devaluation by state disinvestment to revaluation and extraction for private enterprise,
notably in this case of a “predatory equity” deal via labor’s own capital. Chapter 4
presents the tenants’ experiences of Page Mill that catalyzed their mobilization. Tenants
explain how the venture capital firm assessed and invested in Black and Latino renters’
communities in East Palo Alto. Their investment prospecting reflected a racialized
rationale that framed gentrification as a contribution, rather than extractive liability, to the
development of East Palo Alto. Chapter 5 of the dissertation analysis takes a step back
from the impact of speculation on renters to demonstrate how the financial calculations
were premised on debt, profits from fees, and the large scale and high speed of capital
exchange.
In the period of Page Mill’s holding of the portfolio, the speculative investment
threatened the near complete loss of the city’s regulated rental units and the displacement
of thousands of residents. Ultimately, the tenants and city would bear the burdens of Page
Mill’s opportunistic investment. Arguably, the greatest risks were incurred not by
investors but by tenants with very little money but an entire community to lose, as well as
by a strapped city government desperate for “development” revenue, but with the very
principle of the city’s founding at stake.

Recontrol: Political Vulnerabilities & a Right to the City
The tenants’ and city officials’ response to Page Mill’s monopolistic and
speculative investment just two decades following cityhood spurred renewed demands for
the right to the city and community control. The investment shaped a critical juncture in
the city’s development plans. The city, state, the limited partner CalPERS, and the lender
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Wells Fargo were all political mediators and capital stakeholders in the making and
unmaking of the portfolio.
Chapter 6 analyzes the vulnerabilities of this portfolio’s structuring of speculation
and the stakeholders’ leverage using a framework borrowed from labor’s strategic
corporate research comprehensive campaigns. Chapter 7 concludes with a discussion of
right to the city as an organizing framework that by definition emphasizes the urban scale
of popular power. The conclusion considers more recent lessons from this specific case in
relationship to other renter organizing efforts in the Bay Area region, as well as for
broader urban movements. At a time of ongoing and increasing crisis for renters and
workers, the study concludes by suggesting the prospects for labor and community
coalitional politics behind a transformative scale-able land and housing agenda that at
once emphasizes racial justice, community/worker control, and redefines current
measures of home and land security.
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Chapter 2. Literature Review
Chapter Introduction

This section presents the scholarship in which I situate my case analysis. To
begin, I honor Neil Smith who advised me to “start this dissertation with Engels.” Smith
was right for pointing me to the political economy of the city. Engels’s writing on
housing, from his journalistic description of industrial Manchester to his polemical
intervention in socialist strategy, offers a touchstone for debate over sites, expression, and
embodiment of class struggle. Engels draws boundaries between strategic sites of
struggle of home and work, while also drawing conclusions that blur these distinctions in
the every day lives of the working class. This dissertation departs from such a binary
between community and work to argue that the collective production of urban space by
the city’s inhabitants (and by the worker-investor-renter) demands a more expansive and
complex view of struggle and possibility.
The review begins with several works in the Marxist tradition from Engels to
Harvey, Lefebvre, and Smith to outline the geography of capital, class formation, and
class struggle. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, Smith’s theorizing of gentrification was
influential to my own work in neighborhood-based organizing for housing rights and
equitable development in Washington, D.C.6 It was in part through Smith that I came to
understand the stakes of my organizing work not as housing per se but as the city, and the
city as the scene (to borrow Lefebvre) and the stakes of neoliberal economic restructuring

6

The colonial arrangement of Congressional oversight of the District of Columbia made this city early
testing ground and a place of contestation around the “roll-backs” and “roll-outs” of neoliberal projects (i.e.
charter schools, vouchers).
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in the U.S. My review of the literature on gentrification and financialization orbit Smith’s
early-work that links the housing market, the economy, with policy, the state. The irony
of neo-liberalism as an ideology that espouses market freedom, to echo many before me,
is the state intervention that allows for market dominance.
I posit, and then disrupt, this literature in political economy to emphasize the
framework of racial capitalism that shapes my inquiry into the historical development of
East Palo Alto. This literature also shapes my understanding of gentrification, what I call
the present racial property regime in U.S. cities of capital centrality. The historical
context of land and housing in the U.S. demonstrates how housing became a racial, social
and ideological signifier and organizer of value. I engage the work of Robinson (1983)
and Hall (1980) specifically as well as Chakarvetty and Ferreira da Silva (2012), and
MccIntrick and Woods (2007) for their clarity in creating and demanding complexity and
praxis. My presentation of the racial valorization of land and housing in the subsequent
chapter extends from these frameworks. I am also indebted to Piven & Cloward’s (1967)
provocative programmatic papers that bring to the fore questions of Black urban electoral
and disruptive power. I point to the work of Pulido (2000), Gilmore (2007), and powell
(2009) for their regional frameworks, and Geronimus and Thompson (2004), Fullilove
(2001; 2011), and de Oliver (2015) for their attention to the social, cultural, and psychic
effects of dislocation and displacement.
The literature review then raises questions of ‘actually existing’ spaces of social
contestation in the neo-liberal city. I examine sociological notions of social movements
and tenancy. I consider the power analysis tools of labor’s corporate campaigns as useful
for tenant organizing efforts examining the financialized portfolios of housing investors. I

21

conclude the literature review by returning to Lefebvre’s (1996 [1968]) formulation of
the right to the city that shifts political centrality to the otherwise dispossessed and
appropriated. It is the necessary collective ‘call and demand’ for the right to the city to
participate in the democratic decision-creative-making processes of the city, as the right
to place (Samara, 2014) and to place-making, as a right to the city where “Black Lives
Matter”— that provides the premise and perspective for this dissertation’s study.

The Question of Housing

When Engels wrote the essay The Housing Question in 1872, German cities faced
a severe housing shortage and the working class masses experienced little if any reprieve
in their daily lives between the miserable conditions of home and work. Engels wrote his
essay in part to counter a socialist assertion that the relationship of the tenant and
landlord is akin to the worker and capitalist; Marx and Engels strongly disagreed with
this analogy. Engels argued that whereas the concentration of both private property and
proletariats in cities is a contingent factor for proletariat insurgency against capitalism,
the issues of slum dwellings, slum clearances (ie. Haussmann forms of urban renewal in
Paris), and workers’ rental versus ownership of housing were symptoms of capitalism
rather than axes, or levers, for social change.
Throughout the essay Engels pointed to the terrible conditions of workers’
housing as not only a secondary but also a necessary evil that would help cohere class
polarization and militancy. Attention to housing or other social issues within the city did
not impact the central contradiction between labor and capital; therefore, Engels stated,
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any successful struggle to improve the conditions of poor workers in the city would only
force the same terrible conditions to emerge in another area of the city. In this way, the
essay privileges struggle at the site of production over struggle focused on the conditions
of everyday life, or social reproduction. Engels’ polemic raises the strategic question of
connectedness and dissonance between the housing crisis for the working class and the
conditions of their labor at work.
A century later, Harvey (1978) speaks directly to this “housing question” raised
by Engels in his study of capital circuits. Harvey first focuses on a strategic question for
class struggle: how accumulation provides the means for the capitalist class to reproduce
itself and how over-accumulation results in crisis. He specifically elaborates on Marx’s
discussion of the primary circuits of investment (production) and secondary circuits (the
built environment for production and for consumption). Harvey demonstrates how the
movement of capital to other circuits, including what he calls the tertiary circuit
(knowledge production, sciences, technology, education, etc.) mitigates crises of over
accumulation in the primary circuit. The secondary and tertiary circuits are constitutive of
the reproduction of the primary circuit, but remain distinct.
There are multiple contradictions that arise in the flow of capital to the secondary
circuit of the built environment pertinent to the housing question. For example,
devaluation of the built environment precedes its revalorization (“creative destruction”).
Harvey draws attention to the state in this process, which he says plays a mediating role
between the primary and secondary circuits. The state also helps to guarantee profitability
in the secondary circuit by making available “fictive capital” through credit. This last
point was important in Harvey’s perceptive analysis of the secondary circuit as a
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potentially expansive terrain for finance. At the time of his publication, the bricks and
mortar of the illiquid secondary circuit required much more time to generate profits
compared with surplus extraction through the direct appropriation of labor in the primary
circuit. Harvey ultimately argues that class struggle must be as expansive as the realms
upon which capital relies for absorbing crises of accumulation.
In this way Harvey complicates the housing question by pointing out that issues
of housing or social reproduction more broadly can serve as either an “antidote” or
“springboard” for class struggle. Harvey did not anticipate the securitization of
residential housing debt and the opportunity to conquer time through the space of the
built environment, so that all that is solid melts to liquidity. Yet he provides a framework
for considering the potential expansion of the finance economy through urban processes,
and specifically in the concentration of capital in the built environment. Instead,
Lefebvre provides a provocative call to consider the city itself as not simply a circuit but
a means of capital accumulation.
Harvey’s work on capital circuits followed the tumultuous years of the 1960s
when key Marxist theorists turned their attention from conflict at sites of production to
contestation over everyday life and the city. Partly as a response to the quick dissolution
of student struggles in France due to capitalism’s pervasive presence and recuperative
capacities in everyday life, and partly as a rejection of the homogeneous character of
urbanism under socialism, Lefebvre (1996 [1968]; 1970) came to recognize urban
subjectivity and social questions as strategically important to class struggle. Following
Marx, Lefebvre also engages questions of over-accumulation pointing out that industry is
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the primary circuit of capital, and the built environment of land and infrastructure acts as
a secondary circuit.
Unlike Marx, or Harvey’s work, however, Lefebvre (1970) theorized that these
circuits would eventually blur in the production of surplus value. Lefebvre goes much
further than Harvey’s distillation by declaring a dialectic, or opposition, between
industrialization and urbanization. Lefebvre imagined the city as ultimately the means of
production itself and anticipated increasing class conflict over urban space. Urbanization,
and the domination and commodification of fused social and physical space by capital,
would become the central contradiction according to Lefebvre. In this way Lefebvre
reframed the site of class struggle outside the walls of the factory and into the city.
Much of the later seminal research on the rise of neoliberal urbanism in the US
and UK context, specifically, demonstrates the heightened urban contradictions to which
Lefebvre’s larger body of work alluded: an increased centrality of power that widens
division of classes despite greater integration of world economies, communication, and
people. A primary expression of neoliberal urbanism in the finance-nodes of global cities
(Sassen, 1991) is gentrification (Smith, 2002).

Gentrification and Uneven Development
Smith (1984) explains that uneven development is the capital organization of
spatial inequity. Smith’s work conceptualizes how urban space becomes both
homogenized and differentiated for exchange value and speculation as a function of
capitalism within the limits of capital in a finite planet. Gentrification is an expression of
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uneven development and the tendency of urban disinvestment and investment cycles to
(re)create opportunities for capital movement and expansion.
Gentrification, in shorthand, conflates all aspects of the exploitation and
(neo)colonization of the urban terrain for exchange value by its wealthier residents,
government authorities, and enterprises whether local or global, resulting in the
displacement, or serial displacement of those who preceded fixed investment. As distilled
by Marcuse (2016) gentrification can involve “economic upgrading: up-pricing; physical
upgrading: redevelopment; and social upgrading: upscaling” but all, for the purposes of
the very definition of gentrification, lead to displacement of lower income residents (p.
2). There is no gentrification without displacement.
A heaving trove of scholarship on gentrification, including Marcuse’s, provides a
range of perspectives that extend from or contrast Smith’s early work on uneven
development, and specifically Smith’s (1979) “rent gap” theory of gentrification as a
causal explanation of the movement of capital to urban centers in the U.K. and U.S.
These works include demand-side explanations (Ley, 1994) and related debates over the
social, cultural, political and geographic impacts, drivers, and, more recently, conceptual
relevance of the term gentrification (Sumka, 1979, Hartman, 1979; Zukin, 1982; Zukin,
1987; Marcuse, Smith and Williams 1986; Vigdor, Massey, Rivlin 2002; Slater, 2008;
Lees, Slater, Wyly 2013).
Smith remains particularly relevant to this case study for contributing a
compelling theoretical framework to gentrification studies by linking urban change to
neoliberalism (see 2002). Neoliberalism refers to the subjection of all social value to
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market fundamentalist logic, much as in the fusing Lefebvre (1970) describes (albeit if
not resulting in the production of surplus value).
Federal urban disinvestment and privatization spurred a shift in urban governing
from the managerial to the entrepreneurial (Harvey, 1978). The most enduring wave of
gentrification in the US since the 1990s, Hackworth and Smith (2001) demonstrate, was
brought about by the agency of government in expanding gentrification to a generalized
scale. Smith contends that development for the middle and upper middle class in
previously lower income neighborhoods has become part of an international strategy
forging private investment with public policy (see, for example, World Bank [1993]
report on how governments could enable finance take over of housing markets in Rolnik
[2013]).
In his case study of New York’s Lower East Side, Smith (1996) identifies state
disciplining and stripping policies that ushered in gentrification. He describes the punitive
policies of zero tolerance policing, anti-squatting, and welfare controls as part of the
right-wing revenge, or revanchist take-back of the city following the gains of the civil
rights movement of the 1960s. Whether an orchestrated “take-back” as Smith describes,
or a spatial fix for capital surplus demonstrated by Gilmore (2007), criminalization and
mass incarceration surged in the 1970s and coincided with the dove-tail processes of
urban disinvestment and gentrification. In recent ground-breaking scholarship on
eviction, Desmond (2016) claims that mass incarceration for Black men is analogous in
prevalence as evictions are for Black women in their experiences of serial displacement.
These processes of encagement and displacement are both formative and symptomatic of
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homes as places of “organized abandonment,” referred to by Harvey (1989) then Gilmore
(2008) to explain the development of under-development that prequils gentrification.
By the early 2000s, in the wake of an enabled housing market of softened state
regulations, housing advocates in New York City and rent regulated municipalities in
California came to recognize a surge of major capital investment in multifamily rent
regulated housing, which they came to call “predatory equity”. Displacement via
gentrification was nothing new, but mass-buy ups and evictions in large residential rent
protected properties exemplified an opportunity for the expansion of gentrification.
Epitomizing the contradictions at the epicenter of the housing crisis, and in stark contrast
to Glass’s (1964) first conceptualization of gentrification as a phenomenon of individual
homesteaders, predatory equity relies on the displacement of tenants, en masse, from
properties ostensibly protected by the state from full market exposure. This capital
prospecting in rental housing invests in short-term financial extraction and circulated,
socialized risk.

The Accumulation of Homes
In 2007/2008 when the collapse of the housing market became clear and
widespread, a growing number of scholars turned to the built environment to grapple with
how to explain the expansion of market financialization post-1970s. Krippner, an
economic sociologist, was among the first to take an empirical assessment of the growth
of the finance industry before the collapse, and to consider the 1980s political context in
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which this market grew. Krippner (2005) refers to financialization7 as “a pattern of
accumulation in which profit-making occurs through financial channels rather than
through trade and commodity production” (p. 181). Financial channels capture the
movement required of capital, and as a result the financial industry (FIRE) profits, in part
through collecting fees (Krippner, 2005; Aalbers, 2008; Aalbers, 2009).
Krippner’s work establishing the long-term developments that led to the existing
upsurge of the financial industry demonstrates that financialization relies in part on the
valorization of real assets on which to deploy financial innovations over time. In the
realm of real estate, the portfolio (and related derivatives) becomes a financial channel to
realize investment returns in an expansive economy. Returns along with profits from fees
represent financial capital, or the non-productive income off the movement of economic
and financial capital through assets, investment, and banking institutions. In the scope of
financialization channels, short-term liquidity opportunities trumped long term equity
realization.
Economist Minsky (1988) in broader strokes also named this shift: “a new money
capitalism is challenging the dominance of managerial- welfare state capitalism:
managers of money are replacing managers of industry as the leading players in the
economy” (p. 5).8 Money managers, Minsky asserted, have come to rely on the financial

7

Aalbers (2015) points out the slipperiness of this term, as both “the explanandum (the phenomenon to be
explained), and explanans (the thing that explains)” (p.2). For further reading on the production of the
rentier class, and a broader view of the historical development of capitalism in relationship to
financialization— by definition an historical process and therefore changing dimension of economy— see
Arrighi (1994) and Montagne in Erturk and Gabor, eds. (2017, forthcoming). See French, Leyshon and
Wainwright (2011) for their critique of the disjuncture of financialization from spatial analysis, and their
analysis of financialization as spatial-temporal fix.
8

For an historical overview of the arc of managerial capitalism from 1920s to present day, involving the
rise of shareholders over owners, and concurrent rise of managerial compensation, see Englander and
Kaufman (2004).

29

industry for employment and profits at exchange points that were made profitable
regardless of final returns. Indeed, this became the case as reported by the New York
Times study of how the U.S. top ten public pension funds provided $17 billion in
“management” fees alone to private equity funds between 2000-2010 (Anderson, 2010).
The agents or drivers of finance help to reveal the intermediaries who control, as agents
of finance, the institutional structures of finance, not as causal figures but as movers and
contributors of the structuring of financializaiton.
Whereas “managerial capitalism” signified the shift from corporate ownership
control (i.e. traditional family firms) to intermediariy control, “shareholder capitalism”
refers to the increased primacy of the investor in debates over corporate governance and
control (Gelter, 2013). This shift to shareholder primacy is a far call from the idea of
“pension fund socialism,” which was coined by economic sociologist Drucker (1976).
Drucker asserted that workers ostensibly control U.S. equities, or publicly traded
companies, production, and the economy through their pension fund investments. Indeed,
over the last 30 years unions have pursued shareholder activism instead as a way to
expand returns to the middle class despite labor’s weakening position in relationship to
employers, a weakening position that is due in part to the dispossession of workers in the
prospecting for greatest returns.
Pension funds at the time of Drucker’s assertion had received increasing attention
including regulation through the national Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 (ERISA). ERISA, notably, mandated private funds to make their ultimate fiduciary
responsibilities to the market as much as to their contributors by making the highest
returns, the primary function of pension investment. Despite the diminishing number of
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traditional employer-based defined benefit funds, which since the 1970s have dwindled in
favor of the private sector’s investment in 401ks, institutional pension funds continued
largely through the survival of public sector unions. Public sector funds gained traction in
the total share of funds when private sector unions began to lose numbers in the 1970s
and 1980s (see for example accounts of union falls in Bronfennbrenner 1998: 262).
Notwithstanding deunionization, Drucker was right to suggest that pension
investment is labor’s capital. Moreover, he predicted the rise of U.S. pension funds’ role
in the economy, which from his writing to the time of the housing crash involved asset
growth from $871 billion in 1980 to $11.3 trillion in 2007, including $196 billion to $3.1
trillion for state and local pension funds for those same years (Tonello and Rabimov,
2010:7). Rather than “socialism,” however, “pension fund capitalism” gained more
traction in the literature as an optic for understanding the rising role of pension fund
institutional investors, including both defined contributions (individual) and defined
benefit fund (private and public employer-based), in shaping global financial markets
(Clark, 2000; Clark and Hebbs, 2004; Aalbers, 2008; Duménil and Lévy, 2006).
Still, there was growing optimism in the potential of pension funds to align with
corporate responsibility (CSR) and socially responsible investment indices (SRI) for
social effect.9 CalPERS leading activist role in the late 1980s of demanding transparency
and accountability in corporate governance in public equities had raised expectations
around the potential of funds’ to be socially responsive in their investments (Hebbs,
2008). Indeed, CalPERS often pursues shareholder resolutiosn targeting large

9

Haigh and Hazeleton (2004) find the composition of SRI and not SRI funds nearly indistinguishable
despite the proliferation of SRI funds since 1993; also, per social effects, they find weak outcomes of SRI
given the greater systemic issues of a deregulated market.
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corporations, albeit with very limited success. In 2002 the first shareholder resolution
requested by a public pension fund in the U.S. was passed involving employment antidiscrimination provisions based on sexual orientation for a publicly listed company
(Haigen and Hazleton 2004:60). Also, in 2000, CalPERS announced the fund would
divest from tobacco. Moreover, public pension funds’ targeted urban investment
programs were seen as a net positive by those promoting social responsibility (See
Chapter 6 for overview of CalPERS example of the California CURE program); there
was little scrutiny by scholars of pension fund intermediaries and the implications of
neighborhood gentrification by pension fund investment despite modest affordable
housing financing (See examples Hagerman, Clark, Hebb, 2005; Hebb and Sharma,
2014).
More recent post-Great Recession attention to pension funds raises the most basic
questions of austerity politics and pension viability around pensions’ two essential goals,
(1) affordability for employers, workers, and taxpayers and (2) guarantees of anticipated
retiree payment (Ambachtsheer, 2012). There is also continued attention in the literature
to the effect of pension funds’ activism and governance structure in light of financial
crises (Clark and Urwin, 2010 Domohoff, 2013). The greater the vulnerability of
pensions to maintaining state support, the more distant pension fund socialism becomes
as experiment or prospect. The higher the yields required and expected for contributor
benefits, the greater leverage to be expected, and greater concentration, rather than
redistribution, of corporate capital.
Lapavitsas (2009) also reflects on pension contributions in his work on the
financialization of every day life through what he calls the expropriation of household
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income for financial assets. For example, the potential for pension fund investment in
overleveraged residential real estate increased with the expansion of the financial market,
and vice versa (Rolnik, 2013). Investors in subprime securities, for one, replaced the
traditional slumlord, albeit by establishing debt tenancy in single-family housing based
on the illusion of “ownership” (Sassen, 2009). Lenders found profitability in upfront fees
and investors gambled for returns on exchanges in the secondary market. Whereas this
trend has been well documented, less attention has been given to the rise of investment in
multifamily rental housing (see discussion of opportunity potential by Dipasquale and
Cummings 1992; and New York City examples by Teresa, 2015; and a New York City
and Berlin comparative discussion by Fields and Uffer, 2016).
It was not until the decade before the housing crash that multifamily rental
housing became attractive to large investors. The dramatic reduction of interest rates in
1993 followed by interest rate reductions in 2000 and after 9/11, increased the availability
of finance capital for placement (see herein Chapter 5). An investment conducive-politics
of softening rent regulation in key states (see discussion of CA example in Chapter 3)
increased the profitability for investment in multifamily rentals. Moreover, investment in
even low-demand or lower rent-yield multifamily portfolios presented opportunity for
cheap credit as cash. In this disjuncture from real estate primers, location simply isn’t
‘everything’, cash flow is (Linneman, 2004 in Fields and Uffer, 2016). Investors also
turned to the promising commercial backed mortgage security market, which became
widely available for multifamily properties beginning in the mid-1990s. The securities
market created a surge of investment interest that during the peak years of the housing
bubble (2005-2007) allowed for tremendous cash flow, including capital liquidity at
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$17.6 billion a year (National Multifamily Housing Council, 2015). At the time of the
housing crash in 2007, the Federal Reserve reported mortgage debt outstanding for
multifamily residences amounted to $798 billion, up nearly double from $402 billion in
200010 (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, n.d.).
This dissertation elaborates upon this line of inquiry through an examination into
the expropriation of homes: Black and Latino/a homes became investment vehicles,
remade into real asset portfolios financed in part by workers’ contributions towards and
desires for living out an old age. This case seeks to extend upon this literature to further
understand how the financialization of household inhabitance (whether ownership, rental,
single and multifamily housing) and futures (pensions) reflected calculations of risks and
returns embedded in the historical and institutional racial valorization of land and people.

The Racial Logic of Capitalism

The case of East Palo Alto reveals racial disparity as not only outcome of class
disparity, but race as a mode of land and housing organization and value. Political
scientist Cedric Robinson (1983) was among the first American scholars to distill the
historical development of capitalism as racial capitalism, in what he calls
“counterdistinction” to the Marx and Engels’ assumption of an eventual rationalization of
social relations (2). Robinson explains the inextricable relationship of race and capital as
an historical phenomenon:
The development, organization, and expansion of capitalist society pursued
essentially racial directions, so too did social ideology. As a material force then, it
10

Multifamily residences refer to holdings with five or more units. Mortgage debt outstanding for
multifamily units reported here for all holders for last quarter of year reported.
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could be expected that racialism would inevitably permeate the social structures
emergent from capitalism. I have used the term ‘racial capitalism’ to refer to this
development and to the subsequent structure as a historical agency. (Ibid.)
As such, race is an historical phenomenon (Omni and Winant, 1994; Bonilla-Silva, 2006)
constructed as if naturalized within relational (Kim, 1999), commodified valorization of
peoples (Harris, 1993) and through negation (Rediker, 2007; Robinson, 1983). Race, in
these terms, is not simply a signifier, but an organizing principle of primitive
accumulation and advanced capitalism.
Cultural critic and sociologist Stuart Hall likewise raises a central political
concern of the relations through which race unevenly “fractures,” or “expresses,” class
struggle. Hall (1980) opposes conceiving race in formulations of totalities, transhistorical
processes, universal applications, human nature (he deftly calls this one an “alibi”),
individual psychological terms, and economic reductivism, which are related to
naturalizing and teleological (inherently racist) explanations for how and why race works
and what racism accomplishes. This conception draws upon Althusser’s framework of
“articulations” to intervene in the dominant logic/s of economic versus sociological
explanations. Hall argues the interconnectedness of historical moment, geography,
politics, ideology, and economic relations (modes of production) in theorizing how
differences and racisms may become specifically and distinctively assembled. This
counters the notion of economics (“base”) as prescriptive of social formations and
hierarchies.
Hall turns to Gramsci’s work on ideology to examine how modes of production
structured in domination have relied on hegemonic processes stating: “Race is…the
modality through which class is lived” (p. 341). Racisms, while not necessary for
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capitalism, Hall posits, have served in “different degree and form.” The implications of
this modality are multiple: centrally, while race functions in structures of domination, it is
through anti-racism struggle that class struggle may be simultaneously waged.
More recent work draws from these and other perspectives to engage in race and
human geography. McKittrick and Woods (2007) in their edited volume Black
Geographies invoke Fanon (1961) to present an expansive view of the relationship
between race, space, and place-making: “racialized production of space is made possible
in the explicit demarcations of the space of les damnés as invisible/forgettable at the same
time as the invisible/forgettable is producing space— always, and in all sorts of ways” (p.
7). The social value of place-making, the very bodies of the place-makers, may be
invisible, unknown, abandoned (“unescaped” in the case of Katrina), they explain. Yet
the people who have been hitherto unseen may be excavated in metaphorical and material
understandings of resistance and the “histories of the everyday” (p. 7). Their framing
essay raises a central tension between socially contested place-making versus placeclaiming, the latter what they consider a reproduction of a hegemonic ownership logic
that can portend another’s displacement or invisibility.
Chakravarrty and Ferreira da Silva (2012) remind us that the financial regime in
which the housing crisis occurred was embedded in what they call a “logic” of racial risk
and colonial and imperial architecture of debt (see also Graeber, 2011). Their work draws
comparisons between the debt obligations of the postcolonial nations and the targeting of
U.S. Blacks and Latino/as in subprime lending, which widened indebtedness in the U.S.
Coates (2014), in a highly acclaimed and provocative essay published in The Atlantic,
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tied the racial valorization of land and housing in the U.S. to intergenerational life
chances and as a basis of his case for Black reparations.
The focus of these works on segregation, debt as servitude, and risk for individual
homeowners remains applicable to renters and the overleveraging of portfolios by
instiutional investors. Most relevant is the point made in these works of who is deemed
immoral, and who is not, for failing to realize an impossible debt obligation, which in
turn exposes the neoliberal “post racial” fallacy. By extension, in the case of the
predatory overleveraged multifamily portfolio, the risks are passed onto the renters where
deferred maintenance results from debt service and low rent yields, where evictions are
profitable, where renters are disposable and exchangeable until the financial asset, the
building, their homes, can be exchanged for returns. Speculative investor landlords are
akin to predatory lenders by blaming renters for their poverty while targeting them for
their poverty and potential for turn-over, or financial expropriation.
Several scholars on the racial production of space draw attention to the regional
interdependence, or racial capital investment in the U.S. metropolis. Pulido’s (2000)
study of the regional dimensions of environmental sitings and Gilmore’s (2007) attention
to regional scale for understanding criminalizaton and incarceration both demonstrate the
center / periphery spatial racial and economic arrangements (see also Smith’s [1992]
work on scale) that undergird the context of the city, suburban, exurban, rural regional
divides and scales. Powell (2009) for one, in departure from much of the U.S. right to the
city organizing emphasis, calls for a regional, metropolitan equity framework to counter
the dispossession of minority populations in cities. Like many strategic organizers,
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however, powell views Black dispossession in cities as directly and historically linked to
the postwar accumulation of opportunity for white populations in suburbs.
The “knots” to borrow from Pruitt (2011) of what Harvey (2005) calls
“accumulation by dispossession” (p. 137), are tightly twisted in processes of
gentrification, in both means and outcome. The number of people displaced in and
following the wave of gentrification in the late 1990s in the U.S. surpasses the number of
those displaced through urban renewal (Smith 2002). Fullilove (2001; 2009) underscores
the psychic trauma that has been understood as the consequences of past mass urban
renewal and parallels to experiences of displacement by gentrification. Homogenization
and reconcentration of poverty are highly visible outcomes of advanced gentrification
(Lees et al., 2008) that mask the individualized experiences of displacement. In this same
vein, Geronimus and Thompson (2004) argue for the importance of cultural explanations
in combination with economic analysis for grasping the “psychic costs” and “weathering”
of people who experience alienation and racism in community fragmentation and
dispersal based on mixed-income social engineering initiaitives.
Piven and Cloward (1968 [1967]) warned that the Civil Rights liberal quest for
integration was a mistaken strategy for that moment and in the realm of housing in
particular. At that time a massive return of whites to central city “ghettos,” and dispersal
of poor urban Blacks to suburbia would be required for such an ideal. The call for
desegregation, they asserted, masked the enduring and urgent need for better housing for
the Black urban poor now and where they lived (p. 185-187). This was not support for
segregation but rather a call for Black control over their housing and support for the
Black Power movement’s aims, which Tyner (2007) later explains as a radical spatial
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move from segregation to “collective separatism” (p. 227). Programmatic aims for
integration in housing, moreover, Piven and Cloward explained, could result in political
mollification due to diffusion and dispersal of Black votes at a time of strategic
possibility for Black political control in cities. For this and other reasons pertinent to
Black political power, they also viewed proposals for metropolitan integration with
caution.
Integration as a project of the Civil Rights era became, by some, conceptually
recuperated as cover for privatization and “ethnic” culture a commodity for
consumption.11 The integration of neighborhoods during early-stage gentrification has
been used as an argument for gentrification. Diversity based on cultural displacement in
early-stage gentrification in U.S. cities is an inverted shift from what de Oliver (2016)
explains in his staged model of multiculturalism as “a social justice ethic to a middleclass amenity,” an act, he borrows from hooks, of “’Eating the Other’” (p. 1299-1300).
Indeed, the prospect of “diversity” in multicultural neighborhoods, often in gentrification
transition, is sold as appeal to individual white consumers who at the same time displace
people of color (Smith, 1996).

The Neoliberal Subject & Urban Contestation

Whereas Hall (1980) engages with Gramsci (2010) to explain the work of racial
ideology, Foucault’s (1994) concept of governmentality provides another way of making

11

This is apparent in the stripping of basic funds to maintain public housing and the destruction of public
housing in favor of privatization and gentrification, and in the name of poverty de-concentration (Lees, et.
al., 2008).
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sense of the complicity of racial ideology cojoined to the policies and institutional project
of neoliberalism. As an analytic framework, governmentality illuminates the historical
processes through which individuals play an essential role in governing themselves in
part through the notions of personal responsibility within an historical racial
pathologizing of the moralized poor. Foucault refers to governmentality as a technology
of power of disciplining and self-management of populations. Gentrification can be seen
as a trope for the dual logics of neoliberalization, including economic deregulation and
free market dominance on the one hand, and the promotion of individual rights over
collective rights, and individual responsibility over collective responsibility, on the other.
Governmentality corresponds with the postmodern theorization of the diffusion of
power and denotes the self-governing of individuals at the level of everyday life. This
notion represents a different perspective from a traditional Marxist view, which as
previously mentioned, focuses on neoliberalism as an elite-project from above. It also
differs from a Gramscian lens in which mass-based consent is understood as obtained
through a top-down imposition of falsehoods, or the concealing of contradictions within a
hierarchical view of power and positionality (ie. former/organic intellectuals) (Gramsci,
2010). Instead the concept of governmentality and Foucault’s idea of how individual
bodies become disciplined and instrumentalized in making populations governable—
biopolitics— suggest that individuals become aligned with a new status quo by creating
and embodying this status quo (Foucault ,2007).
It is helpful to quote Brown (2003) at length for an explanation of how neoliberal
governmentality works at the level of the individual to create a citizen subject that in turn
produces who s/he has become:
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In making the individual fully responsible for her/himself, neo-liberalism equates
moral responsibility with rational action; it relieves the discrepancy between
economic and moral behavior by configuring morality entirely as a matter of
rational deliberation about costs, benefits, and consequences. In so doing, it also
carries responsibility for the self to new heights: the rationally calculating
individual bears full responsibility for the consequences of his or her action no
matter how severe the constraints on this action, e.g., lack of skills, education, and
childcare in a period of high unemployment and limited welfare benefits.
Correspondingly, a "mismanaged life" becomes a new mode of depoliticizing
social and economic powers and at the same time reduces political citizenship to
an unprecedented degree of passivity and political complacency. The model neoliberal citizen is one who strategizes for her/ himself among various social,
political and economic options, not one who strives with others to alter or
organize these options. (Ibid.:42-43)
Neoliberalism inscribed within the discourses, technologies, and practices of
governmentality converges dialectically in the subject-making of the neoliberal citizenry
that Brown describes. Governmentality within neoliberalization therefore suggests a
constraining and reductive analytic of citizen formation, narrowing the possibilities for
strategic resistance and change.
Yet, the technologies of governmentality become operationalized not only
through instruments and apparatuses but also over and through space, making spatial
contestations an important aspect for re-thinking the political strategies of social claims
within the dual logics of neoliberalism and governmentality. Spatial analysis of
neoliberalization and governmentality would consider how certain places are
open/guarded for included/excluded subjects during allowed/disallowed times. Spatial
analysis also raises the issue of the Sovereign, and the “existing” political geography of
the state with the notion of governmentality. Right to the city, a spatialized analysis of
urbanization and collective social change possibilities, is useful for revisioning urban
citizenry and to pry open the possibility for alternative forms and effects of subjectmaking in contestations over the racial property regime of gentrification.
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This dissertation contends that neoliberalism remains unaccomplished as ongoing
processes. Embedded within neoliberalism and financialization, the urban space becomes
a dynamic field of power for not only private enterprise, but also for well-positioned local
government, and threatened inhabitants seeking voice in the contentious making (and
potential unmaking) of the neoliberal city. The irony of neoliberalism as an ideology of
market-driven enterprise is that neoliberalism results from policies driven by actors who
shape its form and function. In this way, neoliberalism is not an elusive force, but instead
may be made tangible through the policies that invoke it and the nodes of
interdependencies in command and control (Piven, 2008).
The case of this dissertation sheds light on what Peck et. al. (2009) terms
“actually existing” neoliberalism by revealing the mediating actors and multiple interests
at play in ‘actually existing’ accelerated attempts at gentrification through predatory
equity. Resistance to serial displacement, including limited successes, suggests
neoliberalism as processes, providing a departure from an ideal-type of neoliberalism as
if a totalizing fait accompli, a point emphasized by Holston (2009). Neoliberalism as
processes is multi-layered, contradictory and contingent, and can be understood through
changes in institutional arrangements (Peck and Tickell in Gledhill, 2004). Varied state
formations apply neoliberal policies (such as deregulation, neoregulation, and
privatization) unevenly and within the interdependent processes and constraints of global
capital (Ong, 2006). Ong (2006) posits the importance of understanding the role of state
power in neoliberalization by examining the “hybrid-state” and forms of “neoliberalism
as exception and exceptions to neoliberalism” (p.3). In this case, although neither
exception nor exception to neoliberalism in whole cloth, the governing officials in City of
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East Palo Alto played a key role in attempting to oppose the deregulation of rent
controlled housing there.
Rather than operating as empty vessels of capital accumulation, or simply as
indifferent carriers of the world division of labor, this study follows Brenner and
Theodore (2000) in arguing that cities are the principle sites of struggle in which
financialization, austerity, and privatization are tested and resisted. A moment of crisis in
neoliberalism during the Great Recession also presented opportunity for urban claimants
to invert the current terms of equity in housing. This study considers the changing city
through not only institutional arrangements of capital, but how a municipal government
and tenants attempted to exploit those arrangements and leverage their power through an
optic of racial justice.

Sociology of the Social Movement Literature
Attention to tenants’ collective action is particularly relevant during a time of
resurgence in rental demand as an outcome of the 2008 housing crisis that has shifted an
“ownership nation” to a “renter nation” (see Samara, 2015). Indeed, the U.S. Census
suggests that the decennial following the Great Recession will be viewed as the “decade
of the renter” (Levy, 2011). The added pressures of foreclosures and loan restrictions
since the housing fallout have exacerbated a nationwide acute shortage of affordable
rental units for low-income renters (Joint Center for Housing Studies, 2011; 2011a).
What does social movement theory offer for understanding tenant oppositional
organizing? For more than thirty years, social movement studies in the U.S. have
principally orbited around resource mobilization theory (RM) and the related political
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process model that privilege the effects of organizational capacity and political cleavages
in the electoral arena for realizing movement goals (ie. Zald and McCarthy, 1979;
McAdam, 2010 [1982]; Morris, 1984; Tilly, 2005). Much of this work assumes rational
actors and a rational political system, ie., a functioning democracy. The literature
generally attends to the mechanics of how it is that movements are organized rather than
why.
Most notably, this literature remains evasive on questions of power, an irony not
lost on participants in social movements. Several enduring discussions provide an
exception in the literature by considering the forms of power available to movement
participants as a condition for mobilizing resistance and realizing movement goals
(Gamson, 1968; Piven and Cloward, 1977; Wrong, 1980). For example, in particular
Piven & Cloward (1977) bring specificity to arguments and examples around why and
how power becomes realized and operationalized in their work Poor People’s
Movements. They are centrally concerned with the conditions in which the poor have
resisted and what they’ve gotten out of it as a result of disruptive power (see also Piven
and Cloward, 1971; Piven and Cloward 2000; Piven, 2006). Relatedly, and more
recently, scholars attuned to questions of agency have challenged RM by focusing on
how participants’ strategic choices affect movement outcomes (ie. Jasper, 2008; Ganz,
2009). My analysis of organizing responses to the housing crisis draws from this
literature but contextualizes and emphasizes organizing within the particulars of the
political economic landscape. The problems tenants confront at the micro scale of their
buildings reveal fundamental changes in landlordism and the broader processes of
(persistently) racial neoliberal urban development.
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Although the sociological literature on tenants remains limited in scope,
especially in the U.S., significant scholarly work considers and debates tenants as a social
class, tenancy as revelatory of the structures of ownership relations, and tenant action as
oppositional social contestation (ie. Engels, 1935 [1872]; Angotti, 1977; Marcuse, 1980;
Dreier, 1982; Heskin, 1983; Hartman, 1984; Saunders, 1984; Morrisson, 1984; Shlay and
Faulkner, 1984; Katz and Mayer, 1985; Lipsitz, 1988; Florida and Feldman, 1988;
Leavitt and Saegert, 1990; Capek and Gilderbloom, 1992). Much of the scholarship on
urban tenant struggles in the U.S. highlights tenants’ militant tactics during three periods:
the socialist eviction blockades and rent strikes of the 1930s; “poor people’s movement”
actions such as the Harlem rent strikes of the 1960s Civil Rights era, and the policyoriented and coalition-based tenant advocacy efforts that lobbied legislators for tenant
protections in the 1970s (Piven and Cloward, 1967; Neagu, 1972; Dreier, 1982; Lawson
and Naison, 1986; Ceraso, 1999; Bratt, Stone, Hartman, 2006).
The entry of highly financialized corporate landlords on a large-scale changes the
landscape for grassroots tenant organizing. Tenant organizing around what was called
predatory equity during the housing crisis has been distinguished from past tenant
organizing by the sheer number of rent regulated units in buildings purchased by single
investment firms: the unprecedented level and severity of harassment of tenants; the
multiple interests at play involving investors and the servicing and securitization of debt;
and the ability of large investment firms to withstand short-term financial losses (ie.
tenants’ rent withholdings and law suits) (ANHD, 2009).
The literature of “community” contestations pays particular attention to the
possibilities and pitfalls of tactics, non-for-profit organizational forms, scales of action,
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and identity-based boundary-making relevant to tenant organizing (ie, Alinksy, 1971;
Katznelson, 1981; Delgado 1994; Fisher, 1994; Marwell, 2004; Saegert, 2006; Gilmore,
2006; Incite, 2007; McQuarrie and Marwell, 2009; Defillipis et. al. 2010; McAlevey,
2015). This literature makes in-roads toward what Bevington and Dixon (2005) call
“movement relevant theory,” addressing both the theoretical and programmatic problems
raised in social contestation. Yet, rarely does the literature in community studies or
community organizing adequately address the questions of scale, important to movement
formation and radical ‘non-reformist’ reforms. It does, however, point to examples of
how, even at the local level, people can pry open spaces for opposition and wins.

Models from Labor Studies

In contrast to the social movement literature, conceptions of power are prolific in
labor studies (ie. Brecher, 2014 [1972]; Juravich and Bronnfenbrenner, 1998; Clawson,
2003; Olin Wright, 2000; Fung and Olin Wright, 2000; Milkman, 2006). This literature
includes a large number of workplace-based case studies from which scholars have
garnered general lessons to inform broader labor strategy. Furthermore, significant
examples of work in this vein make explicit the relationship of workers’ power and
conditions in the workplace to larger socio economic processes (ie. Silver, 2003;
Jayaraman and Ness, 2005; Muñoz, 2008; McCallum, 2013). Urban processes for labor
receive a great deal of attention by scholars who attend to historical developments of
cities, and the relationship of urban change to workers’ dilemmas (Parsons, 1984; Logan
and Molotch, et. al, 1987; Fainstein, Gordon and Harloe, 1992; Fisher, 1994; Radford,
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1996; Dreier, 2000; Freeman, 2001; Herod, 2001; Clawson, 2003; Botein, 2007; Herod
and Wright, 2008;).
Notwithstanding the complexity about labor’s divided interest (as investor and
tenant) in investor housing, the labor literature also speaks to labor’s strategic
confrontations against venture capital firms, particularly private equity (ie. Fung, Hebb
and Rogers, 2001; Bodie, 2008; Lerner, 2010). Strategic corporate research provides
direction for tenants grappling with the structuring of exploitation, but only within
organizing through intensive tenant-centered tactics that build momentum, confidence,
solidarities, and ultimately wins. Juravich describes key areas for nuanced research for
comprehensive campaigns that expose “profit centers, growth plans, decision makers, and
key relationships” (in Bronfenbrenner, 2007: 32). These four areas allow for an analysis
of mediating actors for tenants to develop and deploy strategy. I employ Juravich’s model
of strategic corporate research in chapter six to identify tenants’ tactical possibilities
taken from the analysis typical of union corporate campaigns.

The Right to the City
Fundamentally, this dissertation extends from a scholarship of critical urban
theory that emphasizes how urban processes become shaped through social contestation
(Brenner, Marcuse and Mayer, 2011). The stakes of this struggle for the poor, and for
people of color, is the right to the city (Purcell, 2002; Samara, 2007; Harvey, 2008;
Mayer, 2009; Mitchell, 2003). As Castells (2000) cogently extrapolates, the right to the
city is for Lefebvre a struggle for not only material existence, but for urban culture.
Lefebvre fundamentally privileged the city as a space for spontaneity and cultural
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eruption. “The human being has the need to accumulate energies and to spend them, even
waste them in play,” he wrote ([1968] 1996:147). The right to the city for Lefebvre, was
the right to participate in its creation.
Lefebvre’s theoretical undertaking appropriates space and time to transform the
city into a sphere for imaginative, artistic ‘lived’ interaction. The right to the city is the
right to reclaim the urban as a potentially liberatory space of, by and for creative and
collective social processes: “…[T]hus the city is an oeuvre, closer to a work of art than to
any simple material product” (Lefebvre [1968] 1996: 101). For Lefebvre, the city was not
just a product of or site for human relationships; the city was the process of these
relations.
Lefebvre called for a radical configuration of time and space that rejects the use of
the city (whether socialist or capitalist) as an object, as merely a means to material
existence. Deeply rooted in his work on right to the city are several key reinforcing
concepts, which remain relevant to today’s urban struggles:
The right to the city manifests itself as a superior form of rights: right to
freedom to individualization in socialization, to habitat and to inhabit. The
right to the oeuvre, to participation and appropriation (clearly distinct
from the right to property), are implied in the right to the city. (Ibid:173174 emphasis in original)
These reciprocal ideas reinforce strategic attention to radical citizenship and use-value,
relevant to the demands for non-speculative housing raised by urban claimants today.
Lefebvre’s framework for a right to the city for democratic participation, creative play
and imagination is inextricably linked to the call and demand for the right to the city
where “Black Lives Matter.” It is to the history of the construction of East Palo Alto and
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to the production of land values embedded in historically contingent, relational constructs
of race that I now turn.
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CONTROL
Chapter 3. Creating California: The Racial Logic of Home, Land, and Security12
Chapter Introduction
East Palo Alto resides at the doorway to Silicon Valley, crossed by the Bayshore
Highway 101 on its west side, and bordered at its eastern edge by the southern arc of the
San Francisco Bay. (See map, Figure
3.1.) The city’s current economic
profile reads as literary foil to the
adjacent, tony cities of Palo Alto and
Menlo Park where the residents’ median
household incomes were $122,532 and
$111,244, respectively (2007-2011 U.S.
Census). In East Palo Alto, a tiny
majority-minority city of 28,867
residents (2012 U.S. Census estimate), the
median household income of $50,137

Figure 3.1 San Mateo County,
California. Source: cc GeoCurrents

(2007-2011 U.S. Census) was less than
half of these other cities. Also, in inverse proportions to its neighbors, the majority of
today’s residents in East Palo Alto are renters (2010 U.S. Census).
The founding of the small city of East Palo Alto followed a century after the
adjacent cities’ incorporation and was distinguished by East Palo Alto organizers’

12

“Geography is not the question, where is Kansas? But, why is Kansas, Kansas?” - Ruth Wilson Gilmore
(u.d.)
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ideological drive for political self-determination on the heels of the civil rights and Black
Power movements. Black and Latino organizers called for local authority within a white
dominated regional and county politics. More broadly, East Palo Alto’s incorporation
into cityhood took place amidst state specific urbanization processes, and within a history
triangulated by the California property regimes of settler colonialism, monopoly
landholding, and privatization/financialization.13 Poignantly, the Page Mill housing
gamble in the first decade of the 21st century evoked familiar terms of the frontier at the
turn of the 20th century: Page Mill investors purchased state regulated property in
monopoly fashion couched in racialized notions of discovery, bravery, and even moral
duty. Smith’s (1996) theory of urban gentrification as a frontier logic considered such
discursive tropes in his explanation of the return of capital to cities following periods of
disinvestment. The frontier metaphor conjures an assumption that the people who live in
areas targeted for re-investment are unseen, and/ or undervalued, legitimating their
disciplining, displacement, and outright political and spatial exclusion.
It is in the very early history of California as border and as frontier where the
following section begins. The historical overview takes account of how the land area of
East Palo Alto that was once sacred Native American burial grounds became
sub/urbanized. The discussion also points to the numerous ways East Palo Alto’s social
history offers a counterpoint to the well-worn historical narrative of California land use.
East Palo Alto arose from a small farmers’ movement in a state of land monopoly. The
town became a center of Japanese horticulture in a landscape of anti-Asian, nativist

13

Constitutive of these relations in California are the multiscalar state policy and institutional apparatuses
that regulate, allocate, or enforce those connections, thus assigning and producing land values embedded in
historically contingent social constructs. For a view on the enduring forms of settler colonialism, reliant on
displacement for land control see Wolfe (1999; 2016).
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sentiment. In the post-war era, it developed as a majority-minority suburb and a seat of
Black nationalism in contrast to the mythological racialized notion of postwar American
suburban ethos and urban pathos. African-American migrants in East Palo Alto
confronted containment and practiced emplacement. Further, cityhood became
accomplished by the organizing thrust of tenants, not homeowners, contesting the very
notion of homeownership as a prerequisite of citizenry. This history provides a context
for analyzing the Page Mill monopoly buy-up of East Palo Alto’s rental stock as part of a
speculative and racialized assessment of land value, and for understanding the tenants’
organizing response as part of an ongoing struggle for home and land security. The
length of historical rendition presented here argues that property regimes necessarily are
social productions that entail roads taken and not taken; present relations of a given place
both reflect historical conditions and alter conditions for potentially very different
futures.

East Palo Alto’s Early History: Territorializing Space, Re-making Place

Land grabs and abandonment mark the early history of East Palo Alto from when
the Spanish Missionaries first made their way northward from San Diego in 1771, to the
fatal detriment of the Ohlone/Costanoan people.i Spanish soldiers purportedly left the
South Bay area soon after they arrived due to their encounter with an insect infestation in
abandoned Ohlone dome huts. The huts in the vicinity of East Palo Alto are now believed
to have served as temporary lodging during funeral rites; East Palo Alto’s downtown was
an Ohlone burial ground (Baxter, Allen and Hylkema, 2007).

52

The vast ranch that encompassed much of present day San Mateo County
reflected the Spanish soldiers’ account in its name: Rancho de las Pulgas, Ranch of the
Fleas (Rigenhagen, 1993). The area remained abandoned for nearly a century following
Spanish missionary occupation and long after Mexico’s independence from Spain in
1821. Relatively few people lived on the ranch during American occupation, including in
1848 when Mexico relinquished California to the U.S., coincidentally within weeks of
the first gold discovery in northern California.
Land monopoly in this “free state” stood apart from the 19th century family farm
model prominent in the midwest and New England regions of the U.S. Concentrated land
holdings in California resulted in part from a perceived scarcity of water supply and
pending Mexican landholder claims. Prospects of gold and capitalization of the Pacific
Railroad further resulted in enormous investor purchases of land available in the public
domain. The Homestead Act of 1862 only led to widespread disappointment for new
settlers and former miners in this state, many of whom scape-goated Chinese immigrants
and Mexicans for their mining losses and narrowing land holding opportunities. (Pisani,
1996)
The U.S. had required Mexican landholders in California to submit land deeds for
approval. Over 9,000,000 acres of Spanish and Mexican land grant claims were approved
between 1852-1856; contested claims took up to 17 years for a decision (Ibid.: 12). In the
area where East Palo Alto now stands and its surroundings, the U.S. originally denied the
Mexican Arguello family two thirds of the total 12 leagues they claimed of Rancho de las
Pulgas (U.S. House of Representatives, 1884: 1-5). Notably, the ranch included valuable
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access to the Bay watershed in a region that would in short order experience a population
surge.
California’s gold rush and the construction of a wharf in the South Bay had
brought new settlement to the ranch, and specifically to the area of today’s East Palo
Alto. Investor Isaiah Woods created the first planned community there after purchasing
3,500 acres of Rancho de las Pulgas in 1849 with backing by the Adams & Company
Bank, where Woods was general manager. Paradoxically, the Arguello family and
descendents had to sell off much of the ranch to American investors like Woods to pay
for the legal fees involved in their land claims, which went all the way to the U.S.
Supreme Court (Rigenhagen, 1993).
Woods was among the 2,298 people who owned more than 1,000 acres of land in
California by the 1870s; in addition 122 individuals and companies each owned more
than 20,000 acres of farms and ranches throughout the state (Pisani 1996: 87-89).
Urbanization in California rose in relationship to land monopoly; ‘49ers without a
farming future turned to the cities (Ibid.: 92). As a result, by the turn of the century over
half of the California’s population lived in cities (U.S. Census, retrieved March 3, 2013).
Woods envisioned a booming regional transportation hub connection with the
Pacific and Atlantic Railroads (San Mateo County, 1963). He named the town
“Ravenswood.” East Palo Alto’s transformation from agrarian frontier to urban frontier
did not follow a straight course despite Woods’ vision of a boomtown. The gold rush had
helped spur urbanization, but elsewhere, the railroad bypassed Ravenswood entirely.
Still, agrarian regions and hamlets such as Ravenswood developed in relationship
to demands of the nearby urban population. San Francisco required increased
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transportation of the grains and produce harvested from the South Bay. Ravenswood also
experienced a temporary increase in economic activity due to the traffic of the passenger
steamer “Jenny Lind” that traveled the ports of the peninsula taking people by boat from
San Francisco and connecting them to stagecoaches at the Ravenswood wharf for
continued transport to the state’s original capital, San Jose. But when the state changed its
capital to Sacramento, and new railroad lines made the steamer obsolete, Ravenswood
became a virtual ghost town. The wharf became known, as it remains today, as Cooley’s
Landing after its second owner who put it back to use for agrarian and, temporarily, brick
shipping.14 (Ibid.)
Notwithstanding these start-ups, East Palo Alto did not emerge as a growing town
until the emergence of California’s “little-landers’” movement. The movement was a call
of the yeoman farmer in the state of big-business land monopoly. East Palo Alto
emerged as a town of small farmers through a large purchase of land subdivided for
“utopian” purposes. Rather than reflecting an evolutionary change from agrarian to
urban, new settlement in the area presented another path, an experiment in a form of
urban agriculture that was made possible by the automobile and farming innovations.

The Weeks’ Utopia: A Modern Vision of A Retreat from Urban Life
The streetscape of present-day central East Palo Alto owes its long and narrow
residential block organization to another “pioneer,” Charles Weeks. Originally from
Indiana, Weeks became an innovator in California’s small farmers’ movement. He briefly
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A brick production outfit employing up to 100 mostly Chinese laborers sent 40 million bricks produced
between 1874-1884 from clay extracted from Ravenswood (Rigenhagen, 1993)
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revived the area after purchasing and subdividing a total of 600 acres of Ravenswood
beginning in 1916 (East Palo Alto Historical and Agricultural Society, et. al. 1997).
Weeks created what he touted as a utopian poultry colony under the motto “one acre and
independence” (Stanford Illustrated Review, 1917).
The one to five acre plots stood in juxtaposition to monopoly agriculture. Weeks’
unique chicken coops allowed for minimal land holding; most members owned just one
acre for intensive farming. The colony, named Runnymede, included a cooperative
market system, cooperative store, “garden” school and central social hall. The farmers’
cash-only land purchases and cooperative organization promoted an image in the
Runnymede advertisements of both individual self-reliance and democratic community
(Ibid.).
The poultry colony remained separate from Ravenswood until the neighboring
town of Palo Alto threatened to annex parts of both communities; residents came together
in opposition spurring the first of a half dozen attempts by the town to incorporate.
Runnymede and Ravenswood residents attempted to incorporate in 1925 to thwart the
annexation. In a compromise, the two communities came up with a new name: East Palo
Alto. However, Palo Alto did not follow through with the threat, and East Palo Alto
failed to incorporate due to conflicts between the Ravenswood and Runnymede residents,
chiefly concerning the political control of a newly shared school. (Rigenhagen, 1993)
The name East Palo Alto stuck, even if unincorporated, and the town continued to
grow into the late 1920s. Residences and business were established around the north area
of the town by the military post, Camp Fremont, a training grounds for soldiers during
WWI. In 1927, private developers opened the two-lane Dumbarton toll bridge; it was the
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first bridge to connect the peninsula to the East Bay. New housing and development grew
at the foot of the bridge in East Palo Alto. Despite the town’s growing development,
including East Palo Alto’s first cul de sac, the “Gardens,”and the poultry colony
continued to distinguish East Palo Alto from the suburban character of the neighboring
towns of Palo Alto and Menlo Park. It wasn’t until the Great Depression hit at the end of
the decade when a great many of the small farmers abandoned the area, which finally
ended the Runnymede experiment. (Ibid.)
Weeks’ social enterprise is an often-recalled chapter in East Palo Alto’s popular
history. Indeed, the “little land” farmers’ movement influenced East Palo Alto land use
into the 1950s, with some of the same land plots converted to flower nurseries by
Japanese and Italian truck farmers. Nearly a century later, several East Palo Alto tenant
activists endearingly referred to the colony as a kind of socialist collective on which the
City of East Palo Alto became superimposed. Urban agricultural activists also have
invoked Weeks to highlight the historical legacy of small farming as an integral
component for the city’s land use future (East Palo Historical and Agricultural Society,
et. al. 1997).
Runnymede was an exclusive utopia by race and class, however, and therefore
stood quite apart from the social justice ideals held by many East Palo Alto activists
today. So too was the Runnymede motto a far cry from state managed socialism, and
certainly contrasted with the revolutionary land reforms being played out at the same
time in the far distant Soviet Union, and much closer Mexican countryside. Instead,
Weeks’ small-scale colony sought to attract a middle class, the entrepreneurial, urban
bourgeoise. The egalitarian ideals of the intentional community were premised on
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existing privilege; membership denoted the status of one’s ability to purposefully
distance oneself from urban industrial life, if after benefitting from it. The colonists were
all European descendents who had cash on hand to invest in the land, housing, coops, and
poultry stock. Europeans descendents continued to be the exclusive landowners in East
Palo Alto when Runnymede’s long poultry tracks were later converted for floricultural
production. (Michelson and Solomonson, 1997)
The fact that East Palo Alto’s agrarian colony was exclusively white despite the
number of Mexicans and Asians in the state and region, particularly people of Chinese
and Japanese ancestry, reflected the racialized spatial and residential exclusions
prominent in developing cities and towns in the western U.S. In the “yellow peril” era,
immigrants of Asian ancestry who remained in California faced organized boycotts,
discrimination, and social exclusion.
In fact, non-white immigrants to the U.S. were not allowed to purchase land in
California, and therefore, by state law they would not have had the opportunity to buy
into the Weeks’ cooperative. Within the U.S., state perpetrated and sanctioned violence,
including Native American genocide and containment, were constitutive of racialization
and disciplining processes that became legal doctrine. Historian Eric Foner pointed out
that "where the social order was least stratified-as in the frontier states [like] California ...
legal discrimination was most severe" (quoted in Brooks 2009: 12). Although vigilante
violence remained a threat to “non-whites” in California, particularly for Mexicans and
Chinese in the early decades of the 1900s, California’s racial disciplining took shape
through juridical and statutory means and specifically through the legal regulation of
where one lived and who could make claim to one’s home or land ownership.
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Creating the Landless Foreigner
Anti-Asian sentiment by white workers in California had already grown to
hysterical proportions following the Gold Rush and resulted in The Chinese Exclusion
Act of 1882. California had entered the union as a free state, espousing the tenets of
“free labor” undergirding industrial capitalism’s expansion. Growing anti-Chinese
campaigns resulted from competition between workers in the mining, then factory-based,
railroad, and port economies. Where Chinese workers previously had labored alongside
European and European American miners, the decline in mining signaled a decline in
prospects for upward class mobility for whites who had little access to land for small
farming. (Ibid.) For European immigrants in California in the late 19th and early 20th
century becoming “white” was conjoined to maintaining the foreignness of “non-white”
Asian immigrants. Whiteness as construct amounted to a spatialized political voice
figuratively and literally.
San Francisco passed one of the country’s first racial residential zoning
ordinances against Chinese mobility in 1890 in the wake of the Chinese Exclusion Act
(Ibid: 24). In later decades before and during WWI, racial bias in zoning became a
common practice. Zoning itself was a policy in urban planning largely new to the 20th
century. The 1917 United States Supreme Court decision, Buchanan v. Warley, declared
zoning restrictions by race unconstitutional, but the decision only addressed zoning.
Instead, racial discrimination in private agreements became a norm, influencing the
regional demographics of the Bay area, including the growing towns south of San
Francisco, such as Palo Alto, Menlo Park and the hamlet of East Palo Alto.
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Although neighboring Palo Alto, to the west of East Palo Alto, never legislated
racial exclusion, as several resident committees had threatened (see Chamber of
Commerce proposal Palo Alto Times January 15, 1921), the small number of Asians and
even smaller number of African Americans lived apart from whites in the early decades
of the 20th century. Restrictive covenants prevailed. The covenants were private
agreements between residents and realtors to exclude Jews, Catholics, Mexicans, Asians,
and Black people from residing in white neighborhoods. The 1913 California Real Estate
Law Book provided templates for realtors to copy: “No part of said premises shall be
sold, leased, or rented, or suffered to be occupied by as tenants for hire or gratuitously,
any persons not of the white or Caucasian race” (Lincoln 1913: 18, cited in Hernandez
[2010]; see also Jensen [1969] and Dean [1947]).15 The logic of organizing space by race
was reproducible.
U.S. expansionism to the Pacific Ridge, like European imperialism, had fomented
and rested on nationalist sentiment aligned with a social-Darwinian discourse that
legitimated colonial conquest and exploitation. It was in the wake of WWI and
xenophobic foment that two chapters of the Ku Klux Klan formed in Palo Alto, involving
hundreds of residents including a handful of members from Stanford University’s faculty.
The Klan appealed to white nativist wartime and postwar sentiment in California, and
followed the organization of white laborers opposing Asian migration to the state
(Bowling, 2012). Stanford University reflected and spurred racialized land use; the
university refused antidiscrimination measures for its private land leases in its
development of Stanford Hills in Palo Alto (Lowe, 1989: 57). Beginning in this same
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See also California real estate principles and practices, Schneider (1927).
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interwar period, the entire nearby town of Menlo Park chose and adhered to a covenant
template declaring that the only “nonwhite” residents permitted to reside in city
boundaries were the whites’ domestic servants (Tajiri quoted in Robinson, 2012).
Racial hierarchy was also prominently asserted through property rights in the
state’s Alien Land Law, which was first adopted in California in 1913 and revived with
greater political support in the state in 1920. The state’s “Alien Land Law” ensured that
remaining agricultural holdings in California would be reserved for whites. The law
specifically prohibited “aliens ineligible for citizenship” from land purchases. The
language thereby still permitted European immigrants to own property since the
Naturalization Act of 1790 exclusively deemed white, free immigrants eligible for
naturalization. In this way the land laws specifically targeted the growing number of
Japanese, many of whom had arrived to California via Hawaii.
Japanese immigrants were viewed as a new source of exploitable labor by
ascending white agribusiness following Chinese exclusion (Aoki, 1998). Unlike the wave
of Chinese migration that followed the gold rush, Japanese women also immigrated to the
U.S., which meant family formation. In time, some second and third generation Japanese
American citizens by birthright purchased land individually and collectively for
agricultural production. For this, Japanese Americans became increasingly perceived as
competition to individual smaller farmers in a context of corporate-controlled monopoly
agriculture. Thus, the 1920 version of the California law sought to close loopholes to
ensure these marked groups among the foreign-born were not purchasing land through
their US citizen children. (Ibid.)
As argued by Aoki (1998), the Alien Land Law contributed to a racist structural
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framework that made possible and deemed rational the mass dispossession of Japanese
immigrants and Japanese American citizens from the West Coast in WWII.16 While
Executive Order 9066 was created in Washington, D.C., it was produced through, and
accepted within, the dominant racial logic reflected in California’s land laws. These laws
also structured a concept of citizenry that upheld whites’ property rights and whiteness as
status in the polity. Just as Chinese laborers were pushed from the mines when gold
became scant, and migration halted based on white labor demands, the land laws ensured
that the Japanese would not be permitted to compete with white farmers.
Japanese immigrant floriculturists in East Palo Alto were largely tenant farmers
when the U.S. armed forces removed them to the confinements of the Heart Mountain
Detention Center in Wyoming in 1942 (Michelson and Solomonson, 1997). The majority
of Japanese and Japanese Americans who did return from forced internment to East Palo
Alto arrived home to a town on the cusp of dramatic change. They took little time to
develop chrysanthemum production in East Palo Alto and served a national market. They
accomplished this despite the fact that the California “Alien Land Law” was still in
effect. Japanese American second generation families eventually purchased East Palo
Alto plots, setting up greenhouses on Runnymede tracks using cooperative labor pools to
support the individually owned flower nurseries (Michelson and Solomonson, 1997). The
Japanese floriculturists became increasingly successful, until the mid 1950s.
The state’s Supreme Court reversed the Alien Land Law in 1952 on grounds that
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Mexicans had been repatriated in the 1930s in part as a result of pressure to accommodate the
great number of Great Plains migrants that came to California looking for work following the Dust
Bowl. The Bracero program of 1942, Aoki (1998) reminds us, later provided a new labor pool of
Mexicans to then replace the detained Japanese. Braceros were recruited ostensibly without prospect
of union recognition (the NLRB didn’t extend to agricultural laborers), or right to land purchase.
They were subsequently deported.
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it conflicted with the Fourteenth Amendment. In response, in the mid 1950s the Sequoia
Board of Trustees chose to accommodate the creation of a new high school in East Palo
Alto by condemning twelve residences and occupying 20 acres of land parcels owned by
Japanese and Japanese American growers. They chose this land rather than pursue a
proposal for the use of uninhabited parcel owned by the largest landowner in East Palo
Alto, the Kavanaugh family. Competition with Europe had become a growing challenge
for the Japanese floriculturists, but the growers’ dislocation for the school had immediate
and devastating consequence for the local industry. (Lowe, 1989:66)
The “Alien Land Law” of exclusion that had prohibited Asian immigrants from
purchasing land, also cohered with the instituted race-based system of both de jure and de
facto housing regulation and neighborhood appraisal in U.S. cities. It was in the postwar
period following WWII that East Palo Alto, like much of the U.S., also experienced
dramatic demographic shifts. East Palo Alto’s population grew exponentially in this
period due to Black exodus from the south and inter-city migration from migrants’ firststop destination Bay area cities, such as San Francisco, Oakland and Richmond. White
authority was reinscribed during both the first and second periods of the Great Migration,
in contrast to some gains in industrial union integration in the war industries. Massive
social dislocation led to policies that shaped land values based on white demands and
were carried out via state-licensed realtors, local and federal underwriting guidelines, and
exclusionary state subsidies.

A National Use for the Home: Federal Interventions in Housing
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Whereas East Palo Alto’s development trajectory was directly tied to its local and
state political context, it was the federal intervention in the housing market that led to
dramatic change in urban and suburban landscapes across the country following the
social upheavals of war time and postwar migrations, and the interwar Great Depression
of the 1930s. The New Deal form of federalism, and its local implementation, further
configured housing prospects of Black migrants, including those who came to northern
California and eventually to East Palo Alto. The New Deal era housing policies followed
other examples of federal government intervention in housing, such as in housing
development for wartime security in WWI. It was following the Depression, however,
that the federal government created a racialized mapping of financial risk in housing that
would influence investment strategies then and now at the national scale. An
understanding of federal intervention in housing in the first half of the 20th century
provides an important backdrop to the post WWII trajectory of East Palo Alto’s
urbanization and tenant-led campaign for cityhood by the century’s end.
Throughout the U.S. before the 1930s, concerns over housing siting, density, and
conditions were considered and regulated by localities, the latter specifically in
relationship to urban social reform movements as well as racialized exclusive covenants.
A national market of housing finance took form by WWI that would contribute to the
Great Depression, spur massive social protest including the form of eviction blockades,
and, ultimately, New Deal housing subsidies and regulation. High labor costs in the
construction industry, increased costs of timber, and the de-mechanized nature of the
building industry during WWI led to higher housing costs disproportionate to urban
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manufacturing wages. Demand for urban housing had rescaled the origins and structuring
of home loans from the local to the national market. The mortgage industry ensued.
Housing became a speculative venture during the Great War, reaching far beyond
the local bank-borrower. The home loan market shifted from cooperative depositor-based
mutual associations known as local “Banking & Loans” to larger national commercial
lenders, including large banks and insurance companies. Increased petty capitalist
investment in mortgage bonds and the creation of widespread household debt through
mortgages soared before and after WWI. In 1913, mortgage interest payments became a
write-off in U.S. income tax law, further incentivizing homeownership and household
debt (Immergluck, 2010; 2009; 2009a; Radford, 1996).
During WWI, the federal government responded directly to the crisis of housing
demand due to its wartime labor implications. Securing the homeland implied securing
“home” for the war-industry workers. In 1914 the American Federation of Labor passed a
resolution during its national convention advocating for “the passage of laws that will
bring about a system of Government loans of money for municipal and private ownership
of sanitary housing” (quoted in Radford, 1996: 36). But it wasn’t until the heightened
labor turnovers in the defense industry, particularly at shipbuilding centers, that the Labor
Department created the United States Housing Corporation (USHC), as well as the
Emergency Fleet Corporation (EFC) of the U.S. Shipping Board in 1918. The prompt
undertaking of production resulted in over 15,000 units of family housing construction
for defense workers, including just under 500 in the Bay Area (Ibid:16).
The EFC and USHC are significant as federal precedent for intervention in
meeting housing demand. Frederick Law Olmsted (1919; 1919a) directed the Town
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Planning Commission for the USHC and wrote of workers’ exhaustion and frustration
from housing conditions, explaining: “No urge of patriotism or high wages could
compensate for the overloaded accommodations for individual and family life”
(1919:28). Although labor largely considered the response tardy and inadequate, the
federal government intervened in housing directly through these programs to the benefit
of highly skilled and necessary workers, nearly all white, and also established some
limited federal rent control laws until they were found unconstitutional in 1924 (Radford,
1996).
The federal government had a high stake in labor productivity for the war
mobilization; for these wartime years the government attempted to regulate labor stability
and efficiency in part through the housing question. The real estate industry
unsurprisingly held a strong interest in limiting direct federal subsidies and rent control to
home occupants. The housing that the federal government controlled and produced was
turned over to the private market at the end of the war, thus ensuring federal rent ceilings
would not diminish profit opportunities in the private market. The pressure on housing
therefore continued following WWI, amidst continued demand that fueled the growth of
the mortgage industry. Balloon payment requirements in individual mortgages helped
impel what would become the Depression’s foreclosure crisis.
The federal government responded to the mass protest movements of the 1930s
with the New Deal, which in the realm of housing effectively bolstered the private
market. The response ultimately involved the development of federal public housing
contingent on urban renewal. Public housing planners refused the model of federal
housing production for specialized workers as was done, albeit temporarily, in WWI. The
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federal plans also eschewed the experimental models of mixed income public housing
and middle class limited equity coops developed early on by the Public Works
Administration. Instead federal public housing subsidies became available only for the
very poor, and were, therefore, noncompetitive with the private real estate market. The
federal response also refused sustained rent control to temper rent gauging. Instead, the
primary federal response to the Depression was to rationalize the private homebuilding
and real estate industry’s mortgage practices at the national level.
Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s New Deal government rescued Hoover’s flagship
ideology of individual homeownership from the catastrophe of the Great Depression’s
foreclosure crisis. FDR’s reforms ultimately demonstrated an insistence on
homeownership as a core national value, debt through mortgage as an acceptable and
manageable wage supplement, and the promotion of the mortgage market as a viable,
profitable industry for those lenders reaching beyond their local depositor market.
Federalism in housing involved a slate of scaled compromises, ensuring state and local
authority over public housing sitings that would ensure alignment with existing racial
segregation patterns. Housing creation of all kinds, in turn, was a boom for the building
trades, an immediate jobs-creator spurred by the federal subsidies.
One of the prominently studied applications that came out of the federal response
was the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation (HOLC) security mapping, publicized by
urban historian Kenneth Jackson (1980; 1985) who came across the maps during his
research on suburbanization. HOLC was a much-lauded New Deal federal agency created
in 1933 to restructure existing mortgages to avoid foreclosures. HOLC provided direct
federal loans to rescue million borrowers that allowed them to avoid foreclosure (Colton,
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2002: 2). The agency conducted the massive City Survey Program. HOLC field agents,
usually coming from the private realtor and building industry, produced a coded A, B, C,
D ranking system of urban land values differentiated and ranked by race for each city.17
The Residential Security Maps reproduced and systematized the racial homogenization of
urban space, neighborhood by neighborhood.
Indeed, within the first three decades of the 20th century, spatial residential
segregation by race had become a central standard of the realtor and homebuilding
industries at multiple scales. As was noted in the cases of Palo Alto and Menlo Park,
restrictive covenants specifically targeting Asians, Mexicans, Blacks, Jews and Catholics
were applied at both the neighborhood level and in individual purchase contracts. What
made HOLC’s efforts stand apart from the locally distributed materials of the California
Association of Real Estate Boards, or even the widely distributed guidelines of racial
exclusion promoted by the National Association of Real Estate Boards (NAREB), is that
the HOLC Residential Security Maps were produced to serve the national government’s
new vested interest in the criteria of local property valuation. The federal government’s
interest in the housing market had expanded with the New Deal: the stakeholders now
included the U.S. Treasury.
FDR’s New Deal policies had set into action federal mortgage programs that
assumed the risk of private lenders. The state’s differentiation of property valuation by
race occurred as the federal government guaranteed the private and burgeoning mortgage
industry. When debt means gambling on the prospects of return, standards for
differentiated risk must be laid. Local and state-based practices of racialized property
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For further reading on enduring implications of the formalization of risk-mapping see Oliver and Shapiro
(2006).
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valuation became embedded in federal underwriting guidelines as a feature of risk
management. In heuristic fashion, the state deemed “non-white” households as risk in
order to lift “white” as secure. The two- market system cojoined land and housing
valorization of some to devalorization of others by race. Property valuation by the state
through race contrasts the Chicago School’s view of an evolutionary, or natural schema,
to class, racial and ethnic settlement patterns in industrial cities. The HOLC maps
depicted a salient constructed racial hierarchy already operationalized within carefully
worded restrictive covenants.
The Federal Housing Administration (FHA) followed HOLC in 1934 as a vehicle
to directly insure private mortgages, guaranteeing low risk to private lenders. The 1935
Federal Housing Administration’s underwriting manual pointedly suggested that private
deed restrictions do the work of regulating race in residential settlement:
Protection against adverse influences is obtained by the existence and enforcement of
proper zoning regulations and appropriate deed restrictions… Important among
adverse influences are the following: infiltration of inharmonious racial or nationality
groups; the presence of smoke, odors, fog, etc. (FHA Underwriting Manual, 1935:
section 309 and section 310 in T-RACES).
White FHA underwriting developers perhaps promulgated language informed by their
own property interests. The language casted anyone deemed “nonwhite” as interloper. 18
In suit, FDR’s administration created Fannie Mae in 1938 to launch a
government-backed secondary mortgage market to facilitate the circulation of mortgages.
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Of course, the FHA could have done the opposite: the federal government could have included antidiscrimination measures in its underwriting manual that made discrimination unlawful, specifically in the
case of federally insured mortgages. In structural terms, Black migrant settlement in the post-war period
was shaped by job opportunity as well as by racialized residential property relations, including spatial
marginalization, resilience and rebellion.
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The purpose of Fannie Mae was to assist housing lenders by buying (and reselling) their
FHA-insured mortgages. By purchasing and selling the mortgages of private lenders,
Fannie Mae provided more funds to private banks to make more home loans. The federal
government became the patron of the national housing market. It was within this national
housing landscape that Black migrants arrived to California from both rural and urban
regions of the U.S. South and from California’s nearby East Bay, especially in the post
WWII era.

Black Migration & Agri-suburbia Transformation
The Second Great Migration between 1940-1970 involved 5 million Black
migrants from the rural south to northern and western cities (Massey and Denton 1993).
During and after WWII Black migrants moved in large numbers to Northern California
from Texas, Oklahoma, Louisiana and other southern states for war era industrial jobs
such as those in the ports of San Francisco and Oakland. Roosevelt had outlawed racial
discrimination in war industrial plants, giving new opportunity to Black workers in
factory positions. In addition to prospects of job opportunity, many left the south in
search of relief from Jim Crow. The Black migration to California in this period led to the
transformation of the agrarian regions in the South Bay to rural suburbia, edge cities, and
metropolises (Ruffin II, 2012).
Until the 1940s, majority Black cities were uncommon in the West (Ibid). When
the federal Home Owners’ Loan Corporation (HOLC) conducted its confidential City
Survey Program of 239 major cities across the U.S. between 1935-1940, Blacks
accounted for less than 2% of the populations in the major cities of San Francisco, San
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Jose, Oakland and Berkley in the Bay Area (U.S. Census, 1940). Between 1940-1970
Black migration transformed the demographics of these cities, and in some cases
suburbia. In the same period, East Palo Alto went from a small community hamlet of
about 2,000 in 1940 to a growing suburb of 8,000 in 1950 and 20,250 in 1960, a
population increase of over 150% in the latter decade (U.S. Census).
The nation-wide suburban large-scale development that followed WWII was
made possible through direct public subsidies backed by FHA and VA mortgage
insurance through the low interest zero down payment provisions of the Servicemen's
Readjustment Act of 1944 (known as the G.I. Bill). Returning white veterans, in
particular, benefitted directly from the federal support. Between 1946 and 1960 the
federal government subsidized low interest rates and insured 350,000 new homes in
northern California, less than 100 of which went to Blacks (Troy Duster quoted in
Loewen, 2005: 128). Realtors and developers promoted homeownership as an extension
of U.S. patriotism and war economy, an analogue of the American Dream, and a bedrock
and product of the “free market” system (Freund, 2010). Yet, since the New Deal, the
private housing market was anything but free of direct state financing and explicit U.S.
Treasury guarantees. The racially exclusive American Dream was financed heavily and
selectively by the state.
The G.I. Bill helped transform the South Bay region’s housing landscape and
broader economy. This was especially true in the vicinity of East Palo Alto. Blue-collar
white workers received college opportunity, which served as training for expanding the
war industry technologies, including that of semi-conductors. In 1947, Stanford
University received a record number of students in the hard sciences due to the popularity
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of the G.I. Bill. Silicon Valley visibly emerged in this period due in part to a renewal of
private “adventure capital,” now known as “venture capital.” By the early 1960s venture
capital involved institutions taking risks on start-up enterprises exploring untested
technologies. Technological advances led to increased manufacturing jobs located, at
first, in the U.S. In the area of production, Latino and African American women began to
take over electronics related assembly-line work in the Valley. In 1964 Romic Chemicals
opened an industrial waste facility in East Palo Alto, by then a majority AfricanAmerican unincorporated town, to handle toxic chemicals used in the semi conductor and
other electronics production process.
Joe Eichler, a merchant developer in California, was the exception to racial
residential exclusion in suburbia that proved the rule. Eichler publicly declared he would
sell to Black buyers. His position stood in direct opposition to the East Coast developer
Leavitt, who said via press conference that he would not sell his FHA subsidized
suburban housing division properties to Blacks (Brodkin, 1998). Yet, unlike Leavittowns,
most of Eichler’s modernist homes were not meant for the working class, but for the
rising white-collar workers, including those who made their homes in the emergent
Silicon Valley. These homes remained out of reach for all but a small number of Blacks
who did not need mortgages. While Eichler refrained from advertising to African
Americans specifically, he stood by his word, offering to pay white neighbors to move
out if they did not want to live near African-American home buyers (Eichler, 1982).
Eichler’s example did not initiate an integrationist movement among other
merchant developers or purchasers. Still open housing gained traction as an issue of
concern for white liberals in California’s Central Valley, including Palo Alto, where a
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group of Eichler-inspired residents formed the Palo Alto Committee for Open Housing.
In 1958, the organization of white liberals listed housing available and published letters
in the Palo Alto Times encouraging non-discrimination in housing (Lowe, 1989:56).
However, by this time much of the interest by African Americans in the region’s housing
stock focused on the available housing in the far more affordable town of East Palo Alto.
Blockbusting was spurred by a deliberate attempt by Blacks in the region to
resolve the “housing problem.” Many availed themselves of the chance to live outside the
overcrowded urban ghettos of Oakland and San Francisco. The more affordable housing
stock of East Palo Alto included “post-revival” bungalow and suburban track housing
with spacious lawns. African Americans in the region of East Palo Alto were virtually
exclusively segregated to just a few blocks in the area of Ramona Street in Palo Alto, and
to a small neighborhood of Redwood City. East Palo Alto was selected as a potential site
for African Americans to purchase homes by a precursor organizations of the South
Mateo County National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP)
and the Council for Civic Unity of Redwood City (Lowe, 1989: 49). Several AfricanAmerican families used white stand-ins through the efforts of this interracial organization
to acquire their homes in East Palo Alto (Ibid).
Blockbusting eventually changed the face of East Palo Alto through racialized
panic spurred by realtors. This was recounted in Stanford University’s Committee on the
Black Performing Arts oral history project and documentary film, Dreams of the City; the
archives include 80 hours of interviews with some of the East Palo Alto’s oldest Black
and Latino founders. African-American resident Barbara Mouton explained the
relationship between redlining and blockbusting:
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We had a realtor who showed us all around Menlo Park and Palo Alto and there were
several places we really liked. Next day, she came back very tearful and she said she
was instructed that she could not show us houses in any place but East Palo Alto.
(Dreams of a City, [1988] 1996)
It was also noted in other accounts by Black purchasers that realtors largely collaborated
in determining where Blacks would settle for the realtors’ own tremendous profits (Ibid).
Ed Becks was an African-American veteran who came to California in 1942 after
serving in Germany. He explained that he looked to the suburbs for better housing in the
mid-1950s, which is how he landed in East Palo Alto: “They [realtors] brought busloads
of Black people from San Francisco and drove up and down the streets, saying these are
houses that you could buy, but also as a way of threatening the white people who were
already there” (Ibid; see also Becks in U.S. Commission for Civil Rights, 1967). Houses
owned by whites were sold in the late 1950s to realtors for 8K who then sold the homes
to Blacks for an exorbitant 12K, explained Becks. Realtors would go house to house
convincing white homeowners that their property values would further plummet if they
did not sell. This in turn back-fired at times for realtors’ profiteering. In the South Bay,
for example, after realtors spurred panic white homeowners often became their own
brokers by competing to sell their homes directly to Black buyers at lower prices (Ruffin,
u.p. dissertation 2007: 276)
East Palo Alto was enticing for its climate, Bay watershed beauty, comparatively
affordable housing, and access to jobs available outside the larger shipping and
production centers of San Francisco, Oakland, and Richmond. Adjacent to the Bayshore
101, and at the doorstep of burgeoning Silicon Valley, East Palo Alto for one provided
entry to domestic jobs servicing nearby towns of affluent whites. East Palo Alto Blacks
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also gained some access to industrial positions such as the Ford Plant that opened in 1955
in the South Bay town of Milipitas for those residents with their own or shared
transportation (Ruffin, 2014). By the early 1960s electronics processing also provided
industrial jobs within and surrounding East Palo Alto.
Not everyone moved to East Palo Alto to purchase housing, however. Absentee
white landlords maintained properties that were available to newcomers as rental units.
These landlords also maintained political power in East Palo Alto despite shifting
residential demographics, and they used their power to thwart Black residents’
incorporation attempts. The dominant political rhetoric in California was steeped in the
prerogatives of property owners as exemplified by Proposition 14, discussed in the next
section. Proposition 14 was a racially coded referendum for racial exclusion in rental
housing, specifically.

The Racist Design of “Fair” Housing
In the 1960s civil rights eralocal organizing throughout California focused on the
questions of fair employment and segregation in housing and education. From New York,
Baltimore, St. Louis, to Los Angeles organizing among public housing as well as private
market renters put working class housing concerns back on the national agenda for the
first time since the end of WWII and with militancy reminiscent of the organizing thrust
of the 1930s. Much of the concerns were expressed in terms of discrimination and
segregation as contributing factors of slum conditions; local efforts gravitated towards a
broader federal civil rights policy change for open housing.
Housing was a touchstone civil rights issue in California and led to several
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statewide initiatives.19 These California-based measures in housing helped to pave the
way to federal civil rights legislation in housing in 1968. A decade after the U.S.
Supreme Court decision Shelley v. Kramer outlawed restrictive covenants in 1948, the
Unruh Civil Rights Act, named after then-California state assembly member Jesse Unruh,
prohibited discrimination based on race or disability by businesses. Moreover, in 1963,
after heavy organizing by groups such as the NAACP, and in the wake of the Unruh fair
employment gains, as well as an even earlier state school desegregation ruling, the
California legislature passed the California Fair Housing Act, known as the Rumford Act
(“Fair Employment and Housing Act [Rumford Act],” Gov. Code § 12955, et seq.).
The Rumford Act, supported by the governor, sought to uphold the Fourteenth
Amendment and end discrimination in the sale and rental of housing. Republicans in the
state legislature ensured that the vast number of private housing units would remain
excluded from the bill, however. The Rumford Act’s groundbreaking antidiscrimination
measures instead covered multifamily housing of five or more units and public housing,
only.
Even these incremental victories came with a backlash, however. For one,
California’s restrictive covenants, redlining, and blockbusting practices continued. The
Rumford legislation also rallied realtors to respond to the new state antidiscrimination
mandate by organizing the 1964 campaign for Proposition 14.20 The state proposition
would presumably take measure of popular sentiment around civil rights interventions in
19

California propositions to curtail the state’s own civil rights gains may have reflected resistance to a
changing electoral schemata. This is an area for further inquiry and investigation. This is essentially an
empirical question as to whether and how white power was harnessed through proposition campaigns to
bypass decisions of their elected leaders who were voted into office through changing racial urban district
boundaries.
20
Note: Archive of regional anti-Prop 14 campaign materials at Graduate Theological Seminary, Berkeley
California.
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housing in an area of the country viewed as far more “tolerant” of antidiscrimination
change than the Jim Crow south. For this reason, Californians’ vote on Proposition 14
came to be seen as a litmus test for the national sentiment for fair housing.
The referendum asserted a right of property owners to exclude an individual for
any reason:
Neither the State nor any subdivision or agency thereof shall deny, limit or abridge,
directly or indirectly, the right of any person, who is willing or desires to sell, lease or
rent any part or all of his real property, to decline to sell, lease or rent such property to
such person or persons as he, in his absolute discretion, chooses. (Art. I, § 26, of the
California Constitution, 1965)
Rather than explicitly tie the referendum language to race restrictions, the wording
carefully framed the issue to say that the consumer housing market could not be regulated
by state intervention, despite the fact that bank underwriting manuals certainly did so
based on state-sanctioned racialized risk taking. Instead, the language focused on the
individual property owner, much like the work of restrictive covenants. It was a “right” of
the property owner to sell or rent at the owner’s discretion. The language obfuscated the
intent. On the one hand, such language might have been written in oppositional response
to municipal-backed restrictive covenants; on the other hand, the right to not discriminate
included the right to discriminate. Yet, there was no right to not be discriminated against
on the basis of race. The referendum was a carefully worded rejoinder to the state’s
mandate that one must not discriminate.
Proposition 14 was named “California Fair Housing Initiative,” in cooptation of
civil rights language. The rhetoric deployed in support of the bill re-framed the issue as
fairness to property owners. Casting the “American Dream” as property rights,
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proponents argued that the individual interests of the current property owner trump the
rights of any individual to purchase or rent. The owner, not just the consumer, could
invoke “choice” as part of the free market. Moreover, rather than circulate housing
exclusion as an issue of race, backers of Proposition 14 articulated the issue as a question
of a property owner’s right to use one’s own moral judgment in determining who
deserved a home, and where.
The campaign rhetoric and images of this notion of “morality” focused on the
right to choose someone based on virtuous behavior, a trope for the racialized “culture of
poverty” discourse that would gain traction following Moynihan’s (in)famous report,
“The Negro Family: The Case for National Action” (March, 1965). Supporters of
California’s Proposition 14 used images that depicted Blacks as impoverished and that
connoted behaviors of family dysfunction, as criminal and pathological compared to
depictions of middle-class righteousness of white suburban families (Theoharis, 2006:
48). Since, according to Proposition 14, it was the individual property owner’s decision to
decide whether the consumer met the owner’s standards of moral virtue, the justification
for housing exclusion was reframed from an explicit emphasis on race to an explicit
emphasis on character. Such merit by deserving status in this example was a harbinger to
contemporary neoliberal discourse of meritocracy that masks the social relations of race
and racism. Racial design, however implicit, has intended and real consequences of
reproducing racial hierarchy.
Proposition 14 won. There were nearly 500,000 more signatures collected than
necessary for the initial petition to allow for the Proposition 14 referendum, portending
an uphill battle for the Rumford defenders. Organizers against Proposition 14 turned to a
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strategy that relied on church networks, CORE, and other civil rights groups, national
press, and voter mobilization (Ibid). Mid-Peninsula Citizens against Proposition 14,
reported in the left-leaning Black newspaper, The Crisis, that NAACP members of the
Santa Clara and San Mateo region responded with a drive that registered 1,000 new
voters (1964). Despite the coalescence of Black protest movement organizing against
Proposition 14, and national attention, the measure passed two to one; 75% of all white
voters supported it (Theoharis 2006).
The federal government was quick to take notice of the Rumford undercut. U.S.
Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach recommended to President Johnson to pursue
federal legislation around housing, as many were linking Proposition 14 to the Watts
rebellion in Los Angeles in 1965. “The housing issue, as indicated by the vote on
Proposition 14 in California last year, may well be the most controversial and explosive
of all civil rights issues” (quoted in Pritchett, 2010: 287). California lost at least $22
million in federal redevelopment funding immediately following Proposition 14’s
passage due to noncompliance with federal antidiscrimination provisions included in
urban public infrastructure programs, ironically to the detriment of urban areas and of
immediate consequence to Black communities (Ibid).
In 1966 the California State Supreme Court ruled Proposition 14 as
unconstitutional, and in 1967 the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the decision citing that the
proposition undermined the Fourteenth Amendment. The latter decision created a
national precedent against state enactment of legislation that would circumvent or
undermine federal anti-discrimination law. Local authority could not allow discrimination
where federal legislation prohibited such practices.
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From Containment to Emplacement

Residents of East Palo Alto had little political voice compared with neighboring
towns. Unincorporated East Palo Alto relied on the county, San Mateo, for its
infrastructure support. Miriam Turner was a white woman who was initially attracted to
East Palo Alto for its affordable housing stock and ample yards. Turner worked with
white and Black residents alike to stop panic buying and eventually spearheaded an
interracial alliance that brought residents together in an effort to take control of their
community through incorporation in 1958 (Dreams of A City 1996). The incorporation
attempt called it the “City of Ravenswood,” of approximately 12 sq. miles, harkening
back to its original name. Large property owners led the opposition to incorporation,
fearing higher taxes. At that time, petitioners had to represent a proportion of propertiedresidents, thus tying formal political participation in cityhood to land holdings.
(Rigenhagen, 1993)
The consequences of failing to incorporate would be devastating for the future tax
base of East Palo Alto, including a total loss of 10 of its 12.5 sq. miles to annexation
before eventual incorporation 25 years later. Menlo Park took advantage of East Palo
Alto’s lack of political status, gaining 25% of the East Palo Alto’s land area, including an
entire industrial park, through annexation, into the 1960s. By the end of the decade,
Leslie Salt, South Pacific Railroad, Hiller Aircraft, Ideal Cement, and the Bohannon
Industrial Park, which included Johnson and Johnson, Sierra Electronics, Upjohn and
Zenith, all transferred to Menlo Park out of East Palo Alto’s unincorporated district,
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plummeting any potential tax base for an incorporated city in the future (Lowe, 1989:
147). Palo Alto, located in an entirely separate county, annexed the golf course and
airport located in East Palo Alto (Ibid). The white, affluent and politically powerful
neighbors of Menlo Park and Palo Alto stripped the increasingly Black-majority town of
East Palo Alto of its economic foundation.
Moreover, East Palo Alto’s small business district had been devastated in the mid1950s. The business district grew as a product of the town’s status as the “other side” of
the tracks of tony Palo Alto. This was due in part to the alcohol prohibitions of Stanford
University and its surrounding no-liquor zones. Rowdiness would become exported from
Palo Alto to East Palo Alto to maintain the illusion of superior moral conduct in the
university town, while residents and students went to booze in the west side section of
East Palo Alto that had gained the name Whiskey Gulch during Prohibition. In 1956 the
four-lane expansion of the Bayshore Highway cut through Whiskey Gulch. The urban
renewal project cleared the business community and what would be a tax base for an
incorporated East Palo Alto (Palo Alto Times, January 11, 1956; Sedway and Cooke,
1970). The Bayshore Freeway appropriation of what had been downtown East Palo Alto
underscored the town’s lack of voice in decision making in their city and within the San
Mateo County Supervisors.

“We are Nairobi”: Black Power to City Power
In East Palo Alto, African Americans had gained access to comparatively quality
housing. In an ideological and tactical turn, many Black activists in East Palo Alto by the
late 1960s shifted their focus from the issue of blockbusting and fair housing to the
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questions of who controlled the land as well as the decision making of local institutions.
Indeed, by the late 1960s, East Palo Alto had become a nationally recognized site of
Black community organization, attracting African-American residents through not only
low cost housing opportunity, but also through the nationally acclaimed self-organization
of its own educational system, which included the founding of its own university.
East Palo Alto’s model community institutions stood as counter to the racist and
misogynist logic of the “culture of poverty” rhetoric voiced by the Proposition 14
campaign that attempted to undermine fair rental housing (see description, Chapter 4).
Still, East Palo Alto was viewed as a ghetto suburb within a regional politics dominated
by white affluence. East Palo Alto community institutions were shaped by the
contradictions of the city’s Black majority status yet lack of formal municipal governing
authority. East Palo Alto residents were propelled to assert community control and
develop their own institutions as pragmatic, ideological, and tactical endeavors
undergirded by a politics of self-determination.
In the early 1960s the East Palo Alto Committee of the Poor organized through a
civil rights framework primarily against segregation and specifically around the
intersecting issues of education, police repression, and jobs. Regional civil rights
organizations such NAACP and CORE chapters led protests resulting in important local
victories, especially an early victory that involved the hiring of African Americans in
East Palo Alto supermarket chains (San Jose Mercury News, 1963). The thrust of East
Palo Alto local civil rights organizing largely focused on educational opportunity,
however, within two seemingly divergent arenas of organizing: school integration and
alternative and autonomous institution building.
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Mothers for Equal Education involved approximately 250 women in East Palo
Alto in the mid-1960s largely concerned with regional educational equity in light of the
increasingly Black public school district in East Palo Alto. Dissatisfied with racialized
low expectations in East Palo Alto public schools, compared with the nearby wellresourced and predominantly white districts, Black activists linked with white families in
a “sneak out” effort. A hundred Black students resided with white families and attended
their schools (interview 2012).
At a pivotal moment in the education organizing, the Student Nonviolent
Coordinating Committee (SNCC) leader Stokely Charmichael came to East Palo Alto to
discuss the local activists’ efforts. Charmichael would soon become an honorary prime
minister of the Black Panther Party. He was recalled for his strong and growing critique
of integrationist strategies, and for greatly influencing the East Palo Alto activists’ next
course of action, saying at the meeting, “I don’t understand why you would be working
this hard to send your children’s minds to be educated by people who have oppressed you
for four hundred years” (quoted in Biondi 2012: 221). This political intervention
coincided with the growing burden carried by Black students in the “sneak out” program
who were exasperated by harassment, violence, and extreme alienation in the white
communities. Indeed, the relentless abuse and taunting in the white schools ultimately
compelled the leaders to reconsider their effort (Slater, 1971).
East Palo Alto’s organizers ultimately helped shaped, and were shaped by, the
principles of self-reliance espoused by the Bay Area Black Panther Party. East Palo Alto
became the seat of the San Mateo County Black Action Coalition where future Black
Panthers Huey Newton and Bobby Seale received training out of East Palo Alto’s St.
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John’s Church (Batchelder u.p. thesis 1994: 29). National Black Action Conferences
were held in East Palo Alto for three consecutive years in 1967, 1968, and 1969 using an
elementary school gymnasium. Later, in the early 1970s, militancy by students and
residents grew in East Palo Alto, in part around local organizing momentum for the
desegregation of Ravenswood High School. East Palo Alto also gained further national
attention as a seat of militant mobilization and protest against the jailing of Black Panther
leader Angela Davis held at the time in next-door Palo Alto (Aptheker, 1999: 96).
The agenda of community-service and community-control dominated the East
Palo Alto organizing influenced by the Black Panthers. Gertrude Wilks, the central leader
of Mothers for Equal Education had come to the Bay area from Louisiana where she had
been raised in a sharecropper family (Rickford, 2009). Wilks turned from leading the
“sneak outs” to develop model schools in East Palo Alto centered on Black pride through
community-controlled education.21 She began Nairobi Day Schools in 1966, which by
1968 included an accredited private elementary school program and then a high school
serving 80 students. The first principal of the Nairobi High School was George Mason
Murray. Murray served as minister of education in the Black Panthers and had been fired
from the English department at San Francisco State College, an act that incited a five
month student strike led by the Black Student Union and Third World Liberation Front
(San Francisco Strike Daily, 1968; Biondi, 2012: 222).
The Black-centered movement that was rooted in pride, self-determination, and
autonomy also led to a referendum to change the name of East Palo Alto to Nairobi in
1968. The name change idea sparked a campaign that grew out of a planning meeting for
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See also Ralph J. Bunche Orals History Collection, Wilks Interview Transcript Box RJB 461, p. 95
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an application to the federal Model City program (Rickford u.p. dissertation, 2009: 139;
San Mateo County, 1968). According to one analysis, the higher voting age of 21 was the
main factor that led to its marginal defeat; if 18 had been the voting age, East Palo Alto
would indeed be known today as Nairobi (Wildflowers, 2013).
Strongly influenced by the grassroots organizing espoused by SNCC, Stanford
student Robert Hoover established a separate endeavor, Nairobi College, in East Palo
Alto in 1969 (Biondi, 2012: 222). Hoover was a member of an activist cadre of families
in East Palo Alto who called themselves the “Floating Crap Gang” meeting in each
other’s homes to mediate street gang issues (Rickford u.p. dissertation, 2009: 138). He
assembled a multiracial coordinating group to launch Nairobi College after first helping
to establish Nairobi Day school and after serving as a college readiness program director
at the College of San Mateo near San Francisco, from which he had been fired for his
political militancy (Ibid.: 274-277).
Although Nairobi College leveraged Stanford University library access for its
students, its designated campus was East Palo Alto. “We think that our primary job is to
train leaders for the Black community,” explained Hoover in an interview for Ebony
Magazine (Slater, 1971:89). Nairobi College was a two-year college that had an
enrollment of 300 students in 1971. The college served as a national laboratory and
training ground in democratic control, and was considered a living example of student
decision making over hiring and curriculum within a climate of protest and crisis. Nairobi
College gained national attention as campus activism nationwide demanded Black
inclusion and protested the Vietnam War (Egerton, 1972).
While alternative educational institutions in other cities came and left, Nairobi
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College outlasted most, with a ten year run. One explanation for its comparative success,
and its downfall, lies in its reliance on outside funding. The college was based on radical
democracy and Black self-determination, but was imbued with the contradictions of
support from private capital as well as federal grants (Rickford u.p. dissertation 2009:
274-277).
As part of the community thrust for autonomy and control, Black activists from
East Palo Alto also demanded voice in the white dominated regional polity. In 1967, the
county responded to residents’ demands for representation by creating an advisory
committee, the East Palo Alto Municipal Council. Each representative on the committee
was elected by vote and the county board generally followed the Council’s
recommendations (Rigenhagen, 1993; East Palo Alto Municipal Council, 1973).
In his 1969 address to a western regional government conference, Herbert
Rhodes, elected Chairperson of the East Palo Alto Municipal Council (EPMC), promoted
the council as a vehicle of participatory democracy but warned against the potential
containment of the political involvement of East Palo Alto residents. “As I see it
participatory democracy must not serve to limit the horizons for the fields of action for
the citizens it is supposed to serve. A political ghetto is no more acceptable than a
physical or a social ghetto…” (1969:6). Rhodes suggested in this statement that the
EPMC should not bureaucratize and co-opt political organizing through the council
structure, but rather help catalyze grassroots political participation from local to the
regional and larger scales.
Rhodes’ statements acknowledged the role of East Palo Alto as a political project
within larger regional and national politics. What was considered an “experiment” for the
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board in minority self-rule, albeit advisory, eventually spurred greater interest in
incorporation. As Ed Becks, one of the first Black migrants to East Palo Alto and a
mainstay leader in the movement for incorporation, explained, “People have to govern
themselves. No matter how poorly they do it, no matter how brilliantly they do it, selfgovernance has to ultimately be achieved” (Dreams of a City, 1996). An independent
group, the East Palo Alto Citizen’s Committee launched incorporation planning in 1979.
The quest for incorporation went hand in hand with the drive for controlling East Palo
Alto’s land use, and for regulating increasing rents.
It wouldn’t be until 1983 that East Palo Alto would win the vote for incorporation
through the political organization of Black and Latino activists and tenants. In the years
following white flight from East Palo Alto, Black residents organized to transform the
town from a product of redlining and blockbusting, or containment, to a place for
making, claiming and controlling their “right to place,” (Samara, 2014) despite
tremendous obstacles presented by the city’s weak economic foundation. The eventual
“movement” for cityhood leveraged the sustained organizing that grew from the early
1960s work such as the work of white and Black residents who marched together against
“ghettoization” and for open housing in East Palo Alto in 1963. Several of these same
leaders were among those who inserted their voices in county politics and planned for
incorporation within a coalition of Black and Latino leadership in the decades that
followed.

Rent Control Goes Local
In cities throughout the U.S. tenants had mobilized around antidiscrimination
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actions, disinvestment in public housing in the 1970s, and dislocation by urban renewal
as “negro removal,” A wave of tenant organizing in California was set in motion in
response to worsening economic conditions and a political opportunity created by a
referendum supported by a faction of developers. Rent control became a tool of local
housing security during a time of rising national job insecurity. Notably, rent control in
California followed in the footsteps of examples in New York City. Moreover, Nixon’s
Cost of Living Council at the federal level opened up the possibility of rent control at the
local level. Nixon temporarily established federal rent control and froze wages for 90
days beginning in the summer of 1971 in an attempt to curb inflation.22
Renters faced a tightening housing market in the 1970s and increasing nominal
rents due to inflation partly based on the energy crisis. Pressure on renters was also
directly due to a decrease in multifamily housing production and an exponential increase
in numbers of condominium conversion. Between 1970-1980 in East Palo Alto, and
across the region, the vacancy rate decreased during this time despite a modest increase
of construction, mostly condominiums (Community Plan, 1981). Consistent with the
decade’s trend of condominium conversion across the country, 5% of East Palo Alto’s
rental units were repurposed as condominiums during the early 1970s (Day and Fogel,
1981, Urban Law Annual Vol. 21:3:p. 4). In the 1970s alone, the number of
condominiums across the country grew from 85,000 in 1970 to 723,000 in 1979, more
than half of which came into being through conversion of rental units (Ibid.:3,11 n. 29).
After a decade of rising condominium conversions, jurisdictions across the U.S.
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Nixon, Richard. "Executive Order 11615 - Providing for Stabilization of Prices, Rents, Wages, and
Salaries," August 15, 1971. Rent control was completely phased out by 1973.
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began to regulate condominium registration. This regulation set a precedent and window
for local authority to review and regulate housing affordability. For example, in San
Mateo County, approved condominium developments required a 20% set-aside
agreement with affordability measures for low and moderate-income housing ownership.
Yet, these set asides generally reflected the politics of racial and class
containment: set asides applied to the unincorporated areas of the county only.
Ultimately, even these set asides were made available at market rate and the moderately
affordable rental units were permanently lost because lower income residents could not
afford to purchase at the mortgage terms of that period at 15.5% (interest rate on April
20, 1981) (Community Plan, 1981: 3-11). By 1980 San Mateo County enacted a
temporary moratorium against condominium conversion in unincorporated areas of the
county only due to the tightening housing demand on rental housing. Although the
vacancy rate in East Palo Alto (4.4% in 1980) was higher than the county’s average
(1.3% in 1980), the incorporated areas of the county, such as the affluent and
overwhelmingly white city of Menlo Park, did not seek affordability provisions or a
moratorium on condominium conversion (East Palo Alto Community Plan, 1981: 3-1).
Renter households would simply need to look elsewhere, namely East Palo Alto.
Table 3.2: East Palo Alto Housing Costs
and Median Income, 1970 and 1979,
Source: San Mateo County Planning and
Development Division, Community Plan,
1981
1970
1979
Median Home
$18,000
$46,000
Value
Median Rent
$147
$280
Median Income
$9,401
$17,623

Table 3.2 demonstrates the
challenge of income and home ownership
in East Palo Alto during this period.
Based on affordability guidelines, the
gross median income was insufficient for
those households to purchase at the
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median home price assuming purchase price at no more than 2.5 times one’s annual
income (Ibid.: 3-11). Yet, the median rent compared to median income did reflect
affordability at one-fifth the median income, assuming one-third of monthly income
affordability measure. Rental rates were increasing dramatically and by approximately
41.5% in just one year between 1978-1979 (Ibid: 3-12).
The East Palo Alto Community Plan of 1981 underscored the housing crisis for
the unincorporated town. Although several recommendations were made calling for
rehabilitation subsidies for homeowners, and an anti-speculation real estate transfer tax,
rent control was discouraged citing widely publicized assumptions that rent regulations
reduce quantity and quality of housing.23
In departure from past mandates resulting in wartime freezes, New Deal
federalism and the civil rights national legislative victories, in the mid-1970s tenants
organizing for rent regulation in California mobilized their local bases of power for
policy change directed at the local level of the city. Statewide efforts had lost and despite
examples of economic controls by Nixon, there was no traction for an ongoing national
rent control policy. In fact, a 1976 California state legislative proposal (AB788) would
have pre-empted localities from initiating rent-control if it had not been vetoed by Jerry
Brown, purportedly based on direct push-back from the state AFL-CIO president at the
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For a summary of major research findings from studies for and against rent control conducted in the
1970s and 1980s, see Appelbaum, Dolny, Dreier, and Gilderbloom (1991; 1992) “Scapegoating Rent
Control, Masking the Causes of Homelessness,” Briefing Paper. Economic Policy Institute. Washington,
D.C. A primary reason against rent control cited in the East Palo Alto Community Plan (1981) was landlord
disincentive to keep up maintenance based on the rental price controls. However, numerous studies have
demonstrated that there was no correlation between rent control and deterioration as concluded by
Applebaum, et. al. (1991; 1992) review of the literature. In fact, neighborhoods and cities with rent
controlled units were less likely to have deferred maintenance due to stronger municipal or state monitoring
and enforcement provisions for the services for those units (Applebaum and Gilderbloom, 1988: 134-140;
Gilderbloom and Markham, 1996).
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time, Jack Henning (Dreier, 1997:17). A similar but more moderate proposal had become
policy in New York State where the Urstadt law in 1971 prohibited municipalities from
adapting new rent regulation more stringent than existing regulation in that state. The
defeat in California of the more restrictive measure, however, gave new confidence to
emergent tenant organizing efforts around the prospect for local initiatives. Subsequent to
the governor’s greenlight to pursue local rent control initiatives, tenants leveraged the
state referendum Proposition 13 passed in 1978 to demand rent control. The right-wing
developer-backed Proposition 13 provided a new opening.
Proposition 13 was a change in the California constitution to provide tax relief to
property owners. Considered nearly forty years later as a major obstacle to California’s
economic stability, Proposition 13 set out to reduce property taxes by assessing property
values at the 1975 value, with the maximum increase in value not to exceed 2% per year.
The tax reduction benefitted existing homeowners as the property tax would be
reassessed only upon resale. In a sense, Proposition 13 was “tax control” for property
owners. The loophole of decontrol, or reassessment of the property taxes, was built into
resale, or vacancy. This decontrol provision was a harbinger of state restrictions on rent
control decades later.
The freeze on property taxes was sold to Californians as not only a means to keep
people in their homes, especially seniors on fixed incomes, but also as a way to reduce
landlord costs, and thus abate rents. At first, the campaign to convince tenants that rent
hikes were about tax burdens was effective. Proposition 13’s leader, Howard Jarvis, chief
executive of the Apartment Association of Los Angeles County, had orchestrated a media
campaign to that effect (Dreier, 1997: 17). However, when property owners began to reap
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the impact of the tax reduction benefits, there were no signs that they would share the
benefits with their tenants. Increasing economic burdens, rising expectations, false
promises, the political affirmation of local rental regulation initiative, and a radical vision
by the City of Berkeley for tenant rent relief helped thrust tenants in more than a dozen
other California cities into responsive action.
At that time, Berkeley renters were the most organized in the state (Ibid). The city
first attempted to implement tight rent control in 1972, which was struck down on
procedural grounds in a California Supreme Court decision in 1976. By 1978, Proposition
13 altered the landscape, however. Framed as an issue of housing affordability,
Proposition 13 created a political opportunity organized tenants seized. In 1978,
Berkeley’s successful ordinance, Measure J, deemed that 80% of the Proposition 13 tax
relief would go directly to tenants. In suit, by 1985, 14 California cities used the
justification of Proposition 13 to win some form of local policy for rent control, in
addition to the 100 California cities that won mobile home rent control policies.
The call for rent control by East Palo Alto residents created both bridge and
boundary between Latino activists and established African-American leaders, some of the
latter of whom were homeowners and viewed renter questions as an increasingly
otherized, Hispanic issue (personal communication, January 7, 2013). The East Palo Alto
incorporation effort that finally led to cityhood in 1983 created both coalition and
controversy among established activists in East Palo Alto. The incorporation
“movement” involved a Black and Latino coalition of activists whose local political
expertise and leadership had grown from their organizing experience over the preceding
decades.
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Education organizing had already included examples of Black and Latino
coalition-building throughout the region, including the establishment of Nairobi College
as at first a multiracial endeavor, and its spin-off sister project, the Hispanic-based
Venceremos College in nearby Redwood City. But it was not until the late 1970s that the
Latino population grew in East Palo Alto with increasing visibility, from 5% in 1978 to
14% in 1980 (Rigenhagen, 1993; 24-25). As several commentators on the East Palo
Alto’s incorporation efforts observed, the African-American and Latino composition of
the organizing work for cityhood ultimately contributed a “unifying” identity within the
increasingly diverse working class (Batchelder, 1994). Yet the call for incorporation,
which would involve municipal service authority and include formal representation of
East Palo Alto in the regional political structure, did not receive the support of all of
those who had earlier organized around community control.
An era of demographic change was punctuated by the ongoing segregation
dilemmas of Ravenswood High School, long a focal point of organizing in East Palo
Alto. The 1976 closing of Ravenswood High was in retrospect considered by many
activists there a loss of a pillar social and geographic institution for East Palo Alto’s
diverse majority-minority community formation, as well as a specific loss of an AfricanAmerican cultural institution (Lowe, 1989; Dreams of A City, [1988] 1996; Moraga,
2002).24 The confluence and complexity of the loss of Ravenswood High School,

24 The closing resulted from a series of desegregation agreements reached beginning in 1971. Many
Japanese, Filipino, and Samoan students were the first who voluntarily left East Palo Alto’s
Ravenswood High School as part of the first agreement, an opt-out transfer plan. That same year, an
opt-in transfer effort led to the bussing of volunteer white students from surrounding white districts
to East Palo Alto. The inter-district integration experiment was short lived, and the loss of white
student volunteer enrollment finally led to the closing of Ravenswood in 1976, more than two
decades after Brown v. Board of Education. The majority African-American Ravenswood student
population merged with an existing school outside East Palo Alto that had largely served the Hispanic
student population of east Menlo Park.
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changing demographics, the repression of the Black Freedom Movement, ideological
splits, and the 1970s recession further added challenges to the organizing among
established activist leaders in East Palo Alto.
Notably, the cityhood coalition faced strong opposition from the Nairobi Day
School founder Gertrude Wilks who became an influential and outspoken voice against
incorporation. The axis against incorporation was framed along homeowner and landlord
interests versus tenant “newcomers.” Wilks formed the United Homeowners of East Palo
Alto to protest incorporation. She argued that property owners would bare the burden of
resourcing the new city given an insufficient commercial tax base in East Palo Alto.
Alongside Wilks, absentee landlords were among the strongest opponents of the
incorporation effort. This was unsurprising given that the incorporation movement raised
“rent control” as a central tenet of its platform. The organization United Homeowners of
EPA also firmly opposed rent control (Kenrick, 1996).25
The opposition was organized. Tri-County Apartment Owners Association raised
$150,000 for anti-incorporation opposition by implementing an apartment tax on its
entire membership (Batchelder, 1994: 36). Whereas the San Mateo Board of Supervisors
stated they would call for the needed referendum vote, the incorporation advocates had to
present sufficient petitions to meet the requirements of the Local Agency Formation
Commission (LAFCO): petitioners representing 25% of registered voters, or 25% of the
landholders representing 25% of the assessed valuation of the land.
The Woodland Association of Residential Property Owners formed among
residents of the Westside bordered by the Bayshore expressway in East Palo Alto. This

25

For extensive media excerpts and primary source analysis, see San Mercury News and Palo Alto Tribune
and Calisphere collection.
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was an area with the greatest number of rental units. This association of landlords
supported East Palo Alto’s annexation to Menlo Park and also organized against
incorporation. A 1981 consultant report to LAFCO on the issue of incorporation
considered the options of incorporation versus annexation to Menlo Park, or the status
quo. The report concluded that incorporation would bring no significant burden to the
new city, which the report claimed would “break-even” from its separation from most
county services (Macdonald, 1981).
The campaign claimed that the consultants’ report showed that the opposition to
incorporation was political rather than based on the city’s financial forecast. Support for
incorporation had grown from an amalgamation of issues: the burdens of multiple service
fees based on special San Mateo County districts, a quest for majority-minority control
over local development decisions, and the recognition of the potential of local
government to allow for policy changes such as rent control. By all accounts, rent control
was the signature banner of the incorporation campaign (Batchelder, 1994). One EPA
tenant explained that the issue of rent control galvanized him into support for the
incorporation campaign based on a simple phone call:
The woman asked, ‘Did you know that should the vote for incorporation pass, the
first decision of the newly empowered city council will be to freeze rent and
initiate the process to rent control?’ In one split nano-second I became a convert
to incorporation. Mind you, I knew nothing about rent control except for the fact
that it was something that happened in NYC. (personal communication, June 8,
2012)
The tenant described himself as a “victimized renter” at the time, and said he would not
have supported incorporation due to the tax-base insufficiencies if not for the rent control
component.
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The tax-based insufficiencies would become of increased concern as federal
disinvestment from cities persisted nationwide. Moreover, given the property tax
restrictions of Proposition 13, in the early 1990s California’s state legislature would
mandate property-tax revenue to provide a revenue stream direcly to the state that would
prevent collection by municipalities. Localities became increasingly reliant on
entrepreneurial land use to collect retail sales tax (Wassmer, 2002). East Palo Alto’s
resounding pro-tenant incorporation efforts offered significant if limited protections for
individual renters, but importantly for the future of the city’s rental housing stock. The
significance would become ever more apparent and urgent in the context of increasing
and concurrent devolution (see Emmeus Davis, 2006), privatization, and fiscalization of
land use.
As promised throughout the cityhood campaign, the first East Palo Alto City
Council adopted the Rent Stabilization and Eviction for Good Cause Ordinance
(Ordinance No. 17-83) as its first act of cityhood. The city’s ordinance was premised on
discouraging speculation in housing. The order’s purpose stated this effect:
to protect residential tenants in the City from unreasonable rent increases by
discouraging speculation in rental property and stabilizing rent increases; to
protect tenants from arbitrary, discriminatory or retaliatory evictions; and at the
same time to assure landlords both a fair return and rental income sufficient to
cover costs of maintenance and operating expenses as well as the costs of capital
improvements to their rental properties. (Ord. No. 17-83:3.)
“Just-cause” eviction provisions were important measures for local renters at the time of
the legislation, but would become especially important ten years later when the state law
Costa-Hawkins Act would all but gut local rent control.
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In California the strongest local measures, 14 in all, including the East Palo Alto
ordinance of 1983, were undercut by the 1995 state vacancy decontrol-recontrol
provision that is the main thrust of the still existing state-wide Costa-Hawkins Rental
Housing Act ("Costa-Hawkins," California Civil Code §§1954.50 et seq.) that went into
effect in 1999.26 Costa-Hawkins created a landlord tool to unravel some of the strongest
provisions of municipal rental protections: vacancy decontrol. Local ordinances with just
cause provisions like East Palo Alto became ever more significant to maintain the right to
stay put (with the exception of owner move in, conversion, or demolition), and prevent
sudden rent increases. That is, if you were fortunate enough to already have secured a
rent-regulated place to live at a rent you could afford, your unit would remain affordable
absent wage loss.
East Palo Alto had established its ordinance before Costa-Hawkins. It was as an
active rather than passive measure in a design for affordability that required landlords to
register rents and respond to tenants’ petitions for repairs. Unlike wartime rent freezes,
such second phase post-war rent stabilization programs (commonly referred to as rent
control in California) did not freeze rents, however. In East Palo Alto’s example, rent
increases are tied to the Consumer Price Index increases.
Even before Costa-Hawkins, in the first decade of East Palo Alto’s rent control
implementation, rents across regulated units increased by a cumulative total of 39.4%
between 1984-1994 (Kazak, 1995). During this same period, in the first ten years of rent
stabilization in East Palo Alto, tenant turn-over decreased and the rental housing stock

26

Costa Hawkins paralleled the state’s Proposition 13 tax control-decontrol provisions, and New York’s
similar but more restrictive 1993 vacancy decontrol provisions for means-tested (renter income),
condominium rentals, and co-op rentals.
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increased. U.S. Census shows that compared to East Palo Alto’s tenants in 1980, East
Palo Alto’s tenants in 1990 had remained longer in their units (15% compared to 23%
had lived in their apartments more than five years in those years, respectively) (Kazak,
1995; 1999; U.S. Census). Also, there was a 14% increase in rental units available by
1990 compared with 1980, mostly due to owner conversion to rental (Ibid.). In effect, in
its first ten years the East Palo Alto rent ordinance defied landlord predictions that the
ordinance would cause a disincentive to rent, and that landlords would be unable to
receive fair returns. At the same time, East Palo Alto was able to show that sustained
tenure for renters had increased, and that projected pressures of gentrification— thought
to be just around the corner, could be potentially abated.
What came just around the corner, however, was decontrol through Costa
Hawkins. Landlords could re-set rents to market rate with every vacancy and subsequent
new renter. Yet, in East Palo Alto where rent control exists, the subsequent rents for that
unit are then re-controlled, and can again increase only up to the maximum allowable
rent tied to the Consumer Price Index. In this way, Costa Hawkins undercuts local rent
control’s potential to reduce real rents throughout the city or if brought to regional scale.
Moreover, new construction by state mandate is exempted from local rent control
ordinances. Further, as more units were decontrolled, the market rent ceiling became the
baseline-regulated rent. In other words, the regulated ceiling rent becomes the floor.
Vacancy decontrol in a housing market positioned for gentrification can discourage
tenant unity and encourage landlords to push people out.
Only when ‘no one leaves’ does rent control over time, on the other hand, result
in potential income redistribution and affordability impact for renters. Likewise, only
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sustained rent control to scale could reduce real rents through a prevailing affordable rent
in a jurisdiction. Renter households between 1980-2010 experienced an increase in
percent of income spent on rent indicating affordability burdens in East Palo Alto and the
region. One explanation of this is that despite rent control, and notwithstanding
California’s decontrol provisions, renters were poorer than in years past given that middle
class renters with means had aspired and realized home ownership in part due to
predatory lending (Joint Center for Housing Studies, 2011; Wyly and Ponder, et. al.,
2012; Schafran and Wegmann, 2012). Even with the rent burden in East Palo Alto,
average rent in East Palo Alto remained much lower than in San Mateo County, which
for a family-sized 4 bedroom unit was nearly twice East Palo Alto’s median rent in 2013
(Rockefeller Harris and Cespedes, 2015:4).
Table 3.3: East Palo Alto Selected Profile 1980-2010, ACS U.S. Census
East Palo Alto
White
Black
Latino / Hispanic27
Asian
Other Race
Total Population
Owner-occupied units
Renter-occupied units
Median Gross Rent
Median Gross Rent (2010
inflation adjusted dollars)
Gross Rent as 35% or more
of household income (see
footnote for 2010
exception)

1980
19.3%
60.3%
14%
5.3%
8%
18,191
45%
55%
$278
(1979
dollars)
$778

1990
12.1%
42.9%
36.4%
9.2%
15.1%
23,451
44.6%
55.4%
$586
(1989 dollars)

2010
6.2%
15.8%
64.5%
3.6%
9.8%
28,155
42.8%
57.2%
$1,154
(2010 dollars)

$948

2000
6.5%
22.5%
58.5%
2.2%
42.3%
29,506
43.5%
56.5%
$826
(1999
dollars)
$1,081

38%

40.8%

44.1%

61%
(as 30% or
more of
household

$1,154

27

With the exception of this category, Latino-Hispanic, all other categories by race reported for those who
self identified as non-Spanish or non-Hispanic origin, alone, for 1980-2010.
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Gross Rent as 50% or more
of household income on
rent

n/a

n/a

23.8%

income)28
35.4%

As shown in Figure 3.3 East Palo Alto remains a renter majority city. In 1970, just
39.3% of East Palo Alto’s housing units were owner-occupied (San Mateo County,
1981). Ten years later, ownership rates peaked at 45% owner occupancy in 1980; owner
tenure status has remained nearly the same for thirty years. So too has average median
income, $52K in 2010 in East Palo Alto compared with $86K in all of San Mateo County
(ACS, 2010). The greatest change to East Palo Alto has been in rent burden, population
(up 72%) and race and ethnic composition. At the time of corporate landlord investment
in the early 2000s, Latinos represented the same proportion of residents that Black
residents represented at the time of incorporation. Whereas most subprime lending as
well as public subsidies including Section 8 and public housing were unavailable to many
immigrants based on noneligible citizen status, rent regulated housing provided an option
for affordability. Meanwhile, many more Black residents left the city in the 1990s due to
increased crime, and the greater competition for quality affordable housing in the city.
Despite this, political control remained largely based on African-American
representation.
In 2008, Latinos for the first time gained a majority of East Palo Alto City
Council seats. Between 1988-2002, during a period of greatest increase in Latino
population, there were no Latinos represented on the council, which was held by majority

28

n/a = not available for this Decennial year. ACS 2010 (5-Year Estimates) provided for 2010. In this case,
ACS only reports rent as percentage of household income for percentages 30% or more and 50% or more
of household income provided. For ACS 2010 61.6% of East Palo Alto renters spent 30% or more of
household income on rent.
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or all Black representatives in those years. In 2010, however and at the time of this
writing, the city council remained majority Black. The living legacy of the city as a seat
of Black political power in Silicon Valley outlives the changing residential ethnic
composition of the city.

Chapter Conclusion

Despite notions of California’s progressive liberalism, the state’s historical
development followed a path-dependent and state-induced racial valorization of land and
housing. The early history of the state reflects a white settler regime of occupation and
monopoly land holdings. Yet despite these property arrangements, racialized through the
state’s Alien Land Law and restrictive covenants, redlining, and legislative attempts, East
Palo Alto demonstrates an oppositional story that at times blurred periphery and center.
In the development of Silicon Valley, early small farmers attempted to create their own
version of utopia. Japanese horticulturalists dominated a segment of worldtrade, Blacks
created community control projects where white flight created space, and Latinos found
affordability in a sea of skyrocketing rents, predatory lending, and state abandonment.
Throughout this narrative, state policy regulated the racialized poor, and their
discontent, while also protecting privileges of white (majority) homeowners through tax
incentives and direct property subsidies. Although rent regulation was legislated in East
Palo Alto to mitigate and even prevent gentrification, Costa-Hawkins allowed for steadily
increasing rent and rent burdens. This gaping loop-hole that allowed landlords to
establish market rents as a base rent for regulation with every turnover of a unit signaled
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new opportunity for real estate investors with capital backing.
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DECONTROL
Chapter 4. Gambling on the City
Chapter Introduction

East Palo Alto was well known by real estate investors, developers, and lenders
for its Rent Stabilization Ordinance (RSO), which at the time of Page Mill’s buy-up
limited rent increases to a rate equivalent to the Bay Area’s overall rate of inflation. As
detailed in the previous chapter, the ordinance arose as part and parcel to the campaign
for cityhood just 30 years earlier. Rent control was enacted as a tool to prevent the further
exploitation of racial containment,
or historical lack of mobility in the
region for people of color, and for
Blacks in particular, on the one
hand, and to protect city residents
from displacement due to potential
gentrification, and racial and class
displacement, on the other hand.
This form of rental restriction in
practice curtailed market rents by

Figure 4.1 Westside of East Palo Alto (Existing
Conditions Report, February 2014: 1-7)

providing a reduced rent ceiling.
Perceived instead as “floor,” rental restrictions indicate the possibility of a “rent gap” or
profits if potential underlying land value could become realized (Smith, 1979). Landlords
took advantage of this gap through the vacancy decontrol window during tenant turn
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over, which conflicted with East Palo Alto’s own restrictions once Costa Hawkins went
into full effect in California in 1999.
Whereas the City of East Palo Alto was produced through defiant responses to
opportunity disparity in housing for Blacks, Latinos, Japanese and Chinese in the region,
corporate landlordism in this instance demonstrates a shape-shifting in racial capital
innovation with political consequence. For East Palo Alto’s majority minority Black and
Latino city leadership, rent control policy not only had allowed the city to remain a
bastion of affordability in the region, but it was politically expedient. Affordability and
security of tenure were and remain necessary measures to hold back Silicon Valley
hyper-gentrification and thereby sustain majority minority political representation in the
city and voice in regional politics. The classed and racial project of gentrification and the
potential scale of displacement in East Palo Alto remains a political threat to the very
founders of the city, and to the potential for majority minority political control there in
the future.
Between 2006-2008 a large corporate landlord, Page Mill II, L.P., a Delaware
liability company, accrued a relatively huge proportion of concentrated properties in one
single and narrow corridor of East Palo Alto. (See Figure 4.1.) Altogether, the Page Mill
II fund’s $270 million purchase represented about half of the city’s entire squat singlefamily bungalow, duplex, and multifamily midrise rental stock (American Community
Survey, 2007). The portfolio comprised 114 land parcels and 185 small to mid size
buildings, including 1,818 residential rental units of which approximately 1,600 were
subject to the city’s rent control (Stockbridge Capital Group, 2009).
This chapter asks the question: “How were tenants impacted and mobilized by
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this corporate landlord?” This chapter provides an overview of key organizing entities,
the impact of the organizing model on tenants, and the way in which this landlord’s
monopoly purchase directly threatened East Palo Alto’s rent control ordinance and renter
security. Subsequent Chapters 5 and 6 analyze the portfolio capital stakeholders,
including capital interdependencies, and the points of vulnerability that tenants and the
City of East Palo Alto leveraged through their oppositional action.

Organizing in East Palo Alto

In 2007, tenant organizing in East Palo Alto was catalyzed specifically around
Page Mill rent increases, rather than out of an existing organized group of tenants. The
various entities involved in the Page Mill organizing exemplify some of the differences in
approaches to social action within and outside the non-profit organizational terrain. The
groups, unaffiliated with one another except through bridge leaders who participated in
multiple organizations, provided support to tenants in East Palo Alto, and exemplify the
types of approaches involved in many urban non-profit and activist sectors of this period
along the differentiated lines of generation, class, race, and approach. The entities
involved in the tenant actions against Page Mill ranged from a latent tenant advocacy
organization that had maintained some infrastructure even through times of abeyance, as
well as ongoing youth organizing, church congregation organizing, legal services, and a
small group of tenants who were affiliated with Stanford University.
Before the Page Mill buy-up, there was no active tenant organization in East Palo
Alto, save for East Palo Alto’s small network of activists loosely involved with East Palo
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Alto Council of Tenants (EPACT) who usually met monthly, but sometimes weekly
during intense activity, and often in the recreation center of a local mobile home park
(interview, 2012). The all-volunteer EPACT typically sprang into action around specific
issues led by their president, a vocal civic leader of housing justice who also sat on the
Rent Stabilization Board for more than a decade. EPACT largely involved the established
generation of EPA activists, several of whom had entered into formal local political
office and had been involved in community control, urban agriculture, and incorporation
efforts. The EPACT work was based on a community advocacy model rather than a
tenant union or council form. EPACT as an education and outreach-based group lent its
name to local referenda measures for defending rent control in EPA, galvanized tenants
and city officials against egregious landlords, and at times held workshops and published
communiqués to educate tenants on their rights and available legal services.
A lead organization in the Page Mill campaign was Youth United for Community
Action (YUCA). YUCA is a youth-led organizing initiative operating from an
unassuming ranch house in East Palo Alto’s working class east side. Although focusing
on East Palo Alto, YUCA was and is buoyed by its network with a broader Peninsula and
Bay area activist community. YUCA had a handful of paid organizers on staff, 650 youth
members in their teens and twenties (a remarkable number given the small size of East
Palo Alto), and ran a dedicated leadership and organizing program with core youth
leaders. They also had a significant local victory under their belt at the time Page Mill
became a known adversary: the 2007 shutting down of Romic chemical plant. This was
the plant, that since the 1950s, had made East Palo Alto the dumpster of Silicon Valley
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toxins.29 An intergenerational effort bringing together YUCA youth and adult
environmental justice leaders from East Palo Alto and the region led the shut down. The
ten-year battle honed YUCA leadership’s organizing skills, energized its youthdevelopment, activated allies including City Council members, and helped to shape its
mission as a base-building group in East Palo Alto.
The Romic campaign led to questions of community development, which helped
to focus YUCA demands around who controlled the Romic land and its use. “We began
to ask what could be reimagined for that space, by and for the community,” explained
one organizer who had first been involved in YUCA in her early 20s and remained as a
paid organizer into her 30s (interview, 2012). She put the Page Mill campaign in the
context of a longer legacy of activism, “This community hasn’t been afraid of corporate
bullies. EPA was a city that grew out of self-determination; people had passion, history,
drive” (personal interview, 2012). YUCA organizers saw the Page Mill fight as an
extension of their fight against Romic, also an “outsider” entity, and that their role in part
was to bring the longer organizing history of East Palo Alto’s community control
movement to the tenants, many of whom were the families of the young people who
participated in YUCA’s programs. As another YUCA organizer said, “We didn’t shut
down Romic to clean up EPA for wealthy white people to then move in and gentrify us
out of our homes” (interview, 2012). She added, “We don’t want to be just about slowing
the tide of gentrification.” Shutting down and cleaning up Romic was not only about
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For a discussion of environmental racism through a regional framework of how white people secure
cleaner spaces for themselves see Laura Pulido (2000) “Rethinking Environmental Racism: White Privilege
and Urban Development in Southern California,” Annals of the Association of American Geographers,
90:1, 12-40
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worker and environmental health and safety; it was about re-envisioning land use, and
asserting community democratic control over East Palo Alto.
Throughout the Page Mill campaign youth leaders gathered in the houseconverted organizing hub for check-ins, tenant clinics, workshops, planning for action
research, marches, rallies, petition drives, and for a meeting with the portfolio lenders,
which they hosted. For YUCA, organizing necessitates leadership by people most
affected by the issue. This was the case from paid staff to youth members. The director of
YUCA was also a tenant of the Page Mill properties, “It’s a small community in EPA, so
it’s a different fight for change, when every fight is a scale that impacts the city in a
concrete way.” Another organizer referring to the Romic campaign put it this way, “Our
work was not about connecting theory to groundwork, but the other way around”
(Domingo and Nguyen, 2009:n.p.) 30 They experienced directly the problems and sought
to develop critical consciousness and experiences of action and change around an
intersectional understanding of oppression and power.
This organizer emphasized that YUCA pursues strategy that demands personal
change as well as change of root-causes: “There’s no turning back. We deal with
contradictions of the personal and the political.” This definition of power speaks to their
engagement with the personal: “Power for us is power from within, to ignite something
positive to think clearly, develop voice, and become a leader by realizing the opportunity
to advance yourself by advancing others along with you.” Power “within,” is described
here as self-development motivated by social change, a component of critical youthleadership development, and one in which, as Gaventa (2006) notes, “refers to gaining
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the sense of self-identity, confidence and awareness that is a precondition of action” (p.
24). Importantly, one’s own voice is contingent upon the development of others, “along
with you,” YUCA’s organizer had explained.
Identifying individual problems as intersectional, and social issues at the axis of
race, class, gender and seeing oneself as an agent in creating change through the mutual
reinforcement of agency of others not only engages in the “sociological imagination,” but
a critical sociological imagination and praxis. Importantly, power, a relational concept,
whether as a concept of fluid, circular, or material resource, is rooted not only in capacity
but in actualization, which to be strategic and expansive must be undergirded by purpose
(intent), and effect.31 In the Romic campaign, YUCA’s organizers had already
demonstrated not only potential but actual power through disruptive tactics blocking
Romic’s ability to renew its permit, and in so, doing had continued developing individual
and collective voice and capacity among their members.
Finding and asserting voice for youth activists and leaders in East Palo Alto was
operationalized by YUCA in part through participatory action research (PAR). YUCA
involved youth leaders in Page Mill by asking them to engage first-hand with the issues
by designing their own research project about themselves and where they lived. They
knocked on doors, participated in conversations, documented conditions, and asked
tenants to join ongoing actions against Page Mill. Young people, who most often are
alienated from decision-making about their lives, were themselves experiencing the
household stress of families under threat of eviction. YUCA as an organizing project

31

I distinguish different conceptualizations of power in organizing in departure from the 1990s throwback
term, “empowerment,” see the works of Piven & Cloward (1977), Wrong (1979), Jenkins (2002), and
Gaventa (2006).
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provided not only access to decision-makers, but also was a vehicle for group mutual
support. PAR itself provided a technology for having otherwise difficult conversations
within their families about their living conditions and the consequences of those
conditions on their relationships and future. Youth leaders produced their report
specifically on Page Mill, and later, three short films on local organizing highlighting the
Romic campaign and urban farming and land use in East Palo Alto. The youth members
hold regular tours of the former toxic Romic site pointing out redevelopment plans. They
are the experts on their owns lives and their community.
Another well-established organizing outfit in the region at the time was Peninsula
Interfaith Action, known as PIA.32 Although in leadership transition during the time of
Page Mill’s initial rent increases, PIA later joined in the tenant organizing work. Several
of their members, congregants of four different East Palo Alto member churches, were
also Page Mill tenants. One volunteer leader was forced out of her Page Mill apartment
and the congregation rallied around her to raise the issue of tenant rights in their church
(personal communication, June 5, 2012). PIA’s lead organizer said fundamentally their
work for affordable housing has been part of “ …trying to confront a politics in the
Valley that bends over backwards for its affluent constituency to the total disregard of the
working class” (Ibid.). PIA’s strategy was based on holding public officials accountable
to the working class.
PIA is part of the People Improving Communities Organization (PICO) faith
based-organizing network that became established in California in the 1970s, first out of
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The PICO affiliates San Francisco Organizing Project and the Peninsula Interfaith Action merged in
2014 to form the SFOP/PIA Bay Area organizing outfit.
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Oakland by Alinskyist John Bauman who was trained by Tom Gaudette.33 At that time in
East Palo Alto, the Black Power movement and community control movement, and later
the rent control and incorporation movement, were highly distinguished in ideology,
strategy and tactics from the systematic and at times pragmatist “organizing” of the
Alinsky-based formations.34 PICO espoused local organizational development around
neighborhood and municipal issues, usually detached from ideology and movements. For
example, the PICO organizers’ first principle of strategy “Small is beautiful” privileges
immediate and winnable issues of “self-interest,”35 which while holding those in power to
task, may avoid questioning of the underlying power structure itself.
In the PICO case, the faith-based network developed and deployed a model that
identified congregations, and subsequently congregant leaders to surface issues for
collective action. In East Palo Alto, PIA action included pressuring the city council for a
fully-equipped grocery store, affordable housing, policing, and the regulation of
secondary dwelling units. “Congregations choose issues, anything from education reform
to speed bumps,” explained the PIA organizer. A volunteer leader in the PIA youth
branch attested that PIA created change by improving sidewalks, a safety issue for
seniors, and taking part in city beautification efforts (personal communication, June 5,
2012).
PIA also had established the organization’s leadership in advocating for housing
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For an accounting of PICO’s formation and their shift from neighborhood to congregational approach,
see the compilation by Aaron Shutz and Mike Miller (2014).
34
In her unpublished thesis Lily Batchelder (1994) argued that though the Alinsky tradition dominated the
field of community organizing at the time of East Palo Alto’s incorporation movement, activists in East
Palo Alto drew from their own distinct legacy, tradition, and theory of change. See Batchelder (1994) “The
Incorporation Movement of East Palo Alto: Renegotiating the Boundaries of Community Organizing
Theory.” Unpublished thesis, Stanford University.
35
Aaron Shutz and Mike Miller (2014).
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affordability in Silicon Valley, and in 2002 won the creation of a housing trust fund in
San Mateo County. In their fight against gentrification in East Palo Alto, however, PIA’s
lead organizer explained that the issues of inequity demanded a new guiding perspective.
She explained that gentrification structured by race and economy demanded deeper
understanding. “One thing we realized is that what PIA hasn’t done a very good job of is
understanding how racial inequity is produced and created here and the impacts of that
and asking ourselves what’s at the heart of that,” she explained (Ibid.). Traditional
demands by PICO for access to resources or decision-makers could not address the
dimensions of why and how inequity existed in the first place.
Another effort involved singular voices of more privileged tenants who had also
experienced the dramatic effects of Page Mill rent increases. This group, EPA Fair Rent
Coalition, was an informal effort without non-profit status. The group was primarily led
by a small group of white men who were self-directed and created an online campaign
hub that produced and compiled media articles, their own analysis of vacancies, and
resources on tenant rights. The coalition also included YUCA and EPACT.
The driving impetus by EPA Fair Rent Coalition was transparency and justice.
They sought to understand as fully as possible the agenda behind the Page Mill
investment, and disclose these plans along with data on displacement, in order to incur
“damage,” on the investors as described by one tenant activist, a Stanford PhD candidate
at the time who led media outreach (interview, 2012). Armed with stats and capacity for
communications, the group aimed to strike at Page Mill for what they considered to be
the sinister and illegal gutting of rent control. “In science, if you lie, you get caught,”
explained the tenant who took on the role of communications director (interview, 2012).
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His approach to Page Mill was based on a premise that facts speak volumes, and public
information was key for enhancing democracy and accountability.
This particular activist also believed “organizing is a science” (interview, 2012).
His work on the Page Mill campaign demonstrated to him a need for what he described as
a “parachuting” traveling and organizing training consultancy that could arrive at places
such as East Palo Alto with honed methodology to arm organizers with expertise and
capacity to impact media and carry out strategy. Unaffiliated with organizing networks,
the tenant had a short-term aim that he believed required short-term capacity support: to
halt the rent increases and evictions.
Carefully developed press releases and cultivated media contacts by the Fair Rent
Coalition led to an onslaught of media articles covering Page Mill and tenant actions.
This also led to responses from Page Mill, including ridicule in the San Francisco
Chronicle by a reputational management representative that called this particular student
activist a “one-man action hero” (Abraham, 2009; Hogarth, 2009). The post was seen by
that tenant as an age-old tactic to single out one individual, weaken his credibility, and
fan flames of distrust among the East Palo Alto tenants (interview, 2012).
Unlike YUCA, PIA, or EPACT, many of the Stanford-affiliated tenants who were
initiators of the Fair Rent Coalition did not have a long-term stake in East Palo Alto.
(They have all since moved.) Finding themselves as tenants in a crisis of what they
considered to be illegal rent increases, however, they acted with urgency. They were
named plaintiffs in a class-action against Page Mill. One tenant who was a start up
software developer, in considerable debt and in need of affordable housing (Superior
Court of California Count of Santa Clara, 2008), lent his time and skills to analyze the
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rent stabilization ordinance and help draft new city legislation. By the time Page Mill was
facing foreclosure, however, the most visible tenant activist of this group, the
communications director, was entangled in a controversy that at times distanced him
from the other organizers.
Tenants Together, based in San Francisco, had just launched when East Palo Alto
tenants rallied into action. There had been no statewide tenant advocacy network in
California, and Dean Preston, previously an attorney for the San Francisco Tenderloin
Housing Clinic, envisioned a tenants’ movement at a political scale that could counter
Costa Hawkins and the Ellis Act.
The creation of the statewide organization was timely in ways that many had not
anticipated: the national housing crisis was just about to “hit the fan.” The landscape was
changing. Homeowners were becoming bank tenants and renters. Renters in foreclosed
properties were threatened by eviction. Greater demand for rental housing would soon
spur even higher rents causing a renter crisis. Moreover, the statewide proposal to phase
out local rent control, Proposition 98, would test the state’s appetite for tenant
protections. At the local level, East Palo Alto provided the nascent Tenants Together an
opportunity to support a local fight aligned with their state-wide tenant rights goals.
Tenants Together had just opened shop when the City of East Palo Alto declared a citywide moratorium on rent increases.
YUCA and PIA were at the time the organizations most closely aligned with
organizing principles: alter power relationships between people and institutions, sustain
and expand capacity for people most affected by the issues, and win demands through
collective direct action and other tactics led by people most affected by the issue. Tenants
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Together’s approach aligned with organizing and employed staff organizers who worked
directly with local groups such as those in East Palo Alto. Although Tenants Together
involves organizational members, not all of these groups are membership base-building
groups. In this way, Tenants Together’s approach, at the time, could be cast as an
organization with a network of local and state-based organizations working
simultaneously to build advocacy and organizing infrastructure for local and statewide
wins.
The Fair Rent Coalition worked closely with Tenants Together. Those in
voluntary roles of staffing the local coalition were also Page Mill tenants and at times
called themselves organizers. Yet in retrospect, the work of the coalition was ad-hoc, or
limited to the current campaign, and in addition to the organizing by YUCA and PIA of
tenants to participate in their organizations, primarily involved advocacy tactics; this
included expert testimony and drafting proposed policies by the voluntary “organizers” of
the coalition. They were tenants and spoke on behalf of tenants but without a dedicated
method for identifying and developing leaders. Nor were they accountable to a larger
group of tenants, and did not necessarily claim responsibility for the outcomes of their
efforts.36
Theories of change inform and link strategy, tactics, methods and organizational
form. Theories also develop through lived experience of oppression. Discontent varies in
degree but also in quality. Not everyone’s anger is the same.37 YUCA was a group that
was anchored in a membership base of people in and of East Palo Alto who had
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Taking responsibility for outcomes is part of what distinguishes a leader from an activist. See Han
(2014).
37
Thank you to my friend Pancho Arguelles for this conversation.
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experienced their coming of age in a place of housing and safety insecurity. A tenet of
YUCA’s work had followed in the tradition of Septima Clark and Paulo Freire who
taught that oppressed people know the answers to their own problems. The Fair Rent
Coalition, of which YUCA was a member, in contrast, involved some activists who based
on their own education and drive privileged the expertise of hard facts and the ethos of
fairness over struggle.

Tenants Speak

“We’re Poor People”
Just as the holidays drew near, in November and December 2007, 1,160 rent
controlled units across the Page Mill’s holdings in East Palo Alto received rent increase
notices. Page Mill attempted to justify the increases to the East Palo Alto Rent
Stabilization Board saying that by combining legal increases that landlords had not taken
in the past, they attained the maximum allowable rent ceiling. Page Mill, represented by
the Woodland Park Management Co., claimed these cumulative increases were allowed
but not taken for previous years. They planned to cash-in on what they considered to be
“banked” rents, a practice the rent board would later restrict in response to the Page Mill
attempt.
Tenants, some threatened by eviction, spurred into action. The standard response
to contest rent grievances for tenants had been to petition before the rent board. In late
2007, Stanford Legal Clinic and Community Legal Services took on over 150 such
petitions by tenants against the rent hikes. Even while petitions were being processed,
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tenants were moving (personal communication, January 9, 2014). Many of the petitioners
were first galvanized in door knocking by YUCA youth leaders and volunteers from
EPACT.
Rent hikes across the portfolio were the first signal of Page Mill’s plans to
undermine rent control and reconfigure East Palo Alto. According to one rent board
administrator, “The city council saw the issue as a low-income people of color issue, and
they knew they had to act… and they lived in fear of the Brown Act” (personal
communication, May 31, 2012). A Brown Act violation involves elected officials
deliberating outside open forums. The longer the period awaiting results from the
individual petitions, the greater the possibility that elected officials might deliberate on
their response outside of a public forum and contend with accusations of violating the
Act. The city council brought the issue to the fore with an emergency public hearing to
vote on a moratorium on rent increases to halt Page Mill action. It was one of city
council’s very first items of business in the New Year.
Although intended as a temporary stay during the review period of the petitions,
the effect of the moratorium proposal was to consolidate the individual complaints to
demonstrate the collective scale of the evictions and rent hikes, and force an affirmative
reading of the local rent control ordinance in favor of the tenants. The hearing brought
out approximately 400 tenants who packed the hall and the hallways (personal
communication, June 5, 2012). This was an overwhelming turn out for a small city of
approximately 29,000 residents, and represented approximately a third of the units
affected.
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The mayor and city council’s very act to draft legislation and schedule a public
forum to freeze rents already indicated the stance and position of the city. Only one city
council member with a history of censure by colleagues (he had been accused of slurs
and disruptive action) positioned himself as skeptical of the moratorium against Page
Mill. The council members shot down this council member’s move to contest the ability
of another council member who was also a Page Mill tenant to participate in the vote
based on alleged conflict of interest (Special City Council Meeting, January 3, 2008).38
The attorney for the city made clear there was only one provision that allowed for
a rent increase for existing tenants, the Consumer Price Index, at the time set at 3.2%:

The purpose of the ordinance, in place since 1983, is to stabilize rent, to prevent
precisely the situation that you face tonight, which are rents going up to 47
percent in some instances. It has worked fairly well for its entire history, until
now, and the reason it's worked so well is one very clear provision of the
ordinance that's codified in the East Palo Alto Municipal Code… ‘Once each year
all landlords shall be permitted to charge rents in excess of that which they were
lawfully charging the previous year, based upon 100 percent of the change in the
Consumer Price Index’” (emphasis added, Special City Council Meeting, January
3, 2008)
Described as the “crux of the ordinance,” landlords tying rent to the CPI could add only
the CPI determined increase, plus a proportion of the fee for rent registration paid to the
city to the base rent of what had been paid the previous year, even if that rent was under
the increase permitted for the previous year. An attorney for Community Legal Services
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In fact, the same council member requested an opinion by the City attorney regarding whether there
would be a conflict given the possible effect of a moratorium vote on the council member’s economic
circumstances in violation of the Fair Political Practices Commission. The City attorney determined the
economic effect of rent increase or freeze would fall below the Commission’s threshold and gave the
opinion the council hearing could proceed with the council member’s participation and vote (Desouza and
Associates transcribed the City of East Palo Alto, Special City Council Meeting, January 3, 2008).
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echoed this argument, adding that individual petitions were burdensome for the city and
community’s resources, given the number of individuals affected, and that the matter
ultimately would be decided in the court’s interpretation of the law. In counter, David
Taran himself, along with what a tenant described as an “army of lawyers” also attended
the hearing and presented their case that they were in their rights to raise the rents.
A white man surrounded by a legion of attorneys, Taran stood in contrast to the
standing-room only crowd of majority Latino, Black and Pacific Islander tenants who
provided testimony one by one of previous homelessness, daily decisions based on
hunger, prescriptions, or rent, single parenthood, and double and triple work shifts. He
also stood in contrast to the council make-up, which included at the hearing three Black
representatives and one Latino; the latter of whom was the current renter, but not
leaseholder in a Page Mill unit.39
Taran attempted to present himself as the most reasonable person in the room. He
asked the city to “Work together in a calm and rational way to address this…” saying
“This is a mistake to adopt this tonight.” He invited individual tenants to speak to the
Page Mill management company directly to work out any difficulty. Notably, he had not
demonstrated the courtesy of explanation or negotiation when his management company
presented eviction notices, or unlawful detainers. In his statements, Taran ostensibly
suggested that the proceedings were irrational, the tenants emotionally blinded, and the
city lacking political sophistication. He admonished the city for keeping itself down:

We do not think that East Palo Alto should be a community that's disadvantaged
or looked down on by other communities. We want to bring East Palo Alto to a
standing where it should be, and that's the reason that we're doing this. We're
39

Another council member at the time, also African-American, was absent.
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improving the standards for our tenants, we want to improve their living
standards, the community. (Special City Council Meeting, January 3, 2008)
In the discourse of settlers, in this statement the general partner of the portfolio implied
that East Palo Alto elected officials and residents could not know their own interest and
that Page Mill knew what was best for improving their community. The representatives
for Page Mill, including Taran and attorneys, spoke early on in the hearing, allowing for
tenants to respond directly to their statements.
Tenants repeatedly made statements at the hearing that appealed to city council as
not only their representatives but as subject of the investor’s plans. Echoing other tenants’
statements such as “fight back,” and, “do not be intimidated,” one speaker framed Page
Mill as not only the tenants’ adversary, but as city council’s adversary:

They question our intelligence; they question your ability to govern. Don't think
they're not going to go back to their boardroom and laugh at you tomorrow about
what happened here tonight. Don't prove them right. Don't buckle. Fight. Resist.
Stand up for our community, because when those people leave and the rest of us
leave, when the face of East Palo Alto changes, so does the face of the city
council, and they're going to run some numbers up against you, and it's going to
be owned by the developers (Special City Council Meeting, January 3, 2008).
This tenant appealed to the city council’s very composition, which he claimed would
gentrify along with the city. Several other tenants speaking at the hearing referred to Page
Mill as an “outside corporation,” underscoring to the city council that “None of those
people live here in East Palo Alto,” and reminding them of the class and race divisions of
their city while distinguishing themselves from the rest of Silicon Valley: “Things are
being allowed to happen… stop it… We're poor people. We're not Palo Altans, we're East
Palo Altans.” Referring to “corporations coming in to buy up” East Palo Alto, another
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tenant observed, “It's the first step in displacing people of color, low-income people of
color in this community.” Another resident boldly claimed, “East Palo Alto belongs to us,
the poor people.” Tenants were unapologetic; no one paid lip service to the landlord’s
“right to fair returns” or need to profit off their investment, except as a way to explain an
exploitative system.
Tenants overwhelmingly presented testimonies of personal hardship. At the same
time, testimonies questioned the myth of rent control as an income program that replaced
work or allowed for low-income tenants to live in leisure. Tenants also both critiqued and
drew upon the narrative of renting as a holding, a temporary position before
homeownership. Homeownership, the goal, asserted some tenants, was unattainable
given the proportion of their earnings spent on rent. Tenant after tenant demonstrated that
they worked maximum hours and could barely afford the prior rents, even if still below
Silicon Valley full market rates, let alone accrue savings. “How the heck are you going to
save anything or have anything if you’re going to take 90 percent of your earnings just to
pay for where you live?” remarked one tenant. Another renter expressed his
disillusionment and stress with the rent burden, “You're supposed to be able to save
money living in an apartment, not be broke every paycheck, worrying about the next bill.
Man, I cannot make it.”
The testimonies spoke of the psycho-social stress of economic insecurity: “This
has got me kind of nervous, because I ain’t never been in this position before… this rent
increase have really taken a load on my mind.” A senior, she remarked how living alone
would not be feasible with the more than $100 increase she received from Page Mill. She
noted that other apartments had young workers quadrupled up in the same size one
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bedroom to share the rent burden, but she was one person.40 Another speaker attested to
the struggle for seniors who, in particular, had raised their families in East Palo Alto,
even through the worst of times and were now threatened by displacement. The testimony
is significant to quote at length because despite many residents’ determination to remain
in East Palo Alto during periods of disinvestment, a lack of affordable housing would
make staying during times of so-called investment impossible:

Many of your citizens are simply going to take that notice and leave, rather than
try to fight, because they don't have the wherewithal. My one neighbor couldn't
come out because of the weather and there was a hazard that's right outside her
door, but like it's been the last three or four months that if she buys her medicine
and pays her rent, she has nothing left for food. So we get together, take her a
brown bag. But if she has this increase, she's not going to be able to buy food nor
medicine. Then what? You know, I'm really worried about her, because she's on
the verge of a breakdown or suicide…She worked here all her life, raised her kids,
outlived her kids, and now this happens (Special City Council Meeting, January 3,
2008).
The rent increases were prohibitive for seniors fixed-income households, especially.
Unlike rent stabilization and rent control laws in New York State, East Palo Alto’s Rent
Stabilization Ordinance (RSO) did not freeze or cap rents specifically for seniors.
The moratorium did not pass that first council hearing despite compelling
testimony, support by the city council staff, and a simple majority. The same council
member who raised procedural issues and acted disgruntled throughout the hearing
abstained. Another council member was absent. One organizer later explained that the
activists expected the moratorium would be delayed requiring several additional readings
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Compared to 13% of San Mateo County renters, 42% of renters on East Palo Alto’s west side reported
overcrowded or extremely overcrowded living conditions. See American Community Survey 2011 (City of
East Palo Alto, 2013: 7-4).
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before a final vote (personal communication, May 31, 2012). Instead, however, in a
surprising move the city council voted on the ordinance the following week during a
regular session, again packed with tenants. The vote was unanimous 5-0 in favor of a sixmonth moratorium on any rent increase in the City of East Palo Alto.
Doubly Disappeared
Among those who didn’t speak at the hearing were those tenants who already
moved out. One tenant at the initial moratorium hearing opened up his testimony by
bringing attention to the displaced: “But I want to tell you about the people that just
moved out, because the rent is too high for next month. They have probably about 40
people move out. I've seen at least six move out from my apartment complex, you know,
and the increase is way too much” (Special City Council Meeting, January 3, 2008). In
most cases, tenants moved out after receiving the rent increases and “pay or quit” notices
before eviction proceedings were underway.
One young resident who moved out later explained that as a result of Page Mill
rent increases, her home was no longer where she lived. Youth organizers from the
organization Youth United for Community Action (YUCA) interviewed her as part of
their participatory action research project they carried out to create a space for the voices
of people whose ability to remain in East Palo Alto was threatened. Many of the YUCA
youth leaders were also residents of the Page Mill Woodland Park housing. The young
former resident explained:
There are five people in total that live with me: my mom, my dad, my sister, my
little brother, and me... Now I live in Redwood City because my dad couldn’t pay
the rent increases by Page Mill Properties. My dad tried to fight the increases but
they would treat him without respect. His dignity was worth more than that to
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him.
Where I live now is great and everything, but it’s not my house. It will never be
the same as the other one because I was like a star up in the sky and now I am a
star falling... It’s as if something inside of me was missing. But even though I live
there, I still go to East Palo Alto Charter School. I choose to go there and make
the hour and a half journey. East Palo Alto is my home, and where I wanna be.
(Homeless Now, 2008:3)
Although the rent increases may have made the situation impossible for her family to
remain in East Palo Alto, she attributed the impetus for the family’s move to the
threatened loss of her father’s dignity. In this daughter’s view, in forced displacement her
father risked losing both dignity and home.
While this family was affected by involuntary displacement, another family would
also lose the opportunity of an affordable rental with this unit’s decontrol. Marcuse
(1985) distinguishes direct displacement and exclusionary displacement to note this
difference and effect. The first refers to moving from one’s home for physical or
economic reasons, the second the inability of the displaced to move to a new home due to
the gentrification of previously affordable areas, and the inability of another low or
moderately income household to move into the unit from which that household was
displaced for that same reason. In this way, displacement begets displacement by
narrowing housing options, creating a chain of serial displacement and fragmentation.
For some, standing up to fight was necessary to retain dignity, regardless of
moving multiple times, as put by one tenant, “I want my daughter to know that the world
is not easy, and it's not going to be -- it's going to be difficult for her to keep moving, but
I want to be an encouragement to her to let her know that with hard work and
perseverance, you can keep going, and come together as a community and speak out…”
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(Special City Council Meeting, January 3, 2008). This tenant suggests a stance of
community creation through the act of speaking out and being active, but also recognized
that moving was a reality her daughter faced.
During the years 2007 and 2008, Page Mill ultimately put into effect 170
evictions, the number documented in San Mateo County Sheriff and Superior Court
records (Fair Rent Coalition, 2009). The Fair Rent Coalition calculated that more than
300 units, or an estimated total of 1,500 people, were pushed out of their homes within
the first two years of Page Mill ownership (personal communication, June 5, 2012).
While some tenants fought eviction in court, Page Mill continued to serve notices that
without tenant response resulted in default vacancy wins for Page Mill.
The larger number of displaced households was due to the number of people who
moved from their Page Mill units before evictions were set in motion. Far more initial
notices to “pay or quit” were sent that precipitated the unlawful detainers, the notice of
eviction. Notices to “pay or quit” require tenant corrective action to landlords within
three days, and subsequent unlawful detainers require tenant response to the court within
five days, counting weekends and holidays, according to the rental ordinance and state
regulations.
One rent board member at the time estimated that nearly 90% of the evictions
were the result of tenants who did not respond within the required period (personal
communication, January 7, 2014). State law mandates the quick response by tenants, and
any hesitancy by some tenants to appear before court, which includes routine pre-trial
conference before eviction proceedings, would result in a default judgment. Without
tenant response to an unlawful detainer, the landlord can take a default judgment for
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eviction. In East Palo Alto, the sheriff most often makes evictions with notice to vacate
on Tuesdays, which can mean a turn around of 5-9 days from the unlawful detainer
response. (Lamont, 2012)
Several tenants claimed that Page Mill refused to receive their rent checks, a
common practice for landlords who then claim non-payment (Bernstein-Wax, 2010).
Other tenants continued to send in the base-rent for the terms of their lease before Page
Mill rent hikes. One tenant claimed that she received an eviction notice before she could
move out voluntarily because she was wheel-chair bound and could not pack on her own
before moving into a homeless shelter (Ibid.).

Individual Responsibility and Regulatory Thickets
The regulation of the rent stabilization ordinance required tenants to be selfassertive in their housing claims. Here Foucault’s (1994) concept of governmentality, the
regulation of people’s behavior, or the “conduct of conduct,” aligns with the shift in scale
and target of state intervention. According to neoliberal discourse, the aim of the state is
to deregulate. Yet, rather than deregulation, there is a shift in regulation; the target of
regulation is aimed at people rather than corporations.
In the case of East Palo Alto, rent control was a regulation reflecting municipal
authority and the devolution or localization of state power, so that the city or locality
became the place of contestation. Still, the assertion of individual responsibility was part
and parcel of the East Palo Alto original RSO, and required an informed tenant citizenry.
Tenants were the target of regulation around occupancy behavior and in the form of
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appeals to landlords, who were in turn regulated by rent registration, increase caps, and
just cause eviction.
The expedited and multi-tiered process for evictions can be confusing for already
stressed and stretched tenants, educated or not on their rights, as described. The petitions
were the prescribed next steps for tenants to challenge a rent increase or unlawful
detainer. At a hearing for the tenant petitioners against rent increases, Community Legal
Services representatives explained the difficulty of access to the petition process:
Even with the help of volunteers, the [petition] process is extremely timeconsuming and onerous, requiring:
1. Scheduling a time for the tenant to meet with a volunteer;
2. Arranging for translation services if necessary;
3. Gathering the necessary documentation;
4. Explaining the law and process;
5. Preparing the petition;
6. Preparing the documentation of the waiver;
7. Obtaining, if necessary, a check or money order for the filing fee;
8. Physically filing the petition papers with requisite copies.
(City of East Palo Alto Rent Stabilization Board, 2008)
For these tenants, many of whom work multiple jobs to pay the existing rent, the process
is a logistical impossibility. For others, it is intimidating. Still others are concerned about
retaliation from their landlord and/or building manager (Ibid.).
In addition to the steps above, petitioners were required to be present at the
hearing. In this case, the hearing had to be delayed on at least one earlier occasion due to
the unavailability of working tenants. Page Mill seemingly counted on these delays and
lack of access by tenants to legal services. In effect, Page Mill would “win by default”
explained a legal service provider (CalPERS Board of Administration Investment
Committee Open Session, 2008). In drawn-out petitioner cases and litigation, Page Mill
also has the upper-hand in creating conditions that pushed tenants out, and the resulting
127

vacancies positioned the properties for market rate rents, and, or, redevelopment. The
lawyers for the petitioners explained the obstacles to the process and timeliness of
judgment for all tenants as an argument for full disclosure of all Page Mill rent rolls, even
for those units that did not include named petitioners.
The Fourth Shift
Landlords often use the tiring out tactic when they do not have a legitimate claim
against the tenants. Instead they try to frustrate and overwhelm tenants while also
potentially tapping into tenants’ fear of exposure in front of the state bureaucracy, if not
deploying direct harassment and intimidation. Relentless notices to tenants all required
immediate tenants’ responses to prevent eviction. In East Palo Alto, many tenants had
been poor or low-income all their lives and were familiar with state bureaucracies.
Mothers in particular carried multiple burdens that included not only the material rent
increases, and deferred maintenance, but also the neo-regulatory environment of behavior
surveillance and self-advocacy.
When one single mom moved into her apartment just before the Page Mill
purchase, she had already experienced serial displacements. She had been living with her
three children, including one teen and two elementary school students in a converted
garage on the east side of town until she was told the property had been sold and she had
to leave. Her furthest dislocation though had been almost ten years before when she and
her son left Michoacán, Mexico. In East Palo Alto, she found work in a night job for an
office cleaning company. Just after Page Mill increased her rent, her hours were cut. The
economy was tanking. The rent increase, 20%, twice in one year, was far above the 3.2%
increase allowed as set by the Consumer Price Index established by the East Palo Alto
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Rent Stabilization Ordinance at the time. Sara recalled, “I didn’t have a place [to go],
then thanks to God, I found more work [in houses]… It takes a lot of patience here [EPA
rent administration]. I don’t know how many times I’ve been at the [legal] offices. The
owners gave us notices thinking we’d leave” (interview, 2013). Working the bureaucracy
is what could be called the fourth shift for this working mom. With several jobs, kids to
care for at home, and unpaid work to supplement their education, she also had spent
countless and tedious hours at legal clinics and at the rent administration, filing appeals to
stay in the home that she worked so hard to afford.
Another mother explained the burden of time for anyone trying to work and enter
the bureaucracies of the poor. The social worker at her child’s school had told her that
she needed to spend more time with her children. Instead she found herself spending
more and more time fighting Page Mill. Meanwhile, she was trying not to let her children
know of the rent increase and the stress. But she suspected they understood what was
happening (Homeless Now, 2008). Another single mother with two children explained to
the city council that tiring out tenants and furthering their marginalization was purposeful
by Page Mill, not an unintentional consequence of the rent hikes:
I work every day, and I have to go to work tonight, so I can't stay too much
longer, but I wanted to be here to voice my opinion. There's no help out there for
you if you're in the middle and if you're in the midway, and you're working and
you have kids and you're trying to, you know, survive, and then they throw this at
you. They pulling you back. They want you to be up underneath the bridge with
everybody else, you know, but I'm trying. (Special City Council Meeting, January
3, 2008)
This mother situated herself as doing better than the rest, “underneath the bridge,” yet
echoed the prevailing sentiment of precarity and exhaustion.
Citizens’ protections, such as rent regulation, assume a notion of a liberal
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citizenry comprised by free subjects with what Rose (2006) calls “responsibility,
autonomy and choice.”41 In this case, the majority of tenants were largely immigrants
who did not qualify for already limited and shrinking supply of public housing. They did,
however, rely on state regulation to prevent full marketization of their rental housing. The
site of family in the reproduction of the self-sufficiency mantra of neoliberalization raises
fundamental questions of dignity and gendered burdens. Women as mothers in such a
regime bear the responsibility for the reproduction of self-governing subjects who abide
by cultural and institutional logics of law and order while also becoming masters of their
own destinies, self-sufficient and supposedly free from the state.
In another petitioner’s case, a single mother who was given a Cease Notice by the
Woodland Management Company feared eviction because security claimed “high level of
traffic and activity...” that they said was consistent with drug activity. Page Mill later
defended the action directly to its largest investor saying, “We have zero tolerance policy
for drug activity on our properties” (Taran, 2009:8; see also Taran, 2009a). Crime,
especially suspected drug-related activity, was used by Page Mill to justify evictions.

The Landlord’s Playbook

Criminalization for Gentrification
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Nikolas Rose, 1996. ‘Governing ‘‘advanced’’ liberal democracies’, in A. Barry, T. Osborne and N. Rose
(eds) Foucault and Political Reason: Liberalism, Neo-Liberalism, and Rationalities of Government,
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, p. 53.
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East Palo Alto’s formation as a city was followed by a period marked by
dispossession over self-determination and community control. The roll-backs of the
1990s, including a final farewell to the Keynseian welfare state in 1994, coincided with
the roll out of a state economy based in part on replacing its social welfare with
investment in mass incarceration (see Gilmore, 2007). In the local context of Silicon
Valley the decades of growing regional inequality and insecurity through abandonment
and criminalization of East Palo Alto, ultimately, but not inevitably, produced the
conditions for predatory speculation of this last regional bastion of rent controlled
housing.
East Palo Alto in particular exemplified Wacquant’s (2008) concept of an urban
space of “advanced insecurity” constituting at once abandonment, dispossession,
exploitation, state sanctioned violence and street violence in which the most exploited
and dispossessed members of the population become cast as the greatest threat in the
expanding scope of public disorder. Moreover, in the circulating discourse of “isolation,
disorganization, and danger” (August, 2014) state and private interests regularly deployed
pathologizing language for the exclusion or elimination of poor people from place for
reinvention of the place for profit. “Crime” could be a sufficient reason to embrace early
signs of gentrification for many community members, notwithstanding that gentrification
may result in the displacement (removal) of the community itself, and in turn reproduce
and exacerbate the conditions of “advanced insecurity” elsewhere.
Just before Page Mill’s buy-up, a referendum measure was put forward to
explicitly make “criminal activity” a reason to take away someone’s home. According to
the proposed change in the municipal code, Measure E: City of East Palo Alto Drug and
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Violence-Free Homes Act, “This Act will reduce drug dealing and criminal activity,
enhance law enforcement, and give landlords the flexibility they need to prevent illegal
activity while ensuring that they will not use evictions solely to achieve economic gain
from higher rents” (http://www.smartvoter.org/ 2006/11/07/ ca/sm/meas/E/). On the one
hand, the act would allow landlords of regulated units greater flexibility to evict tenants
deemed to be involved in criminal activity, and on the other hand, would delay landlords’
ability to subsequently raise rents through decontrol for one year.
Rosetti Realty sponsored the referendum ostensibly to test rent control. East Palo
Alto’s largest landlord at the time, Rosetti was planning to sell his properties to Page
Mill’s purchasing agents and looked to gut the city’s RSO to raise his asking price,
according to the EPACT tenant advocate who described the act as “from any reason
eviction to no reason eviction” (personal communication, May 30, 2012). A vote for
Measure E would ultimately be a vote for apartment turnover for decontrol and market
rents. The measure was slated for a voter-referendum alongside two other crime-related
measures that would also potentially mobilize voters with interests in increased policing.
One measure mandated greater funds for crime enforcement, the other for greater
preventative social services along with increased policing.
In an editorial to East Palo Alto Today, the leader of EPACT wrote against
Measure E saying the effort was “…subverting the very reason East Palo Alto struggled
for incorporation in the first place more than twenty years ago, namely, for the sake of
self-determination and the increase of rights, not their reduction” (EPACT, 2006: 23).
Another letter to the editor also recalled the city’s founding legacy, “We will vote No on
Measure E because we revere the vision of the incorporators of East Palo Alto. Boldly
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they stated that only by conscious action to invest in economic and cultural diversity
would families of modest means and families of color continue to have a home on the
peninsula” (Cruz and Hyland, 2006: 23). The latter made explicit that the consequence of
increased evictions premised on criminal activity would be race-based.
The East Palo Alto City Council and staff attorneys decried the measure’s
deceptive language; state law would permit market rents through vacancy decontrol
immediately following eviction. “Arguments against Measure E,” which accompanied
the text of the act at the ballot box, warned, “Absentee Landlords are using this measure
to increase the attractiveness of their rental property to other corporate buyers”
(http://www.smartvoter.org/ 2006/11/07/ca/sm/meas/E/). The elected officials who
signed the arguments against the measure were well aware of the acquisition of properties
by Page Mill on the west side and urged tenants and other East Palo Alto voters to
demonstrate their support of the current city ordinance for just cause eviction. Majority
approval was required, and the measure failed with 69.7% of East Palo Alto voters voting
against (Ibid).
As the tenants experienced in short-order, the Page Mill strategy also attempted to
tap into the narrative of criminal behavior or pathology of the poor in order to justify
harassment, rent increases and evictions of tenants within and outside the legal
stipulations of the city’s existing rent regulations. An attorney for Page Mill described the
tenants to one reporter as “…drug lords, gang leaders, gang members, drug users and
other non-upstanding individuals,” explaining that Page Mill Properties inherited the
existing tenants when we purchased the property, which at the time had the highest crime
rate in East Palo Alto” (Bernstein-Wax, 2009).
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Page Mill targeted their harassment on young males, according to one tenant
activist, “There was a lot of intimidation of young males. They would be detained by
Page Mill security, would wait for police… there’s a long history of distrust with East
Palo Alto Police Department, and YUCA met with the police about harassment by the
security” (interview 2012). Private security guards played a policing role by monitoring
the tenants as well as the property. Another aspect of harassment for tenants was the new
regulatory environment. Tenants protested the additional paperwork Page Mill required,
including car registration for parking (there is no on street parking). This was not always
available in the renter’s names among undocumented tenants, who in the context not of
deportation, but of “deportability” (DeGenova, 2007) feared the paperwork requirements
as proxy for demonstrating citizenship status (personal communication, June 5, 2012).
Page Mill presented the community as the beneficiaries of their war on blight and
crime, despite the fact that Page Mill’s plans were predicated on the displacement of
many of the tenants to reposition the properties for market rents, and of all of them for
redevelopment. Page Mill’s general counsel did not mention these plans in another media
placement of their good deeds: “In one instance a gang leader was living in a single
family home in poor repair. The gang leader was eventually arrested but other members
of the gang kept congregating by the home, so Page Mill bought the home and then had it
demolished. Those are the kinds of steps we’re willing to make to improve the
environment” (Apartment Management Magazine, 2008: 16). Real estate managers and
investors were the audience for this magazine.
“Gangsters” like “thugs” are coded language reflecting racial subtleties of
discourse, othering, and devalorization through the production, real and perceived, of
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“advanced insecurity.” Indeed, race had been a risk-adjusting factor in the gentrification
of East Palo Alto. One rent board member put it this way: “[The] sheer number of people
of color, keep large numbers of affluent people from moving in” (personal
communication, June 8, 2012). Since the blockbusting of the 1950s, race, along with
class, had symbolically defined the boundaries of the city in contrast to their white and
affluent neighbors. The discourse of diversity in new urbanism design ethos of
gentrification echoes and re-signifies through inversion the racist notion of the “tipping
point” long-asserted by the real estate industry (Reed, 1999). (The idea that a certain
percentage of Black residents will make a neighborhood unappealing to whites, or
devalue real estate.) Page Mill pitched to investors a vision of a new west side for East
Palo Alto, one of social cleansing that erased the “gangsters” by evicting their families.

Legal Barrage
“Tiring out” was a Page Mill tactic targeting tenants as well as the City of East
Palo Alto, which would soon become barraged with technical challenges and lawsuits. In
two letters to the city, the fund’s attorneys sent a list of legal arguments for why the
moratorium was inadvisable, and then how the moratorium would violate various other
local and state law (Thompson, 2007; Griffith, 2008). In particular, Page Mill claimed
that the City violated its own RSO by allowing the city council to interfere with what was
a voter-mandated legislation that Page Mill argued could only be amended by the voters.
The Page Mill attorneys further argued that in effect, the city violated local and state law
by not allowing for even CPI increases during the six month period of moratorium, or
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vacancy decontrol, a matter pertinent for adjusting any newly vacant apartment to market
rate as allowed by Costa-Hawkins following evictions or tenant departure.42
Page Mill put the responsibility for the initial rent increases to which the
moratorium responded on the city, specifically the city council. In a letter to the mayor,
Page Mill’s development director explained the rent increases as a response to the city’s
prior ordinance on the Ellis Act to de-incentivize demolition and shore up just cause
eviction provisions:
…we have felt like we were in a race with the City. We can only react to the
issues and agendas that the City and the Council put forth and we must also
complete our analysis of these issues within the time frames that the City sets.
Recently the City adopted the ordinance for the Ellis Act and is in the process of
adopting a new Density Bonus Ordinance. These ordinances will have a major
impact on the land values of our properties and will also shape what could be the
potential highest and best uses in the future. In addition, the Rent Stabilization
Board took on the "banking" issue, which could have an immediate and extreme
financial impact on us. I am concerned that the City's recent policy actions and
their implications will make our residents the unintended "losers" in all of this
(Thompson, 2007: 2-3).
The ordinance concerning the” Ellis Act” involved a city action three months prior to the
rent increases. The ordinance clarified landlord responsibilities in the event the landlord
withdrew a rental unit from rental availability in order to demolish or convert a structure.
The ordinance called for increased notice, increased relocation payment, and more
careful review for approval from the city. Although the statewide Ellis Act facilitates the

42

As the director of Berkeley’s Rent Stabilization Administration later pointed out to the City of East Palo
Alto, “the [Costa-Hawkins] requirement that a rent-controlled rent ceiling be replaced by a market rent
upon a vacancy is not limited to those situations where the market rent is higher, but applies when the new
rent is lower as well” (Berkeley Rent Stabilization Program Peer Review of City of East Palo Alto Rent
Stabilization Program: September 11, 2008: 4). In other words, there was no “banking” un-charged rent to
charge at a later time. Rent was based on what the landlords determined the market could bare, even if
well-below what the market may bear in the future.

136

withdrawal of rental units from rent control in case of owner occupancy or demolition,
the Act provides some municipal leeway for how to implement it. By September 2007,
the city had decided to replicate the San Francisco’s stricter and court-tested local
ordinance.
In a hasty correspondence to the City in anticipation of the rent freeze vote, the
attorney for Page Mill similarly blamed the tenants’ burden on the city:
Page Mill is willing and ready to sit down with the City and tenant representatives
to develop a workable solution but it cannot do so in the face of the City's
repeated attempts to devalue its significant investments in this community. The
City's proposed action tonight will ultimately fail in its purpose to protect the
tenants because they will bare much of the burden of the City's disregard for the
law. Moreover, the proposed action risks bankrupting the City by adding to its
already substantial litigation expenses and inviting significant monetary
judgments. (Griffith, 2008: 5)
The letter made clear that Page Mill would sue the city and maximize rents to further
cover their legal expenses rather than negotiate terms for mitigating rent increases in the
future. Neither the tenants nor the city were willing, however, to allow for any increase in
any case above the letter of the rent control law.
In addition to petitions by tenants to the Rent Stabilization Board, which included
six specific administrative proceedings of multiple petitioners, plus unlawful detainer
hearings, Page Mill filed ten lawsuits against the City of East Palo Alto. The tenant
petitions alone had taken a large toll on the city’s legal capacity, in addition to the
landlord’s 41 separate appeal petitions each for a waiver on rent protections due to mostly
“scheduled” (future) capital improvements, amounting to $11million, which the city
noted involved “seven bankers’ boxes” of paper work (City of East Palo Alto Office of
the City Attorney, 2009:2). Notably, if Page Mill had won these cases, the rent
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stabilization ordinance would be effectively gutted. The landlord fees associated with
registering regulated rents would be reduced and there would be no funding source to
administer the program for any remaining units. The city denied each Page Mill appeal.
The litigious CEO of Page Mill and General Partner for the fund also had amassed
a small fortune of legal fees. This became apparent following the collapse of Page Mill in
late 2009. In a memo from the court’s receiver, the receiver noted “counsel [on behalf of
Page Mill, LLCs, or individual associated principals] generally asserted that they were
owed substantial unpaid attorneys fees and costs” (Superior Court of San Mateo County,
2009: 4). Although Page Mill had warned the City of East Palo Alto two years earlier of
the monetary costs of legal pursuits, Page Mill representatives had not heeded the
warning on their own account.
Page Mill’s legal strategy against the city invoked procedural misconduct around
rules and regulations governing rent control matters. For example, Page Mill sued the city
for passing the rent increase moratorium by arguing that the moratorium required a public
referendum. They also put the city to task in a separate lawsuit for retaining an empty
seat on the Rent Stabilization Board that according to the RSO was to be filled by a
landlord representative with holdings in East Palo Alto. In separate suit, Page Mill called
for a review of new appointments to the board, which they deemed inadmissible based on
the Rent Stabilization Board’s failure to give the proper number of days notice of the
appointment hearing.
Several of Page Mill’s lawsuits against the City of East Palo Alto raised
allegations of political misconduct. Alleged Brown Act violations involved lack of public
notice or elected officials meeting privately without public forum. As put by one city
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council member, “If we were meeting with more than three people, not just you and me
discussing this, I could be accused of being in violation of the Brown Act” (personal
communication, June 8, 2012). Holding meetings with several people to strategize, or
consider draft legislation could be in violation of the Act. Although designed for
increasing transparency, public participation and scrutiny of elected officials the Brown
Act could also be invoked to stall action, or even nullify past action.
When the city did put forth a public referendum in favor of tightening rent control
in East Palo Alto to a citywide vote, discussed further in Chapter 6, Page Mill attempted
to stall and overwhelm the city with another procedural obstacle. Page Mill’s lawyers
found what one advocate called an “arcane environmental doc” that required that the
public resolution had to be vetted based on provisions of the Environmental Qualities Act
that mandated an environmental impact statement (personal communication, January 7,
2013; San Mateo Superior Court Case, 2009). The fees alone for the city to put the rent
control resolution on the ballot amounted to $50,000, paid to the county to hold the
election (personal communication, June 5, 2012). As they stalled the resolution, Page
Mill continued to evict tenants.
Tenants whom Page Mill claimed were not covered at all by the RSO filed a class
action lawsuit against Page Mill and its subsidiaries. Class action litigation had become a
strategic tool for civil rights claimants following a 1966 Supreme Court rule that allowed
for unorganized individuals to be presented together as a group of claimants. Class action
plays a particular role in a country where local justice, as de Tocqueville once noted, still
reigns (see Lawrence Friedman in Powell and Steinberg, 2006:53). Litigation can allow
for a particular issue to jump scale, from the local to the national. Local justice by lower
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courts could hear claims by unorganized individuals on behalf of an entire class, often by
consumers and workers, even if located across localities. In this case the named plaintiffs
extended to those similarly situated Page Mill tenants, reaching by impact renters in the
properties who were not actively organizing.
One of the most important aspects of the tool, strategic for organizing, involves
the politics of recognition. The unorganized become a legal entity as a “class,” which
provides a rendering of affected status for tenants regardless of their participation as
named plaintiffs, petitioners, or participation in tenant collective action. Most importantly
for organizing, the process of disclosure during the proceedings, regardless of outcome,
would lead to the type of exposure Page Mill avoided and could be used potentially as a
strategic lever for negotiation. Less important was the potential payout for winning class
members, which in typical class actions tend to be symbolic for the plaintiffs, once
divided. On the other hand, a mass award including legal fees paid by a losing defendant
such as Page Mill could have punitive impact for the defendant, and in this case affect
Page Mill’s ability, and that of subsequent large landlords, to exploit the “mom and pop”
provision to raise rents in East Palo Alto.
The “mom and pop” provision of the RSO was established to exempt small (and
usually local) landlords from the municipal rental restrictions. In the tenants’ class action
the defendants included the parent entity Page Mill, but also 50 individual LLCs that
Page Mill had established and that the Wachovia loan agreement recognized as assigned
borrower entities (Wachovia Assignment of Leases and Rents, 2007). Although David
Taran was signatory to all LLCs, they were separate conduits for the Page Mill parent
entity created to take advantage of the exemption of small scale landlords with holdings
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of four or less units from rent protection.
The tenants argued that Page Mill was the singular owner of all purchased units,
and that the RSO should apply to all Page Mill owned properties regardless of unit
numbers per structure. Two named plaintiffs involved tenants who had helped to form the
Fair Rent Coalition. The lawsuit also included the declarations of fifteen tenants,
including the same city council member of East Palo Alto who was a Page Mill tenant.
Simply put, the tenants claimed that the multiple LLC configurations were a sham. They
sought over-charge returns plus punitive damages of $500 per tenant, a symbolic but
important demand that acknowledged the landlord’s intent to evade the law.
The tenants initially won a preliminary injunction against any rent increases
during the period of litigation, and a notice that the plaintiffs would likely prevail.
Substantial evidence had been submitted showing that “separate personalities do not in
reality exist” thereby affirming that David Taran was the principal for all the LLCs, and
furthermore affirming that the LLCs were conduits of a single entity, Page Mill (Superior
Court of the State of California San Mateo County, 2009).
Taran participated in two separate depositions in the class action suit, which he
requested be sealed from public record. At the time, Wells Fargo was reviewing whether
to extend loan repayment options, and Page Mill was seeking additional investment. It
was imperative to the general partner to keep confidential records, such as the “…balance
sheets and income statements, loan agreements, organizational charts of defendants'
corporate structure, LLC agreements, assignment agreements among Defendants'
property management agreements and a description of an employee incentive program,”
(San Mateo County Clerk of Superior Court, 2009). Taran was determined to keep these
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documents sealed naming individual investors, and disclosing the status of financial
accounts, including a CalPERS appraisal that could reveal the financial precarity of the
portfolio. Before these depositions, a plaintiff from the case explained that the tenants
had no idea of the extent or details of the CalPERS involvement or the scope of leverage
(personal communication, June 5, 2012). It was in the process of discovery of the class
action that tenants learned of the extent of CalPERS’s investment in Page Mill and the
original Wachovia loan agreement.

Denying the City
In a city that incorporated in large part for rent control, Page Mill attempted to
eliminate rent control by denying cityhood. If the City of East Palo Alto would not
concede to Page Mill’s rent increases, Page Mill would leave East Palo Alto. Attorneys
for the Woodland Park Management Company submitted a 30-page letter to the San
Mateo County Local Agency Formation Commission (LAFCO) arguing to remove the
Woodland Park neighborhood from the East Palo Alto sphere of influence. In other
words, Page Mill sought to secede the west side. Their argument was premised on present
and future governmental service inadequacies, largely in policing road and light services.
They accused the city of prioritizing blight removal but then not allowing Page Mill to
follow the city’s own recommendations
Much of the letter attributed increased crime in the city as evidence of a lack of
adequate law enforcement and crime prevention services. The letter alleged resistance,
non-cooperation and inept service by the East Palo Alto Police Department in dealing
with the landlord’s own security officers (Taran, Letter to Local Agency Formation
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Commission, 2009:9). On other occasions, however, such as in public testimony to
CalPERS just a few months earlier (see Chapter 7), Page Mill representatives claimed
that their management of the properties and partnership with the EPA PD resulted in
reduced crime in the city (CalPERS Board of Administration Investment Committee,
April 22, 2009:67). The Fair Rent Coalition made this point in a letter to LAFCO that
cited Page Mill earlier statements (Fair Rent Coalition, September 12, 2009). Tenant
advocates had produced their own analysis of crime statistics to the CalPERS Board
demonstrating an increase in crime citywide and on the west side (CalPERS Board of
Administration Investment Committee, 2009: 108). The Page Mill attempt to secede from
East Palo Alto further exposed the City to scrutiny over policing, and if successful would
have removed the properties from the city’s political boundaries and rent regulating
authority. The land grab would become not only a denial of homes for those tenants
facing displacement, but also a denial of cityhood. Ultimately, the head of Local Agency
Formation Commission made clear that the Page Mill request was unusual, unsound, and
would be denied, citing LAFCO’s mission to consolidate, not de-centralize services
(LAFCO Municipal Service Review, October 15, 2009).
Despite maintaining cityhood for the west side, on other fronts, the city was
unable to maintain its legal capacity to prevail against Page Mill in court on other fronts.
The court overturned the rent freeze moratorium and exposed the city to technicalities
and contradictions in its ordinance following Costa-Hawkins. The city settled with Page
Mill in November 2008 by dismissing with prejudice its own litigation against the
landlord that alleged tenants were being charged beyond maximum allowable on rent
certificates, and more than once in one year. The city’s attorney sent a letter to Page
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Mill’s general counsel rebuking Page Mill’s message to the media stating that the city’s
withdrawal indicated admission or concession of the rent hikes:

…What the City concluded was it was not a productive use of resources to pursue
this particular case since many of the tenants it hoped to help had already vacated
the rental units or found a way to pay the increases. ‘Spin’ is one thing; outright
misrepresentations are quite another (Armento, 2008: 1-2).
Nearly a year earlier the city had consulted for a review and revision of its Rent
Stabilization Ordinance. Rather than fighting Page Mill in court around technical issues
with an outdated ordinance, the city again took rent control to the ballot box.

Conclusion

Page Mill created an investment portfolio of land and housing from the Westside
neighborhood of East Palo Alto at a time when city residents experienced both income
and housing affordability pressures. Women, seniors, and immigrants were particularly
impacted. Rather than voice their framework and demands around the specifics of the
Rent Stabilization Ordinance, or housing code reforms, tenants instead expressed their
right to stay put through the terms of class and race disparities. In a city that was created
as a result of segregation, tenants asserted their self-determination to remain. Page Mill
attempted rent increases and evictions in an effort to clear the portfolio for
redevelopment, and, in the interim, market rents. The management company deployed
typical tactics of deferred maintenance, criminalization of tenants, and refused rent
payments in their attempt to displace residents.
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This chapter demonstrates how tenants pushed the City of East Palo Alto into
action, including a rent freeze. As a result, the city became an adversary and target of the
landlord. The city faced a dozen lawsuits initiated by Page Mill including scrutiny over
possible violations of the Brown Act. Moreover, the city contended with a petition
presented by Page Mill before the San Mateo County Local Agency Formation
Commission to secede the westside from the city itself.
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Chapter 5. Building a Portfolio from East Palo Alto
Chapter Introduction

This chapter’s mapping and analysis of the Page Mill fund takes a step back from
when Page Mill first besieged renters and the City of East Palo Alto with rent increases,
harassment, evictions, and litigation. The bulk of this chapter takes a different analytic
view by following the trail of capital transactions to outline the structure of the Page Mill
portfolio through those actors who held capital claims in the investment. The relationship
between the fund manager, lenders, and institutional investors helps to explain the
structuring of speculation that the tenants and the city deciphered, and to which they
attempted to respond.
The portfolio analysis raises multi-pronged questions that stem from the
financialized and racialized production of real estate risk: How did Page Mill create a
portfolio out of the Westside of East Palo Alto? What are the roles of different capital
stakeholders in contemporary corporate landlordism? Relatedly, why would California
Public Employees Retirement Services (CalPERS), the country’s largest public pension
fund, invest in the dispossession of majority low-income immigrant and Black renters?

Bricks and Mortar or Capital Abstraction

As a single line on a pension fund’s investment ledger, the Page Mill portfolio
item elides the contentious politics of placemaking and disposession upon which the
investors’ profit margins relied. The portfolio instead appears in the monolithic terms of
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asset value and return on investment. Claims by other stakeholders, including tenants, are
hidden from the ledger accounts. So too are the rulings and proclivities of lawmakers,
administrators, commissioners, and regulators. Fees exchanged between lenders,
purchasing agents, investors, brokers, assessors, servicers, derivative traders, and account
managers are also concealed in the ledger’s bottom line.
Financial actors, above all, often appear as vague references in a national and
global “housing market” reified into abstraction and marked by colossal losses or gains.
These stakeholders are presumed the furthest in social distance from low and middleincome tenants who call regulated rental housing home. Piven and Cloward (1977)
suggest financial actors are indeed often out of view to the tenants in the circumstances of
every day life:
Tenants recognize the leaking ceilings and cold radiators, and they recognize the
landlord. They do not recognize the banking, real estate and construction system. No
small wonder, therefore, that when the poor rebel they rebel against the overseer of
the poor, or the slumlord, or the middling merchant, not against the banks or the
governing elites to whom the overseer, the slumlord, and the merchant also defer. In
other words it is the daily experience of people that shapes their grievances,
establishes the measure of their demands, and points out the targets of their anger. (p.
20-21)
Indeed, the most recognizable and immediate targets to tenants in large multifamily
portfolios most often are those collecting the rent and appearing on behalf of the owner’s
interests. Piven & Cloward’s observations explain that the poor use the power they have
within the parameters of their daily interactions and opportunities for action (rent strikes,
street disruption, housing court, etc.).
Despite the abstraction of financial structures, the role of capital actors in rental
housing through and beyond rent collection is highly instructive to tenants threatened by
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displacement and bearing the greatest costs of corporate landlord speculation. When
taking measure of the relationships between capital actors, new possibilities for aggrieved
tenants to identify targets may emerge. In fact, much of the description of the Page Mill
fund outlined in this chapter reflects the investigation and analysis of tenant leaders who
ultimately looked beyond the rent collector management company and pursued the Page
Mill portfolio’s investors and lenders as primary targets. This chapter in particular is
indebted to those tenants’ discoveries.
If new financial instruments have led to changing forms and scales of corporate
landlordism since the time of Piven & Cloward’s account above, the daily experiences of
the aggrieved in many ways, however, largely remain the same: rent increases, leaking
ceilings and cold radiators. Yet changes since the 1970s also involve dramatic added and
exacerbated pressures for low-income tenants in hot markets such as Silicon Valley
driven by the digital economy, debt-fueled markets, and the stripping of rent protections
hard won by the very tenant movements that were a focus of Piven & Cloward’s strategic
endeavors. In this case, investment in the Page Mill high-risk monopoly real estate
portfolio was made possible in part by labor’s own capital due to changes over the same
period in CalPERS’ real estate strategy.
As detailed below, CalPERS, the largest investor in this particular portfolio,
financed the East Palo Alto tenants’ displacement. In the thirty-year period before the
2007/2008 housing crash, CalPERS had moved the bulk of its real property investments
into out-sourced and overleveraged funds such as Page Mill that sought higher gains by
taking higher risks. The Page Mill portfolio’s investment structure exemplified the
pension fund’s preferred role as limited partner, an investor and monitor with limited

148

control over the management of the portfolio. CalPERS investment in such portfolios
contrasted the pension fund’s real estate investments of the past, which emphasized
investors’ earning through stable if passive rental income and capital appreciation based
on long-term holdings.
Such past real estate investments and prospects for returns in the period before the
1980s were fixed in the spatial and time constraints of capital circulation in the built
environment (Harvey, 1978; Hagerman et. al. 2005; Krippner, 2005; Sassen, 2008; Fox
Gotham, 2009; Weber, 2010). When CalPERS was first authorized by California state
law to invest in real estate in 1953, equity and asset value were expected to result in
stable if significant portfolio returns over decades, not months or a few years. In the web
of increasing financial exchange, the typical real estate portfolio of the early 2000s,
among those representing multifamily property and often properties in pool, instead
became an investment and credit vehicle through which capital actors came to deploy
various financial instruments to make sizeable profit in the short term. Corporate
landlords, shorthand for large investors such as private equity firms and hedge funds,
increased investment in residential real estate in part as an opportunity to rake in fees and
place capital for quick, rather than long-term, investment returns.
This chapter follows the trail of the portfolio transactions and associated primary
data such as the prospectus, loan agreement, independent auditors’ reports, CalPERS real
estate unit reports, consultant evaluator reports, depositions, and account manager emails.
Made visible, these statements call into question gentrification as a process of consumerchoice, or “natural,” or “free” market fluctuations as determinant of who wins and who
loses in the gamble over speculative real estate investments. This chapter clarifies the
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structure of the portfolio itself, which complicated the opportunities and obstacles
confronted by the largely low-income immigrant and Black tenants in East Palo Alto who
called the portfolio home.

The Managing Stakeholder, Page Mill Properties II

The Page Mill fund could not be assembled without the availability of investment
capital and cheap credit in the context of the pre-2007 booming real estate industry. Yet
the fund’s specific attraction to East Palo Alto rested squarely on the perceived potential
to thwart municipal authority and, in effect, undermine rental affordability measures. The
gamble took into account the specific conditions of a location of which the fund’s general
partner, David Taran, was familiar.
A Bay Area developer, Taran had established himself as not only a financier in
the investment world but as a local operator. In an interview for Private Equity Real
Estate, Taran argued that local operators can be effective at establishing alternative asset
funds: “[Operators] have a perspective that is more useful, in my mind, than someone
with a Wall Street background who is just used to placing money…You're making money
bets. You're making momentum bets. We're not making momentum bets. We're making
real estate bets” (Lovell, 2005: 22). In this statement, Taran placed himself apart from
traditional investors moving capital at the turn of the market, and safely out of site of
local conditions.
Taran suggested a different expertise necessary for the risk involved in expanding
private equity funds and their institutional and individual investment partners to move
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into residential real estate. The rate of return for multifamily housing investment was a
gamble beyond buying low and selling high, and market fluctuations. In this targeted
portfolio Taran took into account state and local authority over rent control, housing
codes, and zoning, in addition to an understanding of financial interfaces, placement fees,
management fees, investor incentive fees, and the securities and derivatives market.
Taran planned to amasse properties into a single portfolio for high returns.
Taran had gained recognition by several large pension funds as a reputable
general manager based on an earlier “opportunistic,” or high risk, commercial real estate
fund that closed only a few years prior to the East Palo Alto purchases. In 2003, at the
upsurge of the real estate bubble of that period, Taran and associates attracted $75million
of CalPERS investment for the first time. This first Page Mill portfolio was a private
equity-backed fund that formed part of the larger private equity-backed firm DivcoWest,
which by 2014 managed $2.5 billion of assets (www.divcowest.com). In addition to the
CalPERS investment, this fund also attracted more than $100 million total investments by
the California State Teachers' Retirement System and the Oregon Public Employees'
Retirement Fund (Security and Exchange Commission, 2002). The fund raised a total of
$290 million in equity with an anticipated fund total of nearly $700 million including
debt for commercial real estate purchases in San Francisco, Boston, and other major U.S.
cities. The fund established Page Mill and likewise Taran and his associates as players in
the $3 trillion field of institutional pension investments.
By the time Taran approached CalPERS in 2006 for commitment for the real
estate fund, “Page Mill II, Limited Partnership,”43 he was known as a serious equity fund
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Initial capital call memoranda use the fund name “Sunstar”. This name was subsequently changed to
Page Mill II (Private Placement Memorandum, 2006).
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manager in and beyond northern California. CalPERS overwhelmingly noted “pros” in its
“Investment Opportunity Summary” recommending $100million in commitment and
citing Taran as “an established fund manager with successful track record with CalPERS”
(Situs Strategic Advisors, 2006). Taran, at the heels of a career in both litigation and
global manufacturing investments, touted a formidable claim of assembling
approximately $2.1 billion in real estate assets largely based on his partnership with
DivcoWest (http://www.pagemill.com).
The due diligence report developed by CalPERS consultants cited few risks for
CalPERS investing in this Page Mill fund. Notably, a risk they did highlight pertained to
a market awash with capital. They raised concern over “the huge quantity of capital
looking for transactions” and the subsequent demand for efficient exchange (Situs
Strategic Advisors, 2006:1-2). Property acquisition and placing capital required greater
speed for greater yield. The due diligence evaluators concluded that the fund would need
to streamline their transactions and widen their sources of “off-market” properties, or
undisclosed listings of real estate prospects. In one respect Taran may have heeded this
concern. The majority of the properties in East Palo Alto were not large enough to
warrant “off list” premium sourcing but they were not necessarily on the market either.
Like the straw buyers from the block-busting years of the 1950s, Page Mill agents
contacted owners directly to make offers without revealing their intended plans (County
of San Mateo Superior Court, 2007). This time, however, the purchasing agents were
making offers that in some instances could not be beat and that would assume an influx
of higher income, and possibly white residents.
When Page Mill’s real estate managers checked-off their final acquisition lists,

152

the fund had made 101 separate real estate transactions with local and absentee landlords
capitalized by $114 million of committed equity from CalPERS and individual high net
worth investors. The fund’s larger vision purportedly involved 140 property tracts within
a $1.6 billion fund, according to disclosures by a Page Mill purchasing agent, a straw
buyer (County of San Mateo Superior Court, 2007:19). The agent’s court statements were
the result of legal action by Taran who accused the agent of acting on Page Mill “trade
secrets” in order to obtain properties for the agent’s personal gains.
Page Mill’s purchasing agents were swift in their transactions. Several purchases
involved East Palo Alto parcels above and beyond Silicon Valley’s standard prices
including one parcel at $5 million and above per acre (Ibid). One city administrator, who
was a council member at the time of the purchases, explained how he took notice of the
buy-ups in 2007 based on the “super high” multifamily purchases that began to surface.
He was particularly surprised by a purchase that involved a local landlord known to the
city for her longtime disdain for rent control:
The owner said [to Page Mill agent] my price is $250K per unit take it or leave it.
She gave them the number thinking they would just walk away, but they came
back and said we’ll take it, and her jaw dropped. She said, ‘You’re kidding?
You’re never going to get this rent back.’ The units were worth at most $130K.
And boom she was gone (personal communication, June 8, 2012).
The seller was well aware that the net operating income required would need to
significantly increase to support such a sale price. City officials, including those who had
worked on the city’s original rent control campaign, became concerned with the plan
behind the growing purchases. The administrator quoted above anticipated an attack on
the city’s rental protections: “My understanding was that the business plan included an
evisceration of the present tenant population that would be replaced by people with
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money, and ultimately a total evisceration of the rent control law” (Ibid.). It did not seem
to any of the housing advocates paying close attention to the mounting property
transactions that such investment could be otherwise viable.
A 2006 preliminary version of the portfolio prospectus anticipated 13-17%
internal rate of return for the general partner and the limited partners (Situs Strategic
Advisors, 2006). Taran and associates later augmented their projection to 30% or even
double returns on investment for the portfolio (Page Mill Fund II, 2007: 31). On average,
stocks yielded 12.17% returns over the preceding ten years between 1996-2006
(Damodaran, 2015). Page Mill projected steep profits for a fund that aimed to exit its
partnership in five years, or before 2011 (Squar Milner Real Estate Services, GP, 2009).
Page Mill anticipated another premium institutional investor would purchase the
aggregated properties by that time (Situs Strategic Advisors, 2006).44
Why would Page Mill expect such short term returns in the purchase of so many
rent restricted properties and some at above market prices? Court disclosures reveal in the
Page Mill prospectus that the business approach indeed translated to an aggressive
strategy to undermine the city’s existing Rent Stabilization Ordinance and pursue
evictions (Superior Court of the County of California, 2008). Yet as shown in the former
and subsequent chapters, the fund’s profitability did not singularly rely on rental
increases followed by sustained occupancy by market-rate tenants. Several housing
advocates suspected from the beginning that the eviction of low-income tenants and rent
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Although the original prospectus outlined the possibility of creating a REIT for public offering as exit
strategy, CalPERS due diligence consultants remarked that the REIT was no longer a consideration by the
time CalPERS committed to the fund, and instead the fund would seek a premium investor before the final
loan payment became due (The Situs Companies, 2006)
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increases formed part of an overarching strategy to deregulate the units in order to
eventually demolish or convert the structures. Such an exit strategy of redevelopment
assumed the investors, rather than the people who live in East Palo Alto, would determine
the city’s future built landscape and composition. It assumed the dominance of the
investors as primary actors over tenants, workers, and elected city officials.
Evidence presented to CalPERS in the Page Mill business plans demonstrates the
intention for redevelopment. CalPERS summarized the goals of Page Mill II, LP in a
fiduciary report detailing returns on investments in opportunistic funds. The report
summarizes that the fund aimed to create value through a focus “on repositioning, redevelopment or conversion along with actual development of real estate assets”
(CalPERS Supplemental Report, 2009). Ultimately, Page Mill planned to sell the
portfolio with the opportunity for repurposing the underlying land. Redevelopment
prospects, including the potential for commercial development and/or condominium
conversions, drove the above-market purchases and future profitability. In one auditor’s
report that questioned why Page Mill did not seek below market or at-market asking
prices, Page Mill responded that the purchases were made below potential value (Squar
Milnor Real Estate Services, 2008: 4).
All indicators suggest that the monopoly portfolio purchase relied on a profit
model that measured current value based on future value. This calibrated profitability for
the portfolio reflects what Levy (2014) calls a logic of future valuation compressed into
the present, or a projected return on equity as if current value. Calculations of the present
investment are future-driven.45 The loan went well above normal ratios because it wasn’t
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In real estate financing this is commonly referred to as discounted cash flows.
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based on the asset value of the portfolio; it was based on its future value. The rate of
returns could not be deemed feasible, nor the investment model prudent, based on the netoperating income at the time of the purchase and debt servicing. As investor partners
would invariably learn, the costs rose well above the income of the project along with an
alarming higher ratio of risk, demanding a higher rate of profit, and higher pressure for
rent increases through deregulation of municipal rent control.
The second version of the Page Mill II business plan targeted potential investors
to partner in a sidecar access fund to supplement and ostensibly expand the Page Mill real
estate portfolio. Sidecars, allowed under the terms of the Page Mill partnership
agreement, typically distinguish a separate portfolio or portion of a portfolio that involves
differentiated risk. Investments listed in this “access fund” included the same
concentrated investments of the Page Mill II fund in East Palo Alto. The different
placement memoranda, high-net worth investors and a significant credit line were, in
practice, designated to the same portfolio (Page Mill Fund II, 2007: 25). The investors in
this side-car fund included well-known venture capitalists and developers in the region.
Nineteen investors eventually sued Taran in his attempt to abscond with their capital
commitment to the sidecar fund, including, among others, 14 Crow Canyon Corp., Diablo
Capital Venture Fund, Shane Albers, Paul Magliocco, and Vertical Venture Capital LLC.
The investors for this fund were accredited. In private equity and private real
estate funds, prospective investors must demonstrate that they have significant funds to
offset associated risks. Private funds are exempted from much of the U.S. 1940
Investment Company Act reporting (and review) that was promulgated following the
1929 crash. Under the Act’s Section 3(c)(1) and 3(c)(7) exemptions, hedge funds, private
156

equity, and private real estate funds do not need to register with the SEC if such a fund
has less than 100 investors (or less than 500 under other provisions), does not widely
advertise its fund (retains exclusivity) and qualifies all investors based on income tests.
At the time of the Qualification Statement, the income tests were stipulated at
$200,000/year or $300,000/year with spouse, or net worth test of $1 million individually
or jointly with spouse. Institutional investors required $5 million in investable assets to
qualify.
Page Mill cited the private fund exemption Section 3(c)(1) in its Subscription
Agreement and Qualification Statement signed by CalPERS and individual investors, in
which the investors also submit to the understanding that, “an investment in the Interest is
highly speculative and may result in a complete loss of its investment” (Page Mill
Properties II, L.P. Subscription Agreement, u.d.:3). The income test and financial literacy
of the investors aims to ensure the investors can afford total loss.46
These funds are generally comprised of multiple limited partnerships that are
short-term, and given the SEC exemption, are more likely to escape public scrutiny.
Unlike stocks, private funds are not publically traded and the pitch by the general partner
or brokers to recruit investors takes place in a performance of exclusivity under the cloak
of “trade secrets,” often in off-site, rented hotel business rooms. One private equity real
estate broker not associated with Page Mill explained a typical private equity real estate
pitch: “It is about building relationships so that I can call on an investor, they will show
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The Dodd-Frank Act of 2011 requires greater regulation of private funds, including investor adviser
registration, and requirements for advisers to maintain records, if not report those records to the SEC. In
certain cases of “systemic risk” to the entire financial system, the Dodd-Frank Act also would require
disclosure of those records to the SEC. Many caveats restrict public access to those records, which for
example, cannot be obtained from the SEC through an exemption from the Freedom of Information Act.
See Coffee (2011).
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for the general partner’s presentation, and they will pledge a commitment to the fund
because timing and opportunity is right” (interview, April 2015). The solicited investor
then pledges capital commitments for the slated opportunities.
When an investor provides equity, there is an expected pay-back. This is why debt
burdens, further discussed below, do not always capture the predatory and speculative
structuring of real estate investor portfolios: it is not only the lender or securities investor
that expects repayment with interest, equity providers expect repayment too. Typically a
fund makes due on its distribution of returns to the investors first, then to the investor
manager in the form of tax-favorable carried interest. The waterfall of returns, as this
period is described, incorporates rate hurdles to pay returns to investors before a return of
initial capital followed by continued performance-based returns to the investors and
manager. In addition to Page Mill’s 1.5% annual management fee, Page Mill is
guaranteed half of all profits after initial 8% preferred return to limited partners, until the
general manager receives at least 20% of distributions. Thereafter, based on this model,
Page Mill would receive 20% of additional profits (Real Estate Alert, 2009:2).
Taran explicitly sold the venture to the access fund investment partners claiming
Woodland Park was “poised for gentrification” (Bernstein-Wax, 2010). Paul Magliocco,
a Page Mill investor associated with the angel investment firm Keiretsu Forum noted in a
court declaration that "I personally would never have invested in the fund had I known
about the scheme to evade the rent control laws… from a purely economic perspective, it
rendered the investment far too risky. At least equally importantly, I find the scheme
morally offensive" (Ibid). Despite such statements to the contrary, the established,
sophisticated high-net investors were likely to have invested precisely because of the
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potential for gentrification, the elimination of rent control and redevelopment as the very
premise for returns.
Just before the housing crash, the west section of East Palo Alto would be a likely
spot to promote gentrification within the tight Silicon Valley housing market. East Palo
Alto’s Woodland Park neighborhood lies between Palo Alto and Bayside highway that
leads north to San Francisco and south to San Jose. The neighborhood is contiguous with
the even more affluent city of Menlo Park. Significantly, the Woodland Park area is a
stone’s throw from the Four Seasons Hotel and office complex where Taran first made
his pitch to the sidecar investors, a vast yet tucked away development project facing Palo
Alto. According to the city’s own General Plan adopted in 1999, and the most current
plan at the time of the Page Mill purchases, parts of the Woodland Park neighborhood
adjacent to the University Circle hotel and office complex were slated for commercial
rezoning (City of East Palo Alto, Cottland, Beland Associates, 1999: 24).
This rezoning did not actually happen, however, as Taran and associates could
observe in 2006. The area outside University Circle retained zoning districts for medium
to high-density residential housing throughout Woodland Park. This area was the home
of low-income households. Indeed, Page Mill’s plans outlined in Taran’s pitch to the
sidecar fund’s prospective investors called for residential redevelopment.
Ultimately, Taran’s “trade secrets” amounted to Page Mill’s intention to acquire
monopoly ownership of all available land and property on the west side of East Palo Alto.
Taran understood that the portfolio’s potential market value did not equal the sum of the
future value of the total individual properties. Instead, the portfolio’s maximum profits
depended on the concentrated purchase for redevelopment. Aggregation allowed for
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scalable redevelopment of the entire neighborhood. Page Mill banked on tenant vacancy
in order to reposition the properties for redevelopment. Tenant vacancy carried risks,
however. Vacancy would mean constraint or opportunity contingent upon the ability for
the investor to service debts without rental income, to leverage the properties for
additional conversion funds, or to make a short-term sale. The tenants’ homes in
aggregate became a vehicle to maximize financialization, or, the further commodification
of the portfolio for greater exchange and associated fees. Amassed as a portfolio fund, the
properties could become a single vehicle for various financial instruments tied to
significant loans.

The Lender Stakeholder, Wachovia

The burdens on this portfolio suggest a different financial relationship from the
landlord tenant primary interdependence around the need and demand for rent income to
support debt servicing, management, and maintenance for long-term real estate
investment. The debt-fueled mortgage-backed securities market allows for additional
points of exchange for capital by multiplying opportunities for putting capital in motion.
Leverage and the securitization of debt involve greatest potential gains in shortest amount
of time, through short-term cash flow, fee collection, and more opportunity for exchange.
In the short view, leverage, including leverage above purchase cost, creates cash flow
from property investment that is otherwise fixed or illiquid until sale. A detailed view of
the loan agreement provides a window into the way in which debt creates opportunity for
greater profits, and fees, and also incentivizes eliminating rent control.
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General Manager David Taran’s strategy, according to his attorney, was to
“leverage the leveraged” (Bernstein-Wax, 2010). In August 2006, the Royal Bank of
Scotland subsidiary Greenwich Capital provided a subscription line of credit to Page Mill
for preliminary financing capacity, first at $90 million but subsequently reduced to $30
million (PMP II Fund Overview and Summary of Investments, 2007: 14). One year later,
thanks to the CalPERS $100 million equity commitment, Page Mill Properties II, LP
through a single purpose entity “Old York Financial Services LLC” became the guarantor
of a $242,952,461.00 loan from Wachovia Bank (now Wells Fargo), $220.7 million of
which was committed towards the portfolio’s $271 million purchase price (Wachovia
Bank National Assocation, 2007). The $100 million commitment from CalPERS
ultimately represented 86% of the equity in the fund (Stockbridge Capital Group, 2009).
David Taran, on the other hand, was required to commit no less than $10 million to the
fund (Agreement of Limited Partnership between Page Mill Properties II, 2006: 21), of
which he contributed less than $2 million by December 31, 2007 (Pricewatercoopers,
LLC, 2008: 12). Through the separate sidecar alternative investment vehicle Page Mill
Access Fund (est. 2007), Page Mill II also attracted an additional credit line from City
National Bank of $30 million, of which $14.8 million was released. The sidecar fund
brokered commitments of an additional $30 million from accredited high net worth
individuals and pooled venture capital.
The structure of multifamily loans such as the large Wachovia loan is predicated
on a market that circulates capital as credit. Commercial loans generally do not see
incremental repayment in full over the lifespan of the loan, but instead are structured for
regular monthly servicing followed by a large pay down or full repayment at the end of
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its 3-10 year term. Such a short span would rarely if ever allow for payment of all interest
and principal over its maturity. A looming repayment typically requires a sale, a new
loan, or refinancing at the end of the original loan’s short term (Congressional Oversight
Report on Commercial Real Estate Losses and the Risk to Financial Stability, 2010:8).
Debt begets new debt in such a structure. Typically, the income generated by rents
provides for monthly servicing on a multifamily commercial loan’s interest, or on interest
and principal. The property is the collateral for the debt and appreciation in property
values can create favorable terms for the borrower on a new loan to repay the original, or
for refinancing.
In this example, the loan agreement between Wachovia and Old York Financial
LLC, established by Page Mill, was disbursed through a series of advances for Page
Mill’s bulk property purchases in East Palo Alto. The loan amount was used for purposes
beyond the acquisition. The debt of the original loan was permitted within cash flow
calculations as reserves for this portfolio. The lender also provided stipulations for loan
advances in the event of the need to pay for debt servicing. Under these terms, the loan
itself could be used to pay for a limited number of servicing payments to avoid default
(Wachovia Bank National Association, 2007).
This circulation of debt perpetuates a much larger pyramid scheme, in which
tenants often have a debt burden of their own. The tenants, profiled in Chapter 5, were
among the most susceptible to debt schemes as low-income workers in need of wage
supplements. Indeed, across the country, higher income renters began purchasing housing
in the 1970s and again in the 1990s through first time homeowner programs initiated in
the later period by Bush and Clinton administrations and the subprime market. Notably,
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very low income renters and undocumented workers could not afford or qualify for these
programs and remained renters. At the same time, rent increases during the 1990s led to
an affordability crisis for those tenants (Hockett, McElwee, et. al., 2005).
Among low-income renters, even regulated rents could also be prohibitive
without an economy of credit that includes debt as wage supplement in the various forms
of payday loans, student loans, and individual credit cards. In California, according to the
California Department of Corporations, the payday loan industry reached nearly $3
billion by 2007, often involving compounded interest rates in the triple digits (de Sa,
2011). Tenants’ contribution of rental income to the cash flow of the portfolio was
ostensibly, if partially, debt-based just as the service to the original mortgage may come
from a credit subscription line or the original mortgage itself. In this formulation, higher
leverage was also predicated on high(er) rents, which in all likelihood would involve
increasing debt burden for tenants as well, regardless of underlying property value. As
noted below, real estate losses for the institutional investor, CalPERS, were exacerbated
by additional leverage CalPERS took on and was mandated to repay. Meanwhile, debt
taken on by municipal governments supplemented the municipalities’ stretched
operational budgets, and local governments’ obligatory contribution payments to
CalPERS for workers’ retirement security.47
Page Mill private placement memoranda, the Wachovia loan agreement, and
CalPERS’ internal reports all demonstrate excessive risk and over-leverage for the
portfolio fund. High concentration of debt in the portfolio meant that more rental income
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Three California municipalities, Vallejo, Stockton, and San Bernardino, filed for bankruptcy by 2015,
each citing high pension costs for municipal budget woes.

163

would be used for debt servicing, at the cost of operating expenses and overall portfolio
stability during the servicing period before property resale. Greater debt also meant
greater exposure with potential asset devaluation. At the time of the Wachovia loan in
2007 two primary calculations typically gauged risk for underwriting in the commercial
market and helped to establish the terms for the maximum available loan: the Loan to
Value (LTV) and debt service coverage ratios. A third ratio, the debt yield, gained import
following the housing downturn but was also used in Wachovia’s underwriting for this
loan. A closer look at the underwriting for the Wachovia loan demonstrates the extent of
the inflated debt provided for this portfolio.
Unlike residential loans that generally involve higher LTV ratios based on an
expected long-term amortization span for loan repayment, i.e. 30 years, multifamily
commercial loans generally have lower LTV ratios.48 The released Wachovia loan
agreement with Page Mill does not include the terms of the promissory note such as debt
servicing schedule, but some publically known elements of the note include the $50
million balloon repayment by the fund by August, 2009, and full repayment by 2011
(Taran, 2009). The loan therefore required a significant pay down two years from
origination, and would come due in full within five years of origination.
The Wachovia loan agreement specified all initial and future borrowing base
properties for this Page Mill fund. The loan stipulations prohibited the LTV ratio from
exceeding 85%. Based on the borrowing properties exhibit, the portfolio was financed at
an initial 82% LTV ratio reflecting the total Wachovia loan allocation to purchase price.
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As put by Immergluck (2015), the higher LTV ratio is based on the idea that homeowners are less likely
to view the property solely as an investment, and less likely to walk away if underwater (personal
communication).
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Yet, altogether all loans including subscription lines obtained for the portfolio amounted
to $287.2 million, well over the portfolio’s total purchase price and appraised value. The
total LTV for the portfolio as a statement of total debt versus purchase price, in lieu of
appraisal value before sale, was approximately 106%. In this estimation, the portfolio
was underwater at origination unless significant added-value redevelopment would take
place with the additional credit.49 Such leverage determination above CalPERS’ own
stated limit of 75% LTV was allowed for in the partnership agreement “[…if] appropriate
for strategic or other appropriate business reasons” as determined by the General Partner
David Taran, and approved by the Limited Partnership (Page Mill Properties II, LP,
2006: 47).
A second measurement of risk in this portfolio’s underwriting, the debt service
coverage ratio50 (DSCR), also corresponded to a future-driven economy marked by
present-day financialization, or opportunities to circulate capital. A DSCR value
considers the annual net operating income and annual loan servicing, indicating cashflow availability and thus the overall strength of the portfolio to support debt servicing
through existing revenue sources. The Federal Reserve found in the period between
2005-2007 “…lenders would base reported DSCRs on estimates of future rents, rather
than on current or historical rental income” (Black et.al., 2012: 3). This was seemingly
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In its private placement memorandum overview to individual investors dated several months prior to the
Wachovia loan agreement, Page Mill deemed a Loan to Cost (not value) projection of 80% for the portfolio
(Wachovia National Bank Associaition, 2007). Loan to Cost (LTC) includes operating expenses such as
budgeted tenant improvements above purchase acquisition (Loan Agreement, 2007: 6). This ratio shows
greater leverage than the Wachovia loan agreement’s stipulation of a maximum 75% LTC ratio for the
borrowing properties.
50
See http://www.uhab.org/sites/default/files/banking_on_gentrification.pdf for a visual graphic of the
definition of DSCR. The graphic depicts debt versus income and was developed by Stabilizing New York
City, a coalition of 14 organizing, legal and advocacy organizations in New York City fighting predatory
equity in that city (Banking on Gentrification: A Report from the Stabilizing NYC Coalition, June 18,
2016:3).
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the case for this portfolio in which neither the LTV nor DSCR could be reconciled at
regulated rents. The DSCR stipulated by the Wachovia loan agreement projected a
negative cash flow between .60-.80:1.00 for the first two years given purchase,
management start-up and capital costs following the first loan advance, and 1.00:1.00
following year two (Wachovia National Bank Association, 2007).51 In the net operating
income to total debt service ratio, only 60-80% of the annual debt servicing costs would
be met in years one and two. Despite this upside down ratio, the Wachovia loan would be
deemed rational in light of competitive low-interest commercial property lending rates
and what appeared to be the ever-rising mortgage-backed securities markets at the time of
origination. Yet with the existing debt including the subscription lines from City National
Bank and Royal Bank of Scotland, the Wachovia loan could only be construed as
unmitigated and excess risk.52
Amplified risk on investment created greater pressure on increasing rents during
the investment period. The lender was aware of the rent control protections that limited
increases to rent income, and provided a brief summary description of the East Palo Alto
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A DSCR ratio less than 1.00 reflects insufficient annual cash flow to support debt servicing and
extremely high risk of default. The bank may have allowed for such a low DSCR given the $100million
equity commitment from CalPERS that preceded the loan. The calculation assumes an eventual increase in
cash flow based on increase in rents and decrease or stabilization of operating expenses over time. Net
operating income does not include as expense the debt servicing or capital expenditures, such as one-time
improvements.
52
Another indicator, debt yield, also demonstrated high risk for this portfolio. Debt yield measures
profitability for the lender in the case of borrower default. This ratio is especially relevant to such a large
loan. The ratio estimates how much a lender can expect in returns over the course of holding the properties
following default in that event. Wachovia provided stipulation for the portfolio of no less than 7% debt
yield in the third year, and thereafter 8% (Ibid.: 15). This ratio estimates that the bank would receive 7-8%
in returns if Page Mill defaulted after the second year. There was not specified debt yield for the first two
years in the agreement. Although the loan agreement did not cite the projected net operating income for the
borrowing properties the debt yield estimation allows for a backwards calculation. At a 7% debt yield, the
minimum net operating income would be approximately $17 million for a $242.9 million loan. The
portfolio, in these terms, would generate $17 million in revenue after expenses. The debt yield was
insupportable even at such low terms.
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Rent Stabilization Ordinance in the loan agreement. Although the Wachovia loan
agreement required a listing of all properties that fall under the ordinance, only five
properties were listed. It is unclear whether the remaining properties were later added to
the agreement exhibit. Due diligence investigation by the lender and the borrower
investors also required disclosure of all lease agreements for each property (Wachovia
National Bank Association, 2007: 18-19). The lack of a complete list of the properties
covered by the ordinance suggests blatant disregard of the existing rent regulations that
covered the majority of the borrowing and future borrowing properties listed by the
borrower. Any strategy of rent increases based on deregulation or increase to maximum
legal rents, however, would be based on future rental income anticipated by the bank and
borrower rather than the rental income at time of the loan and purchase. Although
inconclusive, the incorrect number of properties may indicate the borrower’s future
projection of how many fewer units would be covered by the RSO as calculation of
future-based rent following deregulation rather than current rent.
Why would Wachovia provide such a high-risk and large loan in a city known for
its rent regulation? Just as Page Mill’s portfolio of East Palo Alto rental stock was a
speculative investment, so too was Wachovia’s loan to Page Mill’s speculative
investment portfolio bolstered by an assumption of value appreciation, continued debt
demand, and circulation based on low interest rates and corresponding robust securities
and servicing market. The bank, like the investors, sought to amplify leverage to amplify
profits. This was especially true for the securitization of loans; the larger the loan, the
larger the fees and cash flow from securities. Wells Fargo, in this instance, however,
ultimately became the greatest beneficiary in this high stakes gamble. As discussed in the
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following chapter, this banking entity later purchased Wachovia debt for pennies on the
dollar and with federal subsidy.
Wachovia’s specific interests can be viewed through its interrelated profits from
increased leverage including interest payments and fees captured by money managers in
the loan transaction. For example, the lender received incentive fees in the immediate
closing of the loan. The borrower here purchased points upfront from Wachovia at
$21,135,716.00 for an interest rate cap at 6.25% per annum over the period of the loan
(Wachovia National Bank Association, 2007: 10). Application fees, appraisal fees and
closing costs were also part of the loan structure at the borrower’s expense. In this case
some fee costs were allocated as deferred financing fees, which became amortized over
the life of the loan, thereby incorporating the fees into the loan amount bearing interest
(Pricewatercoopers LLC, 2008: 17). The borrower also provided fees to sell or swap
interest rate caps as derivatives contingent upon the loan covenants, with the aim to
reduce the impact of increases of interest rates on long-term debt (Ibid.: 9).
Lenders further benefit from such related fees and anticipate fees accrued in the
future exchange of servicing rights, which represents another separate market of
exchange deploying the loan agreement. This market entails the selling and purchasing of
contract rights for servicing mortgage payment collections from the borrower (Howley
and Gittelsohn, 2013). Yet still the most compelling reason for Wachovia to issue a loan
structured with such over-leverage was the ability for the bank to create paper: a primary
driver of real estate lending is the ability to pool and securitize the loan. The security
derivative takes the loan off the lender’s ledger.
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The Opening of Securities for Liquidity
The circulation of debt grew by the early 1980s, when Freddie Mac first issued
collateralized mortgage obligations, or CMOs, in which securities could be segmented to
distribute and differentiate risk (Immergluck, 2009: 461). Lenders and investors had more
incentive to securitize residential mortgages and commercial real estate loans as vehicles
for investment in the secondary market. Wall Street was making massive profits through
CMOs in a boom that just among government-sponsored, mortgage backed securities
escalated in value from $200 million in 1980 to more than $4 trillion in 2007 (Sanchez,
et. al., 2010: 105).
Commercial real estate securities followed residential mortgage backed securities
and gained traction as a fix to the savings & loans crisis. The Resolution Trust
Corporation was established in 1989 to take over the failed thrifts, nearly half of which
were multi-family and commercial loans (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 2005).
The Resolution Trust Corporation liquidated the failed loans through securitization,
eventually making gains for the U.S. Treasury and overwhelmingly realizing investor
profit. These securitizations differed from traditional commercial-backed mortgage bonds
because the securities were based on pooled loans and properties rather than on a single
mortgage and property.
By the time the Resolution Trust Corporation liquidated the bulk of the distressed
loans, the commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) had begun to play a rising
role in financing new loans. In 2005 the FDIC reported on the self-propagation of the
CMBS market in its review of the Resolution Trust Corporation’s securitization program.
“Large commercial banks are now underwriting and originating commercial mortgage
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loans specifically for securitization” (Ibid.: 420). New commercial loans were financed
by securities through the pooling and selling of existing loans. The securities market in
turn expanded through the availability of new loans to pool and sell, and put capital in
motion where capital exchange was otherwise constrained by illiquidity. In 2007, the
same year that Page Mill received its loan, multifamily portfolio purchases grew to $56
billion, “more than twice as much as any previous year” (Joint Center for Housing
Studies, 2009:ii).
Some of the same institutions underwriting residential and commercial mortgages
also purchased mortgage-backed securities (Fannie Mae, 2014). By the late 1990s and
early 2000s, the underwriting involved escalated risks or subprime lending. Between
2005-2007, Wachovia was the leading underwriter in the CBMS market with $81 billion
of commercial mortgage-backed bonds according to data analysis by Bloomberg
(Campbell, 2010). Just months before Wachovia issued the loan for the PMP II portfolio
purchases, Wachovia had demonstrated the institution’s tremendous confidence in the
market by leading the largest CBMS transaction in history. In that deal, Wachovia pooled
$7.9 billion in loans to form a single security, involving half of the approximately $3
billion of financing for the Peter Cooper Stuyvesant Town purchase that later went
underwater (Securities and Exchange Commission, Pooling and Servicing Agreement,
March 1, 2007). CalPERS lost its total investment in that high-risk deal: $500 million.
In the immediate period following the Page Mill loan issuance, the near total shut
down of the CMBS market in the fall of 2007 would have made securitization of the
Wachovia loan to Page Mill’s portfolio highly unlikely, however. Indeed, there were no
certificate issuances for this loan disclosed through the Security and Exchange
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Commission. Notwithstanding the collapse, all indications point to the likelihood of
Wachovia transferring the loan for securitization based on the bank’s surge in mortgagebaked securities pools at that time. Wachovia agreements issued on the titles for different
property purchased in East Palo Alto stipulate Wachovia’s securitization rights for the
loan (Wachovia Bank National Association, 2007; Superior Court, 2008). Securitization
would have allowed for Wachovia to move the loan off its books while maintaining
servicing.
Securitization provides another example of financialization at the node between
lending and investment. Subprime loans created greater risk for investors, but also
heightened returns and the pace of moving capital, which in turn allowed for the
origination of new loans. Rating agencies assess and disburse risk in pooled loans and
account for the amount of risk by investor class attributed to different tranches, or cuts,
within the pools. The complexity of tranches further concentrates risk for those investors
in the lowest tranches (Benmelech, Efraim and Dlugosz, 2010: 164). However, even
those who invested in AAA rated superior tranches lost in the downturn. This was due in
part because much of the AAA rated tranches were the upper-rated tranches of what were
aggregated B-rated pooled loans. In this structured trick of mirrors, even institutions that
were restricted to investing in AAA debt obligations could invest in high-risk, B-rated
pools. The pooled commercial mortgage- backed securities were far more likely to be
purchased by premium institutional investors than commercial banks (Stanton and
Wallace, 2012). CalPERS was a leading institutional investor in these ultimately doomed
loans. Notably, in July 2009, CalPERS sued raters over highly graded ratings assigned to
poor performing structured investment vehicles.

171

Figure 5.1 demonstrates the sharp decline of CalPERS funds in mortgage backsecurities (including residential and commercial) paralleling the near collapse and reemergence of this market. CalPERS funded this particular portfolio at the height of its
investment in mortgage backed-securities of more than $18 billion. Investment in overleveraged real estate by CalPERS coincided with the pension fund’s rise in investment in
mortgage back-securities. By all appearances the underwriting for the Wachovia loan for
the Page Mill portfolio represented a high-risk loan given the over-leverage, rental
restrictions, building conditions as well as the short-term period of the loan (Black, Chu,
et. al., 2011). Notably, most multifamily loans involve the short-term balloon payment at
the 5, 7, 10 year terms that require refinancing (Joint Center of Housing Studies, 2009).
Figure 5.1. Mortgage Back-Securities, Total Book
CalPERS Annual Reports 2002-2012
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The CalPERS initial capital investment in Page Mill was but one small piece in a
much, much larger CalPERS international and domestic real estate investment portfolio
that was itself leveraged by the pension fund. In many instances, CalPERS’s own
“equity” investments were drawn from credit. The CalPERS credit-based investments in
turn allowed for invested funds to obtain financing for asset purchases and development.
In an overview of CalPERS losses following the housing downturn, the Wall Street
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Journal reported that an average sixty percent of the money invested in residential real
estate funds by CalPERS was borrowed (Corkery and Karmin, 2008). Likewise, up to
fifty percent of CalPERS investments in commercial real estate was borrowed (Ibid.).
The equity infusions that investors coveted from CalPERS in order to gain leverage were,
in part, and sometimes in large part, also debt in appearance as investment capital.

The Billionaire Limited Partner, CalPERS

CalPERS is a significant institutional investor in the U.S. and world economy,
representing the largest U.S. public sector pension with $299.4 billion of assets
(CalPERS, 2014). The fund is commonly referred to as the “gorilla” in the field of
institutional investors, holding a significant portion of the world’s largest 113 public
sector funds that together represented $5.8 trillion of managed assets in 2013, or 39%, of
the $14.9 trillion of managed assets held by the world’s 300 largest pension funds that
year (Pension and Investments and Towers Watson, 2014). In the area of real estate,
thirty years out from the inception year of its current real property portfolio in 1983,
CalPERS had become the 12th largest single real estate investor, globally (CALPERS,
Real Estate Strategic Plan, February 14, 2011).
CalPERS first grew as a result of low risk investments, investing in fixed bonds,
and long-term real estate (1953), and finally, stocks (1967). The risks associated with
overleveraged real estate investments stood in stark relief to the stable, long-term
components of CalPERS mandate, and instead reflected increasing pressures and
incentives for greater returns within a shorter period. The example of increasing risk
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resurfaces a sizeable question on the mission and purpose of public pension institutions:
Are public pension funds an investment vehicle for workers’ security or capital? Do
institutional investment funds simply adhere to market structures, or shape market
structures (and investment chances)? What are the consequences for workers in not just
whether their investment fund realizes returns on investment but how those returns are
produced? Does workers’ capital invest in the theft of workers’ capital?
Two periods of real estate demonstrate the increase of both leverage and risk in
CalPERS’ real estate division. The early 1980s-2001 opened a period of external real
estate management including money managers, consultants and placement agents.
CalPERS’ current property portfolio’s inception year signifies the timing of the shift from
comparatively stable long-term real estate investments. This period also saw the first
shifting effects of Proposition 21. In 1984 this measure had allowed CalPERS to take on
greater risks in investment. The greater latitude for investment allocation was sold to
California legislators as a means to reap higher returns, and increase worker benefits
(Malagna, 2013). The latter period 2002-2009 continued this trend but was marked by a
decision to increase opportunistic funds and decrease oversight requirements. CalPERS
peaked its investments in higher risk alternative, opportunistic real estate funds just
before the housing crash in 2007, including at the beginning of the end of the boom in
highly overleveraged funds such as Page Mill.
CalPERS real estate investments fall under core, specialized value-added, and
opportunistic classes (a range of increasing risk). For example, CalPERS classified the
vehicle for investment in East Palo Alto, Page Mill II, as an “opportunistic fund” of
anticipated higher returns based on higher risk. CalPERS real estate opportunistic
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endeavors generally follow the “J curve” effect, anticipating few or negligible returns
early on given institutional fees and absolute returns of 13% or more after fees through
their short life-cycles (CalPERS, 2006). Investors refer to these opportunity funds as
private equity real estate funds (Anson, 2011). In the case of CalPERS, private equity
funds are disaggregated from real estate funds by investment unit and are listed
separately from real estate under alternative assets. Although the returns on investment
for these alternative assets funds are made transparent, the returns on their individual
portfolios are not.53 These funds may include a range of investments including real estate
portfolios, securities, and corporate buyouts. Page Mill II’s Limited Partnership
agreement described its own structure as a “venture capital operating company”
(Agreement of Limited Partnership with Page Mill Properties II, L.P, 2006: 22).
Although CalPERS may assemble and manage a real estate portfolio in-house,
since the 1990s external managers have overwhelmingly handled CalPERS's investments
in alternative investment classes and real estate by forming limited partnerships for the
investment of CalPERS funds. These funds were also critiqued for their colossal losses.
Between 1998-2010 the $3.2 trillion global investment management firm, Black Rock
Advisors, managed CalPERS’ core (non opportunistic) $1 billion multifamily portfolio
investments. CalPERS notably lost its investment in Peter Cooper Village through its
Black Rock partner in one of the largest real estate transactions in real estate history. In
the same year, CalPERS lost $970 million through another partnership with adviser,
Macfarlane Partners (Corkery, 2009). At a smaller scale, this was the case in the
CalPERS investment in the private venture capital firm Page Mill that offered CalPERS a
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Chapter 5 discusses CalPERS classification of this particular portfolio in East Palo Alto as a venture
capital fund and the implication of the asset class for CA transparency law.

175

limited partnership defined in a private placement agreement. The partnership limited
CalPERS control over the assets within a more complex co-investment model and
governance structure.
External management-induced fees accompanied outsourced investments. For
example, for the Page Mill II portfolio, CalPERS and other limited partners did provide
for multiple fees paid out to the general principal, David Taran, while also bearing the
expenses for, but limited control over, the portfolio fund. In addition to the management
fee, the general partner received property management fees, leasing fees, construction
management fees, and redevelopment fees. In just over the first year of the project
origination, the general principal accrued $7,137,000 in fees of which, at that time,
$1,899,000 in management fees had been paid out by the partnership. (Squar Milner Real
Estate Services, GP, 2008: 7).
In 2000, CalPERS’s 13-person board had begun to delegate more investment
decisions directly to the staff who then became direct targets of placement agent lobbyists
who receive commission from investors for brokering deals (cite). Increased scrutiny
over this practice of external management fees and controversy over “pay to play”
placement fees following losses led to public outcry and reviews of many of CalPERS’s
funds managed by external firms. In the case of Page Mill II, the partnership agreement
allowed for placement agent costs and fees, but there was no agent of record for the
portfolio (Agreement of Limited Partnership with Page Mill Properties II, L.P., 2006:
31).
Michael McCook was the senior investment officer for the real estate division
during the period of Page Mill II investment. Considered one of the “30 most influential
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people in private equity real estate” by Private Equity Real Estate (November, 2006),
McCook’s self-reported and nominal gifts from those who sought out his influence reads
like a daybook marking dates and meetings with gifts received including meals, golf
outings, wine, and cigars from partners including Macfarlane Partners, San Francisco,
KR Capital Agra, India, AIG Hong Kong, Page Mill, DIVCO (of which David Taran was
a co-founder and partner before Page Mill II), Apollo, CB Richard Ellis, Deutche Bank,
Resmark, Hines Beijing and Shanghai, Capri Capital, Rreef, Nomura Real Estate Tokyo,
and Consolidated Capital of Amsterdam (McCook, 2006; McCook, 2006a; McCook,
2006b). These self-reports make clear both the legal limits of gifts to McCook and the
interpersonal, relational work of investment strategy.
McCook oversaw the shift in the real estate division to higher risk.54 Within its
real estate assets classification the real estate unit defines opportunistic funds as an
alternative asset: “An established investment program temporarily investing outside its
benchmark or asset category based on current favorable market conditions” (CalPERS,
2013). CalPERS consultants deemed mezzanine debt, international real estate in Japan
and Europe, and U.S. distressed properties or distressed sellers as opportunities of highest
returns within this higher risk program. Ironically, in the realm of real estate, the highest
amount of debt as indicated by high loan to value ratios, were often loaded onto the
riskiest distressed properties.
For example, the loan-to-value percent for CalPERS entire real estate investments
reported for the year 2000 was 9.4% LTV. This low-risk, stable LTV compares with the
real estate portfolio’s escalated leverage of 64% LTV in 2008. In 2008 the average loan
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As previously noted, CalPERS separates real estate from other alternative investment funds.
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to value rate of all opportunistic class funds was 70%. For that same year, CalPERS’
guaranteed and non-guaranteed debt for real estate was $24 billion, compared to $1.2
billion in the year 2000 (CalPERS Real Estate Unit Review, 2009).
Public pensions began to turn to opportunistic asset and alternative assets classes
as a way to recoup lost stock returns in index funds in the economic wake of the deflated
tech bubble in the spring of 2000, and the 9/11 terrorist attack the following year
(Williams Walsh, 2004). The outpouring of both equity and debt capital into the real
estate market following the downturn of stocks also meant lower yields from CalPERS
core-assets. CalPERS in 2004 sold $16 billion of core-assets and leveraged the remaining
portfolio to support what became a $30 billion investment in high-risk real estate
(CalPERS Real Estate Unit Review, 2009). Arguably, CalPERS also sought quick
returns after failing to reap the gains of 1990s stock boom. A former chief investment
officer for California’s Teachers Employee Retirement System (CalSTERS) stated in an
interview with Reuters, this failure, led by CalPERS, propelled Wall Street in the years to
come:
Had public pension funds locked in profits then [1990s], pension fund boards
years later would have thought twice about buying into opaque investments and
Wall Street may not have been so inventive... It would not have been necessary to
create these overly risky products with the intent to recover from what they
missed. (Christie, Henderson, Alban, 2009)
Instead, following initial investment in private equity in 1990, CalPERS led pension
funds into hedge fund and the higher risk opportunistic real estate investments beginning
in the early 2000s. Ironically given the strategy of private equity, CalPERS investment in
venture capital, particularly finance was seen as aligned with its “Double Bottom Line”
policy in 2000 to invest in socially responsible, non-polluting industries. See figure 5.2.
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for CalPERS allocations by investment area.
Figure 5.2. CalPERS Investment Areas by Allocation
Percent, Annual Reports 2002-2012
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In 2002, CalPERS allocated its first investments in the newly created “real estate
opportunistic fund.” CalPERS cited potential for returns well above the 13% benchmark
and in the 20-30% range for this new opportunistic class. For example, one opportunity
cited in an internal report on higher risk investments was to provide mezzanine bridge
loans to commercial investors facing what CalPERS calle d conservative underwriting at
the time. Among its first opportunistic domestic real estate funds in this new class was
CalPERS’ investment in the first Page Mill Fund in 2002. At that time, CalPERS
allocated a total of $500 million in opportunistic real estate investments. CalPERS
identified funds for such investments in 2002 by leveraging core investments. In this
structuring, stable real estate funds would be used as collateral for debt used as capital to
invest in higher risk opportunities (Members of the Investment Committee, CALPERS,
2004).
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By 2006 high-risk opportunity funds represented 15% of CalPERS’ total real
estate portfolio, or $1.6 billion, and by 2010 represented 40% of the total real estate
portfolio (CalPERS, 2006). As evidence of the loosening of monitoring at CalPERS, only
opportunistic real estate investments over $200 million required CalPERS Investment
Committee Board approval by the time the program was formalized in 2006 (Ibid.). In
classes considered less risky, such as core property, CalPERS would allow up to $1.8
billion in a single deal without investment committee approval (Jacobius, 2009). In
contrast, in the period before 2002, most of the CalPERS domestic real estate investment
pertained to commercial office buildings for rent generating income with relatively little
debt; any investment over $50 million had to be approved by the board (Robinson and
Marois, 2010).
Another consideration for investment and risk managers in the CalPERS real
estate unit was compensation tied to return on investment. When CalPERS’ potential
beneficiaries profited in the short term from high-risk investment, so too did its senior
investors. Performance incentives in the real estate unit were tied directly to gains in the
real property asset classes. In the case of CalPERS senior investment manager Ted
Eliopoulous, 20% of his performance based review score for compensation was based on
non-core, opportunistic returns (CalPERS, 2009). Although this could also amount to
losses in compensation, investment officers were rarely hurt by their gambles.
Eliopoulous oversaw the real estate unit during the housing downturn and faced
CalPERS’ record loss of 47.9% of its real estate asset value in the year 2008, but he was
still awarded a $93,941 bonus that year (Pensions & Investments, 2010).
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If core real estate had been long considered a stable assets class at the time David
Taran presented to CalPERS Page Mill Properties II as an investment opportunity, noncore or “opportunistic” real estate was another matter. Although CalPERS’ real estate
assets did not meet their benchmarks and suffered tremendous losses for core and noncore classes beginning in 2007, the opportunistic class lost most significantly. The
consultants CalPERS hired to conduct a due diligence report in anticipation of a
subscription agreement with Page Mill noted the vulnerabilities facing CalPERS with
such an investment in non-core, opportunistic classes. They provided a rationale for their
services, stating:
Long ago adjudicated as an Alternative Asset Class, real estate has only recently
been more able to standardize and gain certain efficiencies, which have the
capabilities of being quantified and duplicated. However, non-core investments
add a more complex asset management and monitoring dimension. We have
approached this assignment with this in mind. (Situs Strategic Advisors, 2006: 1)
Despite the consultant advisors’ claim that greater risk and complexity of risk and
governance required increased monitoring, CalPERS real estate unit did quite the
opposite in this period, even as “opportunistic” real estate funds and securities purchases
went into free fall.
For example, three years after the fund initiation when the CalPERS real estate
unit sought clarity on the Page Mill portfolio value, the fund’s general partner rebutted
saying the CalPERS real estate unit held no authority to conduct an appraisal because the
portfolio did not fall under the same scrutiny obligations of CalPERS “core” assets
(Shore, 2009:1). The higher the risk, the less monitoring the real estate unit mandated, or
in this case, was permitted to undertake in its role as limited partner.
CalPERS ultimately lost all equity in the Page Mill fund. In the structure of
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venture capital funds or private equity real estate, limited partners such as CalPERS have
little authority over the General Partner. Despite holding the largest share, CalPERS’
voice and control in the management and governance of this portfolio was circumscribed
by their position as limited partner as described in the partners’ terms of agreement with
David Taran.
The 1.68 million California public sector worker contributors to CalPERS, who
are disproportionately people of color, contribute through their deferred compensation the
investment capital that makes up the CalPERS pension fund. They assume future
earnings from CalPERS investments by money managers tasked to invest their deferred
wages. Ultimately, as fiduciaries of workers’ capital, “[t]he primary component of [public
pension funds’] duty is to ensure the best long-term, risk-adjusted rate of return for the
plan’s assets” (Silvers, Patterson and Mason, 2001: 203). Not withstanding fiduciary
responsibility to the workers, in a debt-sourced economy workers are at the bottom of the
market pyramid scheme. The burdens of retirement payout and potential income security
can be shifted from the employers to the workers and larger number of CA residents. In
the case of California, the state guarantees CalPERS solvency, making all California
residents the greatest stakeholders by number in its investment strategy.55 Much of the
debt burden for over-leveraged investments fall onto municipalities who must take on
their own debt to support contributions to CalPERS.
Although most pension funds first gained their wealth and garnered state and
labor investment through long-term investment strategies and earnings, the financial
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Pension funds, the world’s greatest single source of investment capital shape capital markets and exploit
them (Fung, Hebb, Rogers, 2001), in this case premising homes as commodity and people as expendible.
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crisis of the early 2000s exposed an economy predicated on other people’s money, risk,
debt, and short-termism. Such high-risk was not induced by the capital innovation in
debt-backed financialization alone. This portfolio must be understood along the lines of
the preceding racial contours of urban, then suburban, disinvestment. This context
intersects with state signals of weakening rental protections; a long-established reliance
on workers to plan ahead for themselves for retirement by producing contributions to
institutional investment capital during their productive years; plus a reliance on
municipalities to supplement contributions to the fund by taking on their own municipal
debt. As municipalities take on greater debt to pay for debt-backed pensions and the
devolution of basic services, “Wall Street” private interests hold influence over local
governments exchanging credit-worthiness for increased austerity and privatization (see
Hackworth, 2007).

Chapter Conclusion
This portfolio description identified the primary capital stakeholders in the portfolio
construction, the general partner, the lender, and the institutional investor. Beyond the
speculation of property for short term gains, this portfolio overview demonstrated how
the general partner leveraged labor’s capital via CalPERS for access to credit, which in
turn potentially supported a securities market in which CalPERS was highly invested, and
whose investments formed part of a larger market of exchange of debt, real property,
bonds, and commodities.
Figure 5.3 summarizes the primary capital stakeholders of the portfolio fund
detailed above in this chapter: the fund manager, limited partners, and lenders. The
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arrows depicted in figure 5.3 indicate interdependencies and broad capital flows rather
than a chronology or processes of the portfolio assemblage.56
The Page Mill general manager, David Taran, established this particular “venture
capital fund.” The general manager

Figure 5.3 “Portfolio Stakeholder Structure”
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residence. The manager sought
investment in Page Mill by CalPERS
and individual high-net worth investors, the latter of whom largely made commitments to
the portfolio’s side-car fund, “Page Mill Access Fund.” In turn, initial capital
commitment allowed the general partner to obtain greater leverage, including the largest
note from Wells Fargo/Wachovia. Credit allowed for property acquisition and funds to
reposition the properties for redevelopment.
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The governance portfolio structure of the fund establishes the separate Page Mill Access and Page Mill
Properties funds that become a single entity for borrowing purposes; leverage therefore became attributed
to separate LLCs all controlled by the general manager (Stockbridge Capital, 2009).

184

The pension fund, the majority investor, for its part collected a portion of state
workers’ wages, along with state employer contributions, in exchange for a promise of
retirement income to member workers in the future. Satisfactory returns from such
investments as the Page Mill portfolio would contribute to the CalPERS assets pool for
pensioner payments and investment equity.
The capacity for capital exchange and fee collection throughout the period of the
Page Mill portfolio, rather than as solely in the acquisition and disposition book-ends of
the deal, the latter being when investment managers anticipated the greater waterfall of
returns, was largely based on the ongoing influx of capitalization through new investors
and leverage. In the time span of the holdings, lenders and the general fund manager
interfaced with brokers in the intermediary markets of servicing, interest rate swaps, and,
potentially for the lender, the creation and selling of securities. In the figure 5.4, another
double arrow depicts potential interdependencies among the portfolio actors: the lenders
and a larger pool of investors beyond those indicated in the figure, investment bankers
and pension funds. The arrow line is depicted as broken because the interdependency is
not between the specific investors and the lenders of this portfolio deal, but between
lenders and investors in securities. The double arrow indicates the lending imperative for
creating paper in the securities market, and vice versa. Lending originators have come to
rely on this circulation of capital in the secondary market. Lenders also rely on deposits
from consumers serviced by banks to guard the consumers’ interest-bearing wages, and
who en-masse rely on consumer credit as wage supplements.
In the sketch of such a pyramid scheme, tenants, homeowners, workers and
consumers are the base on which value extraction and the debt economy rests.
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Ultimately, the scale and debt structure of the large, concentrated, and over-leveraged
portfolio created greater impetus for Page Mill to suppress tenant collective action to
defend and expand rent control. As investors’ contributions and debt amplified so too did
the fund manager’s drive to eliminate rent control and create a portfolio attractive to
prospective developers for amplified returns. Indeed, the general manager sought to
secede the underlying land of the portfolio from the City of East Palo Alto in order to
break away from the city’s rent ordinance.
Although Page Mill anticipated subverting rent regulations and increasing rent in
the short term, the arrow between the fund manager and the tenants in this figure was
breached: ostensibly, the general manager had no intention of retaining tenants’ rights to
occupy their homes in exchange for rent, nor did the general manager plan on remaining
the tenants’ landlord for long. Instead, unfolding events first discussed in Chapter 4
exposed the investment strategy’s intermediate objective: to wholly displace the tenant
population.
Page Mill sought to both profit from and overhaul state protections established for
renters. Undergirding this investment model was a racial organization of real estate risk
extended from preceding California property regimes and broader U.S. housing and
urban policy. The potential for return on investment ultimately relied on the historical and
ongoing otherizing of Black and immigrant renters, devalued by race, income, and
citizenry as part and parcel to re-valuing the land and housing for new, ostensibly white
and higher income residents. Segregation as containment marked the boundaries and
ratios of value, rent control abated gentrification but at the same time became a reason for
speculation.

186

RECONTROL
Chapter 6. Leveraging Points of Vulnerability

Chapter Introduction

This chapter extends the discussion of tenant action in East Palo Alto. Tenants
deciphered the portfolio stakeholders outlined in Chapter 5 enabling them to create a
crisis for investors. When informed tenants organize strategically, they can exploit
vulnerabilities among targets and create new opportunities to actualize their collective
tenant power. Although no singular approach prevailed as a “winning strategy,” for the
Page Mill tenants and their advocates, together their efforts created a whirl of activity that
ultimately propelled a crisis of profitability and control for the investors. As put by the
lead organizer for the statewide tenant-organizing outfit, Tenants Together: “The Page
Mill business plan didn’t allow for these kinds of delays by tenants. Tenants fought
back…they would have gotten reinvestment funds if we hadn’t fought back” (personal
communication, June 7, 2012). Reinvestment funds would have allowed for Page Mill to
continue ownership over the portfolio and wait out the financial crisis to sell the portfolio
to a premium investor for development. Without the reinvestment funds, Page Mill faced
the crisis of foreclosure and total investment loss for all investors.
Through their own actions, tenants won time to remain, claim, and expand their
rights as renters and as residents of East Palo Alto. In succession, tenants won a
temporary moratorium on rent increases, and, significantly, a city moratorium on
development. This chapter recounts why wielding the city’s power mattered to tenant
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action, and in particular, how their actions resulted in new guidelines by the state’s two
largest public pension funds, CalPERS and CalSTERS to prevent predatory equity
investment. They also created a new opportunity through the crisis of foreclosure to
affirm rent control, and ensure the city’s westside rent-controlled properties would not be
demolished by redevelopment.
Tenant action also resulted in greater transparency concerning workers’
contributions to the Page Mill venture. Tenant action pulled back the curtain on the
portfolio’s stakes and stakeholders to reveal Page Mill’s “trade secrets.” The trade secrets
amounted to a prototypical example of what housing advocates have called “predatory
equity,” as described in Chapter 5’s overview of the portfolio’s financial details and
business model. These details shed light on the social actors and structures involved in
large, overleveraged, private portfolio real estate funds and thus revealed the multiple
points of vulnerability for the investor landlords. Although tenants may count traditional
direct action such as the rent strike and eviction blockades as central bases of power,
renters in the Page Mill portfolio calculated that the traditional tenant/landlord
interdependency of rent exchange was not their most significant or sole leverage point for
securing their demands. Instead, in this case, the investment structure offered
opportunities for the tenants to exert political pressure and leverage other financial
constraints on the fund by targeting the city and state.
This chapter asks, “What were the points of vulnerability within the corporate
structure of this predatory equity scheme?” To answer this question, this chapter borrows
extensively from Juravich’s (2007) strategic corporate research framework developed for
union campaigns, and specifically from a U.S. perspective. Juravich argues that as
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corporate structures change, so too must labor tactics. This analytic framework pays
particular attention to relational, interdependent, secondary targets, or those actors who
are leverage points or intermediaries who may disrupt or block the primary target
(primary decision maker) as a result of governance or state oversight authorities. In the
portfolio structure described here, the general manager, or principal, of the fund was not
the sole or even primary target of the tenants. Tenants wielded leverage on the city, the
public pension fund, and the state (and to a lesser extent, the lender). As in workplace
campaigns involving immigrant workers in the service industry (see for example Fine,
2011; Gordon and Fine, 2010; Fine, 2005), tenants found in the case of this corporate
portfolio structure that the state matters.
Renters organizing in East Palo Alto did not deploy Juravich’s specific
framework, or develop a comprehensive strategic research strategy from the onset. Still,
several activist tenant leaders did play the role of strategic corporate researchers in their
quest for transparency and data, including the Stanford graduate students involved in the
Fair Rent Coalition. Transparency caused reputational damage and threatened targets, but
could not result in the desired outcomes without the people most affected by the threat to
their housing organizing around collective demands. Juravich’s premise that the
corporate structure should inform strategy is only as effective as the organizing work that
allows tenants to leverage points of vulnerability in the corporate structure. Beyond
rational choices based on strategic options that calculate opportunity and risks, effective
organizing rooted in social movement vision is a highly oppositional process for realizing
power based also on identity formation, solidarities, ideology, and consciousness (see in
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the labor literature, for example Stepan-Norris and Zeitlin, 2003; Voss and Sherman,
2000; Fantasia, 1988).
The following sections extend Juravich’s framework to this tenant organizing
campaign targeting the venture capital investors. This analysis centers tenants, workers,
and voting constituents as those who attempted to act upon points of vulnerability
through the secondary (city and state) and primary (investor) targets to meet their
demands. At the level of the city, the investors were vulnerable to tenant political
pressure vis a vis two primary areas of municipal authority. The first local authority
limits rental income; the second power limits redevelopment potential. Limits on rent and
restriction on development made property disposition, refinancing, and fresh equity less
likely for the general partner whose overleveraged portfolio required new capital infusion
or sale.
Another secondary leverage point for the City of East Palo Alto and tenants was
through negotiations over litigation, discussed previously in Chapter 4. The city’s
capacity and power to litigate or respond to litigation could increase the city’s negotiating
power based on disclosure demands. For example, the city pressured the investor by
demanding documentation of its business model. Through disclosure, the city and tenants
first learned the extent of CalPERS’s investment and leverage amount by the primary
lender.
After a discussion of these areas of power for the City of East Palo Alto, the
second section of this chapter discusses the limited partner role of the public pension fund
CalPERS. CalPERS exposed the fund to a point of vulnerability beyond municipal
regulation. This is a pension fund that is at once a limited partner in this private portfolio
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corporate structure and an arm of the state. CalPERS is led by public sector union
leadership at the service of state and municipal workers, accountable to state legislature
oversight, and guaranteed by California taxpayers.
Less impactful, but nonetheless forceful, were tenants’ and city demands on the
lender target. The lender was a point of vulnerability for the investors even following the
loan agreement; at the time when the investors’ balloon payment came due, the note
holder could negotiate refinancing or proceed with foreclosure. The lender, or, in this
case, debt purchaser, ultimately determined the control over the portfolio through its
transfer to a new purchaser following foreclosure.

Wielding the City

That the City of East Palo Alto defended its rent control was an unexpected
challenge for Page Mill. In fact, Page Mill’s general manager had highlighted in the
fund’s prospectus their anticipated private-public partnership with the city that would
allow them to usher in development plans and attract a premium purchaser.
The city used its authority to limit the portfolio’s net operating income, which the
general partner relied upon for debt servicing in the short term, but more importantly as
an added value of income potential for attracting a premium purchaser in the near future.
This mattered for a business model that predicated its current debt threshold on future
earnings, rather than present conditions (see Chapter 5).
One point of vulnerability for the investors included the just cause provisions that
protected tenants from eviction. The just cause provisions in the city’s rent regulation
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could impede income potential. No-cause eviction would facilitate tenancy succession
and vacancy decontrol that would otherwise allow the landlord to raise rents to market
rates. In this case the city blocked some rent increases and some, but not all, evictions.
These efforts only partially deterred secondary displacements. Additional eviction
protection, including increased remuneration for tenants facing the state Ellis Act (tenant
evictions through property demolition), was passed proactively by the city during the
Page Mill’s initial phase of the property acquisition. The intent of that initial shoring up
of eviction protection was also to encumber property repurposing and development.
These tenant protections were then immediately followed by Page Mill rent increases,
which led to the city’s emergency moratorium on rent increases, and referendum on a
new and stronger ordinance in suit.
Twenty years had passed since the original RSO’s passage in 1988. During the
short ownership tenure by Page Mill, the City of East Palo Alto was pressed to tighten the
ordinance to comply with state law. Once the Page Mill portfolio was defunct, the City
remained in a hurry to issue the new ordinance ahead of the change in ownership of the
portfolio properties. A clear message was intended to prospective bidders: the City of
East Palo Alto would not allow a large landlord to steamroll the city and gut rent control.
Any acquisitions of the portfolio properties would be made with full knowledge of the
regulated base rents and incremental increases allowed.
Not only did the City take the bold stand freezing rent through the initial
moratorium vote described in Chapter 4, they requested that the City of Berkeley Rent
Stabilization Board review their RSO to ensure compliance with state law and maximize
all due tenant protections. Their first attempt to hold a voter referendum to introduce
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amendments to the ordinance and strengthen tenant protections was halted by Page Mill’s
legal action. Page Mill cited a provision mandating an environmental impact statement to
precede the referendum. Notwithstanding Page Mill’s attempts to sabotage the ordinance,
on June 8, 2010 the new ordinance reached the electorate; 79% of East Palo Alto voters
approved the revised and strengthened Rent Stabilization and Just Cause for Eviction
Ordinance in the City of East Palo Alto.
The new ordinance accomplished several goals for the City of East Palo Alto. For
one, the 2010 ordinance reasserted popular support for rent control in the city. It
demonstrated that the city’s elected officials who had worked against Page Mill’s
increases indeed had done so with the support of the vast majority of the city’s voting
residents. Second, the new ordinance resolved important inconsistencies that were
brought to the city’s attention by Berkeley’s review of the East Palo Alto’s Rent
Stabilization Ordinance.57 The new version clarified language to comply with the state’s
limitations on vacancy control that went into effect with the 1996 Costa-Hawkins law.
Third, the new ordinance provided stronger protections and benefits for tenants while
maintaining a landlord’s right to fair returns.
The ordinance reduced the amount of annual rent increases allowed from 100% of
the Consumer Price Index to 80% of the CPI, a small additional savings for tenants that
the city argued still allowed for fair return on rents. The ordinance also strengthened Just
Cause Eviction and strengthened measures against retaliation and harassment of tenants.
This new RSO included language that made explicit the ability for tenants to withhold

57

This review was paid for by the City of East Palo Alto at their request.
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rent based on erroneous increases, habitability citations, or landlord failure to submit
proper rent registration.
The new ordinance was followed in 2012 by the city’s marked disincentives for
the redevelopment of multifamily properties by increasing city oversight and relocation
supports required for displaced tenants. In 2014, the city also passed the Tenants
Protection Act to address “the imbalance of market and bargaining power between
landlords and tenants” (City of East Palo Alto Municipal Code Ordinance No. 374, May
6, 2014:1). The ordinance asserted and affirmed a tenant’s right to organize. The
ordinance further clarified the prohibition of landlord harassment, including utility passthroughs and cut-offs, lockouts of tenants, or discrimination of tenants with children, or
student status. It also made landlord harassment in form of retaliation a criminal offense.
Most notably, the ordinance put new prohibitions on demolition of multifamily units, and
upped relocation provisions and oversight in the case of demolition. The city ensured that
undocumented residents would receive the same protections as citizens by prohibiting
inquiries into documentation status for relocation supports (Municipal Code Ordinance
No. 374, May 6, 2014:1.).
A second authority held by the city involves rezoning and redevelopment.
Rezoning for new development would require changes in the city’s general plan, and
ensuing changes to water, sewer, and other infrastructure services to the portfolio’s
consolidated geographic area. The investors relied on the city to demonstrate favorable
conditions for reinvestment and development; this was also part and parcel to the
business plan to attract a premium investor for development. Public-private partnerships
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allow developers to work directly through the city to pursue redevelopment funds
including bond financing for new city services.
Although such partnerships for mixed-use, commercial or residential development
may promise the expansion of the city’s commercial tax base and employment
opportunities, the city had refused partnership with Page Mill. Moreover, Page Mill
argued that the City had stalled in working with the fund around basic infrastructure
projects including lighting, and services such as the police (see Chapter 4). The city
explicitly and strategically took time, or stalled, on development rezoning.
YUCA spearheaded a coalition, Transform and Build East Palo Alto, to mobilize
and shape community input into the city’s general planning update that was slated to
include the west side. The organizing and mobilization of residents was co-led with PIA
organizers. YUCA along with PIA mobilized standing room town hall and city council
hearings. For one, the city responded by freezing west side development and declaring a
moratorium on any development for two years. Later, the city would extend the
development ban until the completion of the Westside Area Plan.
At the same time as affordable housing remained urgent to the city, the prospects
of creating additional affordable housing by new construction were diminishing. In 2012,
the state halted state subsidy for affordable housing, dissolving the local redevelopment
agency. In response, East Palo Alto established an ordinance for a tax “set aside” on
market rate new constructions. The “set aside” would allow the city to develop a mere
118 below-market units by 2022 (City of East Palo Alto Ordinance No. 379, 2012). This
paltry number in a six-year projection reflects the limitations of the city without state
supports to redistribute resources or incentivize the production of affordable housing.
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In the community input process for the Westside Area Plan, the City attempted to
create a participatory process to tap into the organizing capacity that grew from tenant
action around Page Mill. In 2015, residents marched under the banner of “Black Power,
Brown Power, Poly Power” (Dreeman, 2015) to protest gentrification and to call attention
to stakes of the plan for the city: the legacy of majority-minority power in a capital-rich
Silicon Valley region dominated by white policy makers.
In 2015 the city released the plan that prevented the demolition or conversion of
the rent-controlled units. The plan allows for new mixed-use development to surround the
existing rent controlled multifamily units but maintains and protects those units. These
are the very units of the Page Mill portfolio that were otherwise slated for repurposing. In
this way, the tenants not only bought time through the city’s authority over development,
in the general plan they also secured the potential of tenants to remain in the rent
controlled units to benefit from the area’s redevelopment plans without fear of losing
their homes due to rent increases or demolition evictions.
In addition to its own regulatory authority, the city also exerted political pressure
on the institutional investor, CalPERS. East Palo Alto is a stakeholder in CalPERS as a
contributor to public employee pensions. However, the city could not directly influence
CalPERS by withholding pension contributions except, perhaps, under federal
bankruptcy protections. (At the time of this writing such a possibility was under review in
San Bernardino, CA.)

Targeting the Pension Fund Investor
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Tenants Together worked with YUCA and the Fair Rent Coalition to target
CalPERS. The groups researched the predatory equity deals in New York City, and
learned from the work spearheaded by UHAB to target the NYC Comptroller. The
comptroller there took initiative against “predatory equity” based on news that NYC
teachers’ pensions had likewise been invested in similar overleveraged deals that
undermined rent regulation there. That comptroller, who at the time was a contender for
mayor, drafted a letter arguing against city public pension fund investment in predatory
equity; at the time city pensions were invested in approximately 15,000 residential rental
units (Office of the New York City Comptroller, 2008:1). Moreover, the comptroller
created an “opt-out” policy for pension funds regarding predatory investment, increased
pension fund engagement with unscrupulous housing managers and promotion of its
Economically Targeted Investment (ETI) program for middle to low-income housing
preservation (Ibid.:2). The Fair Rent Coalition tenant advocates in California shared the
New York letter directly with CalPERS.
In the summer of 2008, Tenants Together hosted a meeting in their offices with a
YUCA organizer, a tenant activist with the Fair Rent Coalition and several other Page
Mill tenants to convey their concerns with CalPERS real estate unit personnel, including
senior investment officer Ted Eliopolous. CalPERS had reason to meet with YUCA and
Tenants Together, which were membership-based organizations. Tenants Together,
although new as an entity, included long-time advocates who were aligned with unions
and other state-wide advocacy groups that often worked in coalition involving state
legislators in Sacramento. They called on CalPERS to withdraw from the portfolio.
A year after the initial rent increases and the City of East Palo Alto’s subsequent
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ordinance to freeze rents, the city and SEIU released at the same time resolutions
protesting CalPERS’ initial investment and calling for CalPERS action. The resolutions
were passed to leverage political accountability vis a vis CalPERS. The director of the
Western States SEIU Capital Stewardship Program had put tenant advocates in touch
with CalPERS Board members, and communicated directly with CalPERS’ C.E.O.
regarding their own concerns with the Page Mill investment, which the union considered
predatory equity (Marguerite Young email to Anne Stousball, CalPERS CEO, December
12, 2008).
The City of East Palo Alto’s resolution framed the CalPERS investment in Page
Mill as counter to CalPERS’ own principles (City of East Palo Alto, 2008). The
resolution recalled the fact that just a few months prior to establishing the Page Mill fund,
CalPERS had become signatory to the United Nations Principles for Responsible
Investment (UN PRI). The UN PRI provides a normative framework for socially
responsive governance, relying on principles of transparency and a self-reporting
assessment by investors to disclose progress (Richardson, 2008). In 2006, just months
prior to the Page Mill agreement, the PRI was unveiled at the New York Stock Exchange
with a CalPERS’s Board member, representatives from other PRI signatories and UN
Secretary General Kofi Annan (CalPERS, 2006; Seee Vorhees, 2015).
The resolution also referenced the CalPERS California Urban Real Estate Fund
(CURE), an initiative by the pension fund that “implicitly,” according to the city
resolution, “recognizes the value of promoting affordable housing” (City of East Palo
Alto, 2008). The CURE program followed a number of CalPERS state-based
development initiatives that responded to the L.A. riots in 1992. CalPERS first
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established the Economically Targeted Investment initiative, a stimulus investment
program that “includes job creation, development, and savings; business creation;
increases or improvement in the stock of affordable housing; and improvement of the
infrastructure” (CalPERS in Hebb, 2005: 10). The success of that program, in
relationship to returns on investment led to the 1995 initiative, the California Urban
Investment Partners, followed in 2000 by the California Urban Real Estate Fund (CURE)
program, which the city referenced in the resolution.
Since 2000, the CalPERS’ CURE program invested in moderate, low income, and
senior housing, and slated funding in the AFL-CIO Housing Trust for affordable housing,
in addition to retail and other commercial in-fill developments (Hebb 2005). Non-profits
that received CURE funds did not necessarily develop residential and commercial
projects as an alternative to the speculative market. The program was designed for
revitalization, and aimed to support minority entrepreneurs, but was also viewed as an
effort in “pursuit of financial returns and gentrification” (Peterson, 2010).
once a neighborhood has begun to show early signs of revitalization potential,
CalPERS is prepared to bring considerable investment dollars that enable early
development to move to the next level (Hebb 2005: 20).
CalPERS distinguished “early development” as a period indicative of stalled
gentrification that needed greater catalyst. Although investment in the CURE fund was
designed as geographic-specific to target opportunities for under-invested communities, it
is not clear if such investment benefitted the people living in those communities or to
what extent. In any case, Page Mill was designated as an opportunistic fund (see Chapter
4). Notwithstanding its risk-ratio, as a California-based residential portfolio, it was
subjected to a review under the CURE fund. Under pressure by tenants, the City of East
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Palo Alto, and SEIU, CalPERS began their review of Page Mill’s portfolio with the
CURE rationale. CalPERS hired external consultants in January 2008 for the CURE
review, which they then extended into a fuller investigation by Stockbridge Capital (JC to
DT, email “Cure Fund Program Assessment” Phase I, January 14, 2008).
The city’s point of reference to the CURE fund drew attention to the fact that
Page Mill’s strategy of targeted urban in-fill and revitalization flew in the face of the
affordability goals established by this well-known and growing CalPERS California
investment program. A CalPERS Board member also referenced the CURE program for
“underserved communities” when she stated to the CalPERS Investment Committee, “So
this [Page Mill] is, you know, absolutely at odds with our general practice” (Mathur,
December 15, 2008). The city and SEIU deployed their resolutions to remind CalPERS
and the public that East Palo Alto, as a place of investment, was the home of CalPERS
workers and tax payers who contributed to and guaranteed the pension fund.
SEIU Local 521 represents 25,000 CalPERS plan members in the region,
including city workers. Approached by Tenants Together, Local 521’s executive board
passed a simultaneous resolution, which included language excerpted here that echoed
tenants’ immediate demands:
Further resolved, that the SEIU L521 Executive Board expresses concern that
CalPERS has invested the retirement funds of L521 members in a real estate
investment that threatens to displace East Palo Alto residents including SEIU
L521 members;
and, be it FURTHER RESOLVED, that the SEIU L521 Executive Board calls on
CalPERS to take an active role to ensure that Page Mill Properties rescinds rent
increases in excess of 3.2%, ceases evictions of tenants who refuse to pay the
disputed increases, and publicly discloses plans for its acquired properties in EPA.
(December 14, 2008)
As the above excerpt demonstrates, in a feedback loop, Page Mill tenants who were
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CalPERS plan members ostensibly invested in their own displacement. “It’s like I’m
paying for these people to give me the boot,” explained an African American member of
the local home care workers and a Page Mill tenant who attended a protest organized by
YUCA. (Sheyner, 2009). Although tenant leaders were unclear of the total number of
plan members who resided in the Page Mill units, City of East Palo Alto officials made it
clear that city workers, including elected officials, were plan contributors. The Capital
Stewardship Program Director for the Local explained that the resolution “was
unanimously approved because of the imminent threat will make members homeless...”
(communication to Andrew Blue, December 14, 2008). That same year, a Local 521
member became the retiree representative on the CalPERS Board, which administers the
CalPERS pension fund.
In preparation for a CalPERS Investment Committee Board meeting where the
East Palo Alto mayor and tenants would speak, the portfolio manager and senior
investment officer for CalPERS Real Estate Unite apprised the board members of the
events surrounding the fund. They gave notice to the board that the Stanford Legal Clinic
had prepared a letter against predatory investment by the pension fund that they expected
to be signed by California congressional leaders, including Anna G. Eshoo and Senators
Boxer and Feinstein. (Eshoo later made a public statement of concern, but did not send
the letter.) They also informed the board that they had confirmed through their contacts
with SEIU that union members were Page Mill tenants. For some board members, the
ostensible investment in their contributors’ displacement may have been the least of their
mounting concerns, however.

201

Home of the Financial Crisis
“We know it's bad news today, very bad news.” This statement opened the
CalPERS Investment Committee meeting in the last month of 2008 (CalPERS Board of
Administration Investment Committee Open Session, December 15, 2008: 5). The bad
news continued for five hours of open session. All eyes were on the national economic
landscape. Not one commercial loan had been securitized for six months, more than half
a million jobs in the U.S. had been lost in just the month prior, and earlier that month the
S&P had plunged despite some fleeting signs of positive gains (Wei and Hilsenrath,
2008). CalPERS had just reported 103% losses in real estate assets for its previous fiscal
year, based in part on over-leveraged housing investments, including debt CalPERS was
obligated to pay-off in addition to losses from expected returns (Corkery, Carmen,
Rundle and Lublin, 2008). Mortgage-backed securities were under scrutiny, with even
greater losses predicted for the following quarter.
At the end of this open session the CalPERS investment committee members
turned their attention from what they carefully constructed in their public comments as
external events, outside of their control, to a very specific illustration of CalPERS’s own
hand in the failing economy. CalPERS board members had very good reason to be
concerned with Page Mill’s evictions of East Palo Alto residents via CalPERS funds.
Six of the thirteen member CalPERS Board were elected by the CalPERS
membership and like other appointed board members played a political role as well as a
fiduciary role in their positions. Board members represented CalPERS to state legislators,
advocated for workers’ pension benefits, and, significantly, held full authority over
investment allocations. In 1984 Proposition 21 had allowed the CalPERS Board this
202

authority and flexibility in investment allocation. As a result of Proposition 21, the
CalPERS Board had become a stalwart leader in shareholder and investment activism.
Many of the trustees were labor leaders with political interests. In the years following
Proposition 21, labor leader board members ushered campaigns for divestment from
tobacco and from developing countries with poor labor practices. Although Proposition
21 allowed board members flexibility, they also became personally liable for imprudent
investments. This was the compromise the board received in Proposition 21.
When representatives from Tenants Together, the Fair Rent Coalition, the City of
East Palo Alto, and Community Legal Services addressed the CalPERS Board Investment
Committee, they were aware of the board’s investment oversight role. They exposed the
board to the vulnerabilities of reputational damage for not only the investment fund, but
for the board members as individual fiduciary agents. They also raised the questions of
vulnerabilities of the fund manager, including the possibility of CalPERS divestment
from the fund, or take-over of the fund. Remarkably at this time of national economic
crisis, the East Palo Alto public officials and tenant advocates were the sole public
commentators for that session. They had the full attention of the CalPERS board and
attending media for this portion of the public agenda.
The newly elected mayor of East Palo Alto, the Page Mill tenant who was a
council member during the moratorium debate a year earlier, read the city’s proposed
resolution before the board. The mayor accused Page Mill of tenant harassment saying
the investor landlords had “unleashed a frontal attack on the city government and on the
tenants,” who he explained were “the working people… who do all the service work for
the surrounding communities, who provide the labor pool” (CalPERS Board of

203

Administration Investment Committee Open Session, December 15, 2008). He
underscored CalPERS accountability to his community: “We particularly find it ironic in
the small community like ours, again where our employees are all CalPERS members,
where we have many union members who are also members of CalPERS, again, as I
mentioned that are mostly low income, moderate income…” The mayor himself was a
CalPERS contributing member and Page Mill tenant. Ultimately, the mayor called on
CalPERS to review its divestment policies and use this opportunity as a test case in
exerting their investor power even if as a limited partner.
The director from Tenants Together pointed out in his testimony to the Board that
the New York City Controller had established predatory-free guidelines in response to
city pension fund investment in rent regulated housing there. Tenants Together organizers
had been active in strategy discussions via conference calls with New York groups such
as the Urban Homestead Assistance Board and participated in their predatory equity
tracking and strategizing (personal interview, May 24, 2012). The Tenants Together
director explained that New York City had set up the guidelines so that “funds weren't in
this situation of finding themselves fueling this type of rent increase and displacement
often of the very people for whom the pension funds are set up.” The Tenants Together
speaker may have struck a nerve bringing up New York City funds as pro-active in their
response to tenants there.
Board member George Diehr interrupted the public speaker to distance the fund
from the Page Mill investment strategy:
…you know, your statement that PERS has invested public employee pension
dollars in predatory landlord practices - I'll let the staff speak - but it makes it
sound like we -- or that was our goal when we made the investment… you'll have
to decide the language here… (December 15, 2008)
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Diehr was addressing the tenants and advocates as much as the media in the room. His
statement put the tenants on notice questioning their rhetoric, while denying CalPERS’s
own responsibility with how their capital was ultimately invested.
Although the real estate portfolio manager at this time was not the same person at
CalPERS who initiated the partnership with Page Mill, many of the investment
committee members were the same people who oversaw the real estate investment
policies that increased opportunistic investment, and had approved the Page Mill
partnership at the fund’s inception. Subsequent court disclosures demonstrated that the
Page Mill business plan was predicated on tenants’ displacement, and by the summer of
2009, Page Mill had prepared for a condominium conversion through a subdivision of
more than 200 of the portfolio’s units (Department of Real Estate for the State of
California, 2009). Still, notwithstanding the board members’ knowledge of these details,
to deny intent, was an allusion to unintentional consequences. This is a common catch-all
phrase for dispossession, premature death, and all related traumas that occur based on any
policy where responsibility and accountability are denied.
The Stanford University graduate student who took on the role of
communications coordinator for the Fair Rent Coalition also spoke. He explained before
the board that he had done door knocking with organizers and youth leaders from YUCA
to determine the vacancy rate of the portfolio. A Page Mill tenant himself, he had
witnessed his neighbors leaving their homes. His census resulted in what he found to be a
24% vacancy rate, up from the 2% vacancy rate just before the portfolio purchases. Using
his own extrapolations, he reported to the committee that an estimated 1500 individuals
had been displaced based on these vacancies. In an email correspondence, the same
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tenant later sent spreadsheets to the board members and CalPERS real estate unit staff of
“verified” vacant unit numbers disaggregated by small versus large multi-families, which
demonstrated 22-24% vacancy rate at the time (Fair Rent Coalition, 2009). Later, in
2013, the City of East Palo Alto concurred. They explained the 2010 Census city
undercount as an anomaly due directly to displacements from Page Mill (City of East
Palo Alto Existing Conditions Report, 2013: 7-1).
A second CalPERS investment committee member to speak expressed distress at
these findings, and said that CalPERS was constrained by legal limitations as a limited
partner in a comingled fund (CalPERS Board of Administration Investment Committee
Open Session, December 15, 2008). She also pointed out her concern that the reputational
damage threatened to devalue the portfolio. There was no commitment by CalPERS to
take action except to meet with the partner to share these concerns, and to have this
example inform future investment decisions.
The director of Tenants Together did not allow the session to end on that
statement. He re-asserted that CalPERS needed to consider greater proactive steps in this
particular portfolio case, which he claimed could involve an investigation by the state’s
Attorney General in unfair business practices (CalPERS Board of Administration
Investment Committee Open Session, December 15, 2008). There was no precedent for a
lawsuit against the CalPERS Board for imprudent investment since Proposition 21 had
allowed for such action. Indeed, CalPERS Board members may not have been concerned
at the personal level for monetary consequence given that they held insurance to cover
liability. However, for appointed and elected members, implications of imprudence
mattered for their continued board service. The Fair Rent Coalition would later ask for all
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delegation authority documents for the board members, chief investment officers, and
portfolio managers at the time of the initial agreement in preparation or warning of
potential suit (Fair Rent Coalition, 2009b). The Tenants Together director also warned
the Board of potential increased liability and fund impact for all investors; the longer they
waited to act, the more tenants would be displaced. The fund would be responsible to
ensure tenants’ right to return to units of similar rent and size for those who were illegally
pushed out, a protection granted under East Palo Alto’s rental ordinance.
In the following month, the Fair Rent Coalition’s communication director
escalated pressure on CalPERS. He wrote to CalPERS saying that he had been in contact
with a reporter from The New York Times who was very interested in writing a story on
CalPERS’ investment in the portfolio. He attended the next CalPERS Board meeting
where he distributed handouts of the portfolio’s vacancy rate and rent increase figures.
He bypassed the public information officers and corresponded directly with the portfolio
investment manager, often providing accounts of personal incidents.
For example, this tenant treated CalPERS as landlord. He called CalPERS directly
to allege harassment by an undercover security agent moonlighting for Page Mill who he
learned was a lieutenant for the Palo Alto Police Department. The tenant activist took
photos of the security agent and claimed that the agent was following him as response to
his advocacy and communication with CalPERS (Fair Rent Coalition, 2009a). He sent
urgent emails as well, in one stating, “the situation on the ground is changing hourly,”
and requested that the portfolio manager call the head of the Palo Alto police department
where the tenant had filed a complaint against the harassment (Fair Rent Coalition,
2009).
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At the same time, tenant advocates attempted to understand the stakes of
CalPERS and their own vulnerabilities in the fund. In another email to the portfolio
manager, the same Fair Rent Coalition communications director speculated that CalPERS
was reluctant to exit the fund because CalPERS had acted as guarantor for the Wachovia
$242 million loan. He requested access to the prospectus and additional portfolio details
including:
email and other written correspondence, investment offering papers list of
partners contractual agreements meeting minutes and phone logs… and all
information that is matter of public record regarding the debt financing used in
Page Mill Properties II LP, loan numbers, and amounts terms of repayment
guarantor obligations etc. (Fair Rent Coalition, 2009c)
CalPERS staff sent the request to legal counsel. They did not provide all of the
documents, and did not provide details on CalPERS’ role with the lender, Wells Fargo.
Tenant activists continued to speculate that CalPERS was bound to the Page Mill strategy
as not only an investor, but as a loan guarantor, which would double CalPERS’ losses. At
the same time, they believed that if this was the CalPERS role, then the limited partner
could assert greater leverage with the lender and assume authority and control over the
partnership. CalPERS was not the guarantor or signatory of the loan, however, a point
CalPERS did not readily address.
The general partner, CFO, and other managers for the fund also communicated
directly with the CalPERS real estate unit staff. Taran had requested a copy of the
transcript from the tenant advocates’ testimony, and in a response letter to CalPERS,
Taran defended the fund strategy: “To conclude that [our] effort is predatory is to doom
thousands of East Palo Altans to permanent garbage-strewn, gang-ridden slums where the
only investment capital comes from drug dealing and assorted criminal activities” (Taran,
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2009: 6). Taran accepted the “possibility” of discomfort that tenants might feel as the
investors acted as “agents of change” (Ibid). Again, Taran presented his mission as
improving the lives of the tenants and the larger community, despite the fact that those he
claimed would benefit from future improvements included those tenants being displaced
from the rental units.

Calling the Pension Fund “Landlord”
Over the course of Page Mill’s ownership, the portfolio manager contended with
emails from activists, journalists, CalPERS consultants, legal staff, information officers,
internal real estate unit colleagues, and board members inquiring about Page Mill and
CalPERS’s next steps. Tenants Together had contacted several CalPERS board members
to continue to push the limited partner to take action and follow through on its authority
to remove the general partner. YUCA youth leaders shared their participatory action
research booklet with CalPERS officials and California congressional representatives,
documenting the impact of the rent increases on their own families (Williams, 2009).
This report, called “Homeless Now?” also included testimony from tenants who were
YUCA members who had since left their Page Mill homes due to the rent increases (see
Chapter 5). The report was published in English and Spanish and included photographs of
unit conditions, attesting to deferred maintenance and lack of subsequent repairs by Page
Mill. Again, Page Mill tenants called the pension fund as accountable to them, naming
the pension fund a landlord party.
The CalPERS portfolio manager distinguished the communications director from
the Fair Rent Coalition from other activists, including YUCA organizers, in part as an
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effect of the incident around extortion allegations described in Chapter 5. The CalPERS
portfolio manager warned an assistant to the board president that the communications
director from the Fair Rent Coalition may be untrustworthy, saying “We should be very
cautious about him as allegations of impropriety have been raised about him… while
each of these groups/people are against Page Mill, they do not necessarily support one
another’s cause” (CalPERS, 2009). Although the CalPERS officials may have sensed a
lack of cohesion among the organizers, the engaged commitment by the multiple
advocates, including the Fair Rent Coalition Stanford students, would remain consistent
and continue to escalate with street action and advocacy to the state legislature over the
next year.
Tenants Together approached several CalPERS Board members individually to
further press their demands. When the tenant leaders came to understand that divestment
was not an option that CalPERS would consider at the time, they shifted to the demand
that CalPERS take over the portfolio. They demanded CalPERS take all possible action
to remove the general manager by charging the manager with lawless conduct. After
receiving an inquiry from a board member as to whether this was a viable option, the
CalPERS portfolio manager reminded her again of the points made to the board regarding
CalPERS need to negotiate with other limited partners:

[a] key element of the briefing memo is that CaIPERS is not the only limited
partner in the Page Mill fund. The presence of other limited partners is
complicating factor that exposes CaIPERS to legal risk should certain actions be
taken such as removing and replacing the manager of the fund (CalPERS, 2009).
CalPERS heeded caution but continued to investigate the bases for taking over the fund.
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CalPERS real estate unit managers were aware and wary of the impending $50 million
paydown due that August. In a letter to Page Mill the portfolio manager expressed
concern that CalPERS had provided $95million of their $100million commitment to the
fund, yet, “We have seen nothing from you indicating how you intend to handle this debt
payment” (CalPERS, 2009a). If CalPERS took over as general partner, they could find
themselves in a position of liability, including for debt servicing. In fact, other partners
who later refused capital calls on their commitment when cash was due were courtmandated to pay-up.
One of the key points of vulnerability for the fund was the growing tension
between CalPERS and the fund manager due to tenant pressure and reputational damage.
Page Mill’s plan, save for negotiating favorable refinancing terms with the lender or
finding another premium investor or purchaser, was to request additional capital
investment from CalPERS. This was ultimately denied. By that spring, CalPERS put
plainly their frustration to Page Mill and said that the General Partner needed to mend the
relationship with the tenants and the City of East Palo Alto:
We believe that the continued controversy surrounding the property is having an
adverse effect on the value of the property and its prospects. You are correct that
we at CalPERS are working overtime to protect CaIPERS assets but we are
particularly concerned about the performance and stability of the Partnership.
Simply put it is unclear to us whether your implementation of the current
investment strategy and operation of the project are effective or yielding
appropriate results. (CalPERS, 2009b)
The CalPERS real estate unit saw the reputational damage as not only a public relations
and political problem for the pension fund, but also a fiduciary issue resulting in the
devalorization of the units.
The CalPERS consultants were well aware of the rental income losses and
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recommended decontrol increases to Page Mill: “Given the large number of vacant units
(390+ a couple of weeks ago), it's critical that they meet current market rent levels
vacancies” (Otto. 2009). In this way, in the Stockbridge Consulting group’s email memo,
they concurred with market conversion. Rather than allowing for market rentals, the
vacancy levels instead led to rental income losses as few people sought to rent from the
disreputable landlord. Page Mill’s tactics also had led to strengthened city monitoring and
enforcement of the ordinance that reversed hundreds of rent increases for units still
occupied.
Moreover, because the Page Mill plan relied on repositioning the property for a
development purchaser, the portfolio relied on attracting another premium investor. Page
Mill had aggregated properties and land, but clearly the city demonstrated they were not a
willing partner to negotiate potential rezoning or other infrastructure adaptations to
support a developers’ vision if predicated on tenant displacement. Meanwhile, Page Mill
continued to target tenant activists.
Several tenants, including the communications director for the coalition received
a “Notice to Cease” letter from the management company. The rental management
company claimed harassment by tenants who they said prohibited regular business and
whose actions would thereby result in their eviction:
You are repeatedly making false accusations and malicious reports to
management staff which is nuisance and interferes with our ongoing business
operations and the ability of our staff to effectively perform their assigned job
duties. If you do not cease this behavior your tenancy will be terminated and
eviction proceedings will commence immediately upon subsequent violation.
(Page Mill Properties, 2009)
Tenants forwarded these notices to CalPERS. CalPERS received these concerns from
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tenants, along with a slew of news articles on mismanagement and deferred maintenance,
from the over-charging of fence repair and paint color consultation (alleged at $20,000
per month) by and to the management company, to inspections by health officials who
gave citations for green and blue algae in the pools (www.pagemillwatch.com; CalPERS
Global Real Estate Unit, 2009; Bernstein Wax, 2009). Local business journals and media
outlets continued to prepare accounts of CalPERS evicting poor tenants in East Palo Alto
via the Page Mill fund such as the article titled, “The pension fund evictions,” in the San
Francisco Bay Guardian (Riddle, 2009).
Emails in preparation for the April 2009 Investment Board meeting reflected the
tension of the financial crisis for the CalPERS real estate unit staff. The media trail
following CalPERS exposed the impact of the crisis on the pension and the pension’s
responsibility for its own real estate losses. Page Mill also presented at the CalPERS
Investment Committee in an attempt to control their image making.
According to Chief Investment Officer Joe Diehr, the CalPERS Board had been
briefed on the Page Mill matter several days before the meeting. At this particular
meeting, Diehr introduced the public commentators invited by Page Mill as tenants of
Page Mill. In fact none of the speakers on behalf of Page Mill identified themselves as
tenants. Instead, they were current and former EPA residents either employed by Page
Mill or partners of Page Mill who had been provided space free of rent to conduct
community and police outreach activities. At least one of these activities was in part paid
for by the East Palo Alto Police Department and Department of Justice as crime diversion
activity akin to the “weed and seed” programs across the country.
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One speaker attested that the comments were scripted. The speakers provided a
testament to Page Mill’s work to repair relationships with the East Palo Alto community.
One misidentified “tenant” was the associate director of an organization founded by
Taran’s wife, Project Happiness. The program promotes emotional resilience through
inspirational literature and training. He called for the tenant and city’s cooperation with
Page Mill, rather than “confrontation” and gave an example of an impromptu kids’
holiday gathering he volunteered at on behalf of Page Mill for tenant families. The East
Palo Alto Police Department organized the party with Page Mill (CalPERS Board of
Administration Investment Committee Open Session, April 22, 2009: 57). Another
speaker, an employee of the property management company said, “They’ve done a
tremendous job at clearing up the city” (CalPERS Board Meeting Transcript, April, 22,
2009: 59). Using this word choice describing tenant change the speaker implied that
displacement had positive effects. One after another, the speakers testified to Page Mill’s
hand in clearing or cleaning up East Palo Alto as an act of corporate responsibility.
One speaker who was a co-founder of the foundation Until There’s A Cure, which
was established to raise money for AIDS, pleaded with CalPERS to stay strong in the
face of the tenants’ concerns:
I asked CalPERS to stay with your heart and with the vision. I honestly would
never be associated with a company that was doing that Page Mill has been
accused of. And I really believe in Page Mill and in David Taran and I think
they’re brave. And it’s not an easy job. And it’s not an easy city. But they’re
doing really good things. And please, please stay and be part of that vision. (April
11, 2009: 65)
The speaker suggested here an assumption that CalPERS might withdraw support for the
fund, perhaps take control of the fund, or perhaps ultimately refuse reinvestment. Another
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portion of the testimony from this speaker referenced that Page Mill had committed to
housing twenty people through a local Shelter Network in the portfolio’s vacant units.
Ironically, several other tenants who could not make payment due to Page Mill’s rent
increases earlier had claimed they had no choice but to move into shelters (YUCA,
interview 2012; Bernstein Wax April 21, 2010).
When a CalPERS Board Member asked the Page Mill general counsel to address
the vacancy factor, the Board President interrupted, “I don’t think it’s proper to get into
that discussion now, thank you,” to which the inquiring board member deferred. This
data-point was considered confidential to the fund, as it could potentially damage the
portfolio value revealing corresponding rental income losses. Page Mill was wary of
CalPERS’s attempts to appraise the properties for that same reason.
Despite the generally hospitable and supportive reception by the board, the
meeting was followed by curt email exchanges between the CalPERS real estate staff and
the general partner on the financial status of the portfolio. Taran had asserted that the
portfolio was considered an alternative, opportunistic asset, not core, and was therefore
exempted from CalPERS mandates to appraise core assets (Taran, 2009b). CalPERS
disagreed, “Your letter seems to imply that CaIPERS monitoring of its investment by
conducting an appraisal of the properties of the Partnership could somehow be violation
of the partnership for the Partnership. Nothing could be further from the truth”
(CalPERS, 2009d). Page Mill responded, “What we do have an issue with is any
contention that Page Mill as the General Partner does not have the exclusive and sole
right and responsibility to value the Fund’s assets” (Shore, 2009:1). He continued by way
of warning, “We trust you do not want to do anything to violate the LP agreement nor do
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anything that may be harmful to the investments in any way” (Ibid.:2). Page Mill stated
that an appraisal of its asset value and cash flow losses would have adverse effects; such
an appraisal would make reinvestment from an institutional investor, refinancing from
Wachovia, or purchasing by a premium investor all the more unlikely.
Although CalPERS was not the manager of the fund, they had committed
consultant resources to conduct a full review of the fund in an attempt to secure their
investment, and as a direct result of tenant pressure. The appraisal review would prepare
CalPERS to better advise Page Mill on investment strategy and would inform their own
internal decision as to whether they would take action to reinvest or take action against
the general partner, including his removal. The latter option was the main alternative to
the present course that the real estate unit staff had planned to explore (CalPERS, 2009e).
In addition to their own appraisal, the consultants also developed financial forecasts to
present to Wachovia. The forecasts would be based on investment cash flows for
baseline, optimistic and pessimistic scenarios (Otto, 2009a). After Wachovia’s agreement
to open negotiation discussions with Page Mill, the general partner reported to CalPERS
that he was “cautiously optimistic” that Wachovia would extend the $50million pay down
due date (Taran, 2009c: 2).
While the general partner presented himself as unfrazzled, CalPERS real estate
staff team was in a scramble. A point of vulnerability for CalPERS was the California
State Legislature and their oversight capacity. California State Assembly member Ira
Ruskin had received messages of pressing concern from Tenants Together and Local 521
and called on CalPERS to attend a meeting in his office to discuss the investment. In an
internal email thread to prepare the CalPERS “message box” for Ruskin, one real estate
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unit staff member suggested not to include the General Partner in the meeting:
I don’t see any advantage in bringing him up with us at this point because at the
end of the day if Ruskin feels the tenants’ issues are valid he has no real recourse
against the GP. Instead, he will want to know what CalPERS can do to rectify the
situation (CalPERS, 2009e).
CalPERS repeated the same statement to tenants, the Board, and state officials that
removing the GP was an option, but risky: “CaIPERS has carefully evaluated this right,
and may yet exercise it if necessary, but to date has refrained from doing so due to the
potential liability which would come with such replacement and the risks of having to
take over the operations of the partnership” (Stockbridge Capital Group, 2009:3-4).
Again, the looming debt repayment made such a replacement less likely and more risky.
Although CalPERS could do something, a take over could amount to even greater losses,
including anticipated legal expenses for the take-over.
That same spring, the CalPERS consultant from Stockbridge Capital sent a
midnight email to Page Mill’s general counsel. He was alarmed of a new strategy
implemented just after the CalPERS Board meeting in which Page Mill exploited the
Ellis Act in an attempt to sell a portion of its portfolio for cash flow. While ostensibly the
sale could provide funds for the debt repayment, the underlying asset value would be
reduced by the loss of units in the portfolio. There would be no added value. Ultimately,
the sale would provide cash flow for the management company and nothing more.
Furthermore, tenants would be evicted. The CalPERS consultant asked for an
explanation:
…we will be quite interested in any strategy which you feel could add value. That
said it seems a bit counter-intuitive to be incurring thousands of dollars of
expenses to evict good long-term tenants when the portfolio is already suffering
from high vacancy. Yet we do not want to jump to any conclusions or respond to
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any inquiries we are receiving from others concerned about your actions until we
hear the facts of and reasons for this strategy directly from you. We trust you can
appreciate the pressures your actions and resultant publicity put on CaIPERS.
(Otto, 2009)
The eviction notices already had been given to residents in three properties without
CalPERS foreknowledge. One of them was to the Stanford University PhD student who
was the communications director for the Fair Rent Coalition. Although evictions was the
strategy of Page Mill for decontrol, CalPERS was in particular alarmed by the sale of the
properties and the persistent denials by Page Mill of tenant displacement despite vacancy
rates and now the use of the Ellis Act in this latest action. The plan was to sell properties
for individual home ownership, rather than as rentals, which allowed for the Ellis Act
provision for evictions. This sale of the properties would decrease the equity of the
portfolio thereby increasing its debt ratio and risk.
The Page Mill attorney rebuked the CalPERS consultant for raising tenant
concern:
[we] cannot stress enough how difficult it is to have our business judgment
second guessed by CalPERS every time a tenant or tenant advocate makes an
inquiry to CalPERS… during these very challenging economic times it is more
important than ever that the General Partner stays focused on the investments and
is not questioned or interfered with whenever some dissident contacts CalPERS
(Shore, 2009).
Clearly the general partner was distressed by the involvement of the pension fund in the
business operations. Typically, limited partners advise fund operations only during
established meeting reporting times and not during the course of operations. This is
regardless of the fact that CalPERS had committed more equity to the fund than the
general partner whose salary for operations and fund management came directly from the

218

fund.
The communications director for the Fair Rent Coalition and three other tenants
attended the June Investment Committee Board meeting to present testimony of
harassment by Page Mill. The communication director again requested the private
placement memorandum, or business plan prospectus, from CalPERS. They were met
with expressions of ongoing concern, but no commitments or additional questions from
the Board. In response, the Fair Rent Coalition posted a “to-be-announced rent strike”
warning on a blog that the CalPERS investment officers shared with “high priority” in an
email thread (CalPERS, 2009f).
A rent strike would require and demonstrate tenant organization. A strike
demonstrates renters’ power to withdraw from the interdependent landlord-tenant
relationship. This could be enacted as a full-strike, or a strike on the rent increases only,
with lesser effect. In the latter scenario, tenants could take the “rent freeze” attempt by
the city into their own hands. Disruptive power by withdrawing, as noted by Piven (2006)
is limited by three criteria, that the protesters’ contribution is crucial; there is something
to be conceded; and there’s sufficient protection from repression.
Tenants would be ostensibly protected from retaliation for a rent strike as long as
they escrowed, or showed demonstrated savings of their due rents. However, the tenants
rent contributions were not necessarily “crucial”. Tenants Together’s director noted that
in the case of Page Mill, a rent strike would not have led to Page Mill negotiation because
Page Mill was no longer relying on the rental income. They could withstand the shortterm losses from any rent withholdings if they could secure reinvestment funds or fresh
equity for the balloon payment.
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Advancing Crisis as Political Opportunity

Page Mill’s largest vulnerability was the fund’s need for and access to
reinvestment or purchaser capital. When Page Mill attempted an eleventh-hour capital
call on CalPERS asking for $25 million in reinvestment funds to allow for the Wells
Fargo pay down, CalPERS refused (Eliopoulos, 2010). Without the reinvestment or new
financing terms, Page Mill defaulted on the payment. In a time span of just three years,
the portfolio became a total loss to the investors. CalPERS’s Page Mill real estate unit
team called for an urgent meeting to devise their message to present to the Investment
Committee and the public (Schlenker, 2009).
Page Mill was in default. State Assembly Member Ira Ruskin’s office called
CalPERS to inform them that the management company’s rental office had been
abandoned (CalPERS, 2009f). In a message thread to CalPERS’ real estate unit, Ruskin’s
staff person explained, “The tenants don’t know what to do if there is maintenance issue
or an emergency. They are completely in the dark as to who owns the property” (Ibid.).
There was no longer any security staffing the properties, and the tenants did not know to
whom to pay their September rents.
Despite their abandonment of the properties, Page Mill still explored options to
save the fund or mitigate losses. In one proposal, the investors considered reorganization
by filing Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Due to the fact that 101 LLC entities had been created
in the cross-collateralized debt structuring, the filing charge would cost approximately
$100,000. Moreover, the attorneys required a $1.5million retainer fee for anticipated
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negotiation with Wachovia, and $30 million in fresh equity to demonstrate to Bankruptcy
Court assurances of operation costs. (Binder & Malter, LLP, 2009). CalPERS again
refused to seek or provide additional capital. Instead the lender pursued foreclosure and
new bidders. The value of the property had fallen well below the $239 million loan; the
portfolio was under water and CalPERS lost its total investment of $100 million.

Outlawing Predatory Investment

In the aftermath of the Page Mill default, public scrutiny by the media and state
lawmakers of CalPERS increased. The “failing economy” was CalPERS’ preferred
narrative to explain the losses. However legislators and others overseeing the pension
fund also focused on their investment strategy: CalPERS itself had risked workers’ funds
by displacing workers. The Wall Street Journal highlighted CalPERS risk taking,
including $600 million losses in the predatory equity deals of Peter Cooper-Village and
East Palo Alto’s Page Mill properties (Karmin, 2010; Heller, 2010). Moreover, state
assembly members were urged by Tenants Together to push forward action to protect
renters from predatory investments, explaining that CalPERS had taken little action
beyond expressions of concern.
In 2010, State Assembly Member Tom Ammiano D-San Francisco introduced AB
2337 (Socially Responsible Investment Bill) to the Senate Public Employment &
Retirement Committee. The bill would be the first in the nation outlawing predatory
investment by public pension funds. The legislation called for criteria for state pension
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funds to identify and refuse investments predicated on undermining rent protections and
displacing tenants. Predatory investment practices were defined in the bill as follows:
‘Predatory investment practices’ means private real estate investments that rely
on, or result in, the displacement of persons residing in rent-regulated housing,
converting rent-regulated housing units to market rate units, or raising rents above
regulated levels as determined by the appropriate governing authority, in order to
generate profits to investors… (Ammiano, 2010; ftp://www.leginfo.ca.gov/).
Importantly, the bill states here that investors should neither enact business strategies that
“rely on” nor “result in” displacement. The bill thereby asserts that investors should
acquire properties with returns on investments and leverage based on current rents, not
projected future rents.
The bill was a bold statement, but was also limited. Investment strategies could
not rely on or result in decontrol intentionally, but those strategies that resulted in
displacement by redeveloping, demolition, or creation of new housing could not be
considered “predatory” by this bill. Instead, the proposed legislation would require
support to displaced tenants. The tenant protections for demolition merely reiterated
adherence to renter relocation benefits in accordance to local, state and federal laws.
An important new mandate of the legislation, however, would require regulatory
policy promulgated by the pension funds to demonstrate how to implement the criteria
and to demonstrate compliance. The proposed legislation mandated annual reporting by
the funds to the legislature. This could allow for a level of scrutiny and transparency of
portfolios in private equity funds that was unavailable. Notably, the bill would not cover
publicly traded entities. Instead, only private funds such as private equity real estate
funds that did not already report to the Security and Exchange Commission would be
covered. (Ibid.)
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A coalition of union affiliates supported the bill including the American
Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME), AFL-CIO, Asian
Law Caucus (ALC), Service Employees International Union (SEIU), and the California
Teachers Association (CTA). East Palo Alto tenants and a representative from SEIU
provided testimony in support of the bill, and CalPERS officials, who also provided
testimony, did not oppose or support it. Other supporters included the California Alliance
for Retired Americans (CARA), the San Mateo County Board of Supervisors, The Rent
Stabilization Board of the City of East Palo Alto, and a number of non-profit
organizations including YUCA, and Tenants Together and the Fair Rent Coalition, which
were co-sponsors.
Two New York City organizations also provided support for the bill, Tenants &
Neighbors and the Urban Homestead Assistance Board. These two organizations had also
led similar campaigns in New York City against New York pension investment in
predatory equity. Unlike in California, the pension money did not result in organizing
traction in New York City. An organizer from UHAB recalled, “We held a press
conference, it was our lead, but the media didn’t seem to care about the retirement
money…” (personal communication, May 20, 2012). Although NYC comptroller had
produced guidelines against predatory equity, and the city had created a task force, there
was less attention to the role of the pension funds in the large-scale deals there and more
attention to the conditions of deferred maintenance and tenant harassment. Unlike
CalPERS, New York City and New York State pension funds were not the largest in the
nation, nor did the funds carry the veneer of socially responsible investments.
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Although the legislation passed on the floor 43-30, it eventually died in
committee. The chair of the CalPERS committee, Lou Correa, was to blame according to
one tenant organizer, who said Sacramento was a tough place for tenant protections
(personal communication, June 7, 2012). The opposition included landlords’ interests
represented by various local and statewide apartment associations and the California
Bankers’ Association. Moreover, CalPERS and CalSTERS were quick to enact their own
internal adjustments to avoid legislated compliance.
Within months of the California state assembly bill’s introduction, CalPERS
rushed to enact its own policy in response. CalSTERS followed suit, with language
echoing the CalPERS investment policy and the bill. By April, 2010 both pensions funds
had introduced multifamily investment policy revisions, which became incorporated into
their investment policy for real estate. However, the pension funds’ internal policy
changes did not have a public oversight provision requiring annual reporting as did the
state legislation. Without such outside review and mandate the pension boards could
change the policies. Nevertheless the language was clear: “CalPERS will not participate
in private real estate investment strategies that rely on or result in eliminating rentregulated multi-family housing units, converting such units to market rate units, or raising
rents above regulated levels…” (CalPERS, 2010). The very recognition of rent regulation
was a small victory for rent control advocates in the era of Costa Hawkins. Also, the
replacement of rent-regulated units in the case of conversions went above what some
local ordinances required. Identifying new units to become regulated would run counter
to existing state law, however, which prohibits rent regulation of newly created or
converted units vis a vis the Ellis Act (Review of the City of EPA Rent Stabilization
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Ordinance, 2015:11). Although the funds’ changing internal policies aimed to steer
pension funds from risky investments in rental housing, without the legislative mandate
there would be no enforcement and reporting provision beyond self-monitoring for
compliance.

Winning Transparency

Reporting its private equity funds’ strategies or even specific investment
portfolios was a matter of “trade secrets” for those funds and CalPERS. Private funds
were not obligated to report to the S.E.C. (see Chapter 5). Tenant leaders from the Fair
Rent Coalition, including one of the original petitioners in the “mom and pop” exemption
case, took the issue of CalPERS transparency to the courts. The First Amendment
Coalition had already taken on CalPERS to release records of private placement agents,
or brokers, in private equity funds (see Chapter 5). Following the multiple requests from
media and the communications director of the Fair Rent Coalition, the director of the
First Amendment Coalition officially submitted a Public Information Request to
CalPERS for a copy of the private placement memorandum and partnership agreement
for the Page Mill II fund. They were denied.
CalPERS cited various exemptions to justify their Public Records Act denial. For
one, CalPERS stated that the “trade secrets” were exempted from public release due to
the provision in the California statute exempting “private equity fund, venture fund,
hedge fund, or absolute return fund” from most Public Records Act disclosures
(Palenscia, 2008). While Page Mill II was indisputably a private venture capital fund

225

exempted from certain S.E.C. filings, CalPERS had listed the fund as a real estate
investment. The First Amendment Coalition attempted to argue for records release by
demonstrating that the private fund was not part of CalPERS’ alternative assets listing.
Rather, Page Mill was an opportunistic fund listed separately within the real estate assets
management program. Taran’s previous private-equity backed fund, DIVCO West, was
also marked as a real estate asset. Blackstone, Apollo and other private equity funds that
capitalize real estate portfolios among other ventures were listed under the separate
“alternative assets investment management program.” These alternative assets funds are
exempted from most specific Public Record Act disclosures under the Public Records
Act.58 Despite CalPERS’ argument that Page Mill was a venture capital fund exempted
by the Public Records Act, by listing Page Mill as an opportunistic real estate fund, the
court found that Page Mill would be subject to the Public Records Act.
Notwithstanding this statute, the court also found that the “balancing test”
applied. The public interest in the disclosure outweighed CalPERS interest in keeping it
out of public record. The court’s final decision explained: “CalPERS’ arguments appear
to ‘misstate that the public’s interest is as serving the privacy interests of a private
contractor, rather than in serving the public’s interest in participating in local
government” (Superior Court of California San Francisco, 2010:5). The fact that the fund
had already been foreclosed favored the arguments for transparency given that the
investment strategy had failed and there was no active partnership to protect. CalPERS
had already lost $100 million in the foreclosed fund.

58

For example, the author’s Public Records Act requests for documents held by CalPERS relating to B2R
Finance, and multifamily investment by Blackstone Real Estate Fund II, were denied.
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This was an unprecedented victory for the First Amendment Coalition whose
work for open access at CalPERS included the significant but narrow release of
placement agent fees and return on investments for its partnerships with venture capital,
private equity, and hedge funds. As put by the First Amendment Coalition’s director,
“Only by understanding how the investment was made can the public be confident that
CalPERS has made sufficient changes to prevent this from happening again” (First
Amendment Coalition, 2010:1). Although the nearly 2,000 pages of documents, and
specifically the prospectus, were not available to the tenants during their organizing, the
late release provided a window into how CalPERS’ shift to concentrated, over-leveraged,
real estate investments led to not only financial losses for the pension fund, but to
homelessness and chaos for tenants. The release of these documents reflects a
vulnerability of a quasi-state entity, CalPERS, in partnering with predatory investors who
rely on a cloak of “trade secrets” to profit from poverty and impoverishment.

Targeting Wells Fargo

The tenants pursued CalPERS through the state legislature and transparency case
after foreclosure. They sought to ensure the pension fund would not repeat its predatory
investments in California. Yet following foreclosure, the lender Wachovia, which became
Wells Fargo, came to the fore as the primary target for the tenants.
At the time Wachovia was inundated with matters of insolvency, investment
scandals, and mass-foreclosures across its assets. Wells Fargo had announced its take
over of Wachovia in October, 2008, but the transition was not complete until 2011.
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Notably, rather than breaking up the banks in the fallout of subprime lending, the federal
government had aided these banks in their consolidation. Wells Fargo received nearly
$50 billion in federal subsidy including $25 billion in TARP funds, and additional tax
breaks leading up to the take-over (https://projects.propublica.org/bailout/list). Wells
Fargo later returned $25 billion to the federal government by the end of 2009 (Ibid.). This
was the context in which tenants and bank-tenants (foreclosed) across California
attempted to hold Wells Fargo accountable for their irresponsible lending and profits
based on risking people’s homes.
The shift in control of the portfolio created a window of opportunity for the
organizers. Vulnerability for the lender and subsequent receiver involved the portfolio’s
responsibility to the City of East Palo Alto whose officials were preparing to put a lien on
Page Mill's buildings, saying the company failed to pay an annual $362,607 fee to the
rent stabilization program. The penalties for the missed payment had now swelled to
$1,087,821 (Tenants Together, 2014).
Although the fines were not punitive to the extent of forcing a crisis or
negotiations with the original investors, the fines did provide opportunity for the city to
negotiate with the Wells Fargo receiver preceding foreclosure. The city requested that the
lender break-up the portfolio find a preservation purchaser, and asked to participate in the
selection process of the purchaser.
In addition to the fines due, the city held potential consumer power as depositor
and borrower with the lender. The broken arrows between the city to the lender in the
diagram presented at the beginning of this chapter indicate this relationship as an
unrealized point of vulnerability and risk for both the city and the lender. The city could
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withdraw city funds from the banking institution, or prohibit business with the banking
institution for city bonds. However, given the tightening credit market of this period it
was far more likely that Wells Fargo would be in a position to leverage its lending
capacity rather than the reverse. Moreover, the city’s budget was limited in comparison to
much larger cities such as San Francisco where such withholdings could have impact.
Similarly, a petition by tenants for city and residents of EPA to withdraw from Wells
Fargo was initiated but went unrealized and held little potential impact if not developed
as a state campaign to scale.
The City of East Palo Alto did negotiate with the bank’s receiver around fines in
order to halt pending litigation. The receiver had decided in the interest of the portfolio to
not pursue the more than 10 lawsuits by Page Mill against the city. The receiver had met
with the mayor, city administrator and attorneys promising to maintain the units and be a
“boring” landlord, in contrast to Page Mill.
The city and the tenants were concerned with who would ultimately purchase the
portfolio. In the foreclosure proceedings, Wells Fargo was the only bidder at 50%
purchase price (CalPERS, 2010). Wells Fargo received tax-relief for buying up Wachovia
debt. In one respect, Wells Fargo was securing title to the properties using federal funds
that ultimately, if partially, guaranteed gains for the bank.
The city advocated that Wells Fargo break up the portfolio to sell to multiple
purchasers to avoid a monopoly purchase and repeat of the Page Mill investment strategy.
Tenant organizers also called for a sale price justified by rents adhering to the RSO, a
community benefits agreement between purchasers and the city that stipulated long term
affordability commitments and purchases backed by minimized leverage (Tenants
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Together, 2011:1-2). Wells Fargo pro-actively coopted the tenant frustration through a
series of community meetings facilitated by Bridge Housing, a non-profit affordable
housing developer commissioned by Wells Fargo. At this series of town halls, including
one hosted by YUCA, tenants, and organizers demanded explicitly that Wells Fargo
break up the portfolio, and assure purchase by landlords who would commit to long-term
holdings, and follow the letter of the RSO.
Bridge Housing was a community development corporation that was well known
in the Bay Area for affordable housing, as a trusted partner in their public relations
towards the city and tenants. One YUCA organizer said this was considered a positive
opening, and that tenant advocates and representatives from the city fully participated in
the community-input process facilitated by Bridge Housing. Yet Wells Fargo shut down
the recommendations and Bridge Housing would not publicly disclose the communityinput report. By tenants’ accounts, the process in hindsight was a farce.
Ultimately, the mayor of East Palo Alto and a city council member were apprised
of the Wells Fargo plans. Wells Fargo solicited their input on the sale of the portfolio to
contending bidders including Apollo and Equity Residential, both of which were
considered by tenant organizers from New York City to the Bay Area as “vulture capital”
entities. The first, Apollo, was well known in New York City for predatory equity
strategy premised on over-leverage and gutting rent regulation there. Equity Residential
was headed by Sam Zell, considered the fiercest opponent to rent control in the state of
California. The mayor who attended this meeting reported that he conveyed to the bank
and the bidders: that the properties suffered from deferred maintenance; that the residents
of East Palo Alto had voted every time in favor of rent control; that the city would
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continue to protect the tenants. He reported that he made plain that he strongly opposed
the sale to a single buyer (personal communication, June 8, 2012).
Organizers with PIA and YUCA began to mobilize. PIA had new staff capacity
and along with YUCA targeted Wells Fargo in a series of actions that protested the likely
purchase by Equity, a sponsor of the defeated anti-rent control Proposition 98. In one
protest, YUCA commissioned a bus for tenants and youth leaders to protest in front of
Wells Fargo’s San Francisco Headquarters, saying “Hells no Wells Fargo. Don’t sell to
Zell,” referring to the Equity offer (Domingo, 2011). At another protest that began in East
Palo Alto, YUCA mobilized tenants to march past the house of Facebook CEO Mark
Zuckerberg, located a stone’s throw across the creek from the Woodland Park
neighborhood, but light years in social distance from the low-income tenants (personal
communication, June 7, 2012). Zuckerberg had just purchased a home only several
hundred feet from East Palo Alto for $7million. Protesters decried the potential sale to
Equity. Parents pushed strollers and one council member rode his bike alongside as they
marched to the Wells Fargo branch in Palo.
The foreclosure crisis was mounting and East Palo Alto tenants were not alone in
seeking justice from the banks. More than a third of all East Palo Alto homeowners
would experience foreclosure in the five years following 2008. Bay area activists first
targeted their protests against the foreclosures in their action, “Showdown with Wells
Fargo.” The showdown was a harbinger of the Occupy action to follow nearly six months
later. It was one of the first national actions that would launch the formation of a New
Bottom Line, conceived in part by the strategist around private equity, Steven Lerner,
formerly with SEIU. The formation would eventually bring together Alinsky-based

231

national formations such as PICO and National People’s Action with the left-oriented
alliance Right to the City. Tenants Together co-sponsored the San Francisco “showdown”
and along with YUCA and PIA, protesters drew attention to the East Palo Alto
multifamily foreclosure as part of the mobilization, which brought together more than a
thousand marchers under the larger demand to break up the banks. YUCA had
spearheaded a drive of more than 700 petitions to Wells Fargo against the offer to Equity
to present at the shareholders’ meeting, which coincided with the protests.
Wells Fargo’s solicitous communication with the city and tenants changed course
as pressure mounted nationally. The bank representatives stonewalled East Palo Alto
community concerns in an about-face from their initiative for community-input. In fact,
Wells Fargo missed the deadline to register their properties with the city’s Rent
Stabilization Board, a point made by the Fair Rent Coalition in their letter to regulators in
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (Matthew Freemont, September 22, 2011).
Eventually, , in December, 2011, Wells Fargo secured the sale to Equity Residential for
$130 million, less than half of Page Mill’s acquisition price.
Tenants had forced a crisis for Page Mill and for a while, won time to further
develop their organizing to freeze rents, increase tenant protections, and halt
redevelopment. They had not, however, secured resident-control of their homes. Equity
Residential would usher in a new period of strife. Tenants again faced unlawful detainers
and displacement. Again, at least one organizing outfit, PIA, proposed a rent strike.
However, without organizing capacity at the time, tenants relied on the city to fortify
rental protections.
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Although the political drive for tenants’ protections was a living legacy in East
Palo Alto, the actual management of the city was another affair. East Palo Alto City
Council fired its newly hired city manager in 2014 due to her close relationship and likely
collusion with Equity Residential to audit the city’s Rent Stabilization Board. After the
release of 3,000 pages of internal documents to Tenants Together, the city determined
misconduct by their manager, who at one point had told rent program administrators to
not assist tenants in filing petition forms and to no longer refer tenants to inspections for
habitability (Lamont, 2014). The city also expelled a landlord representative from Equity
Residential from the Rent Stabilization Board, and condemned the audit of the
stabilization program.
In one respect, the actions by the city manager was a test of East Palo Alto’s own
tenacious political commitment to the philosophy of the rent control ordinance. YUCA
organized hundreds of residents to participate in ongoing planning sessions. In 2015
SFOP/PIA have proposed a county-wide rent control measure to the San Mateo County
Board of Supervisors. Tenants Together has launched a rent control tool kit for
California, which in 2016 was being adapted by the national Right to the City Alliance
for localities nation-wide.

Chapter Conclusion

This chapter examined the points of vulnerability of the corporate landlord that
the tenants along with the City of East Palo Alto leveraged to make their claims. As first
demonstrated in Chapter 4, tenants pressured the city to use their authority to take
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municipal action. The city responded with a rent moratorium, development moratorium,
protection of Westside rental properties from redevelopment, and a referendum on rent
control. City officials also participated actively with their residents and the tenant
advocates by pressuring CalPERS to restructure the portfolio and protect renters.
The tenants, advocates, and City of East Palo Alto leveraged three areas of
CalPERS authority and vulnerability pertaining to the Page Mill Fund. Tenants and the
city called on CalPERS to withhold any remaining capital commitment and divest in the
portfolio. Such withholding and withdrawal by CalPERS would create a crisis for the
general partner that would hasten foreclosure. The second area of vulnerability for the
primary investor was vis a vis CalPERS’ authority. The limited partnership agreement
included the option for CalPERS to take control of the portfolio and dismiss the general
partner. Lastly, the tenants organized the state legislature to act upon their authority to
demand CalPERS divest from the fund and prohibit investment in future predatory equity
deals.
CalPERS claimed that as a limited partner they could not divest workers’ capital
from the fund or withhold capital committed. Individual high net worth venture capital
investors did attempt to withhold capital commitment to the fund claiming that they were
not aware of the partner’s intention to undermine rent control; however, these limited
partners were then court-ordered to make due on their commitments. CalPERS could
withhold its capital commitment but would also likely face litigation by the general
manager for breech of contract. Despite providing the largest amount of equity to the
fund, the limited partnership agreement stipulated that CalPERS held an advisement role
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only. However, the governance agreements did allow for the limited partners to dismiss
the general partner under certain circumstances of general partner imprudence.
Based on political pressure, CalPERS carried out an independent investigation,
including an independent audit and appraisal of the properties to ascertain the viability of
taking over the portfolio; CalPERS did so against the wishes of the general partner and
the general partner’s claims that CalPERS violated its limited partnership authority. By
making CalPERS the general principal partner of the portfolio, CalPERS would become
the tenants’ primary target. CalPERS would then have authority to: halt litigation against
the city; roll back rent increases; terminate displacement and guarantee a right of tenant
return; invest new equity; manage maintenance, and transfer fund investment class from
opportunistic to core investment. A prospective tenant demand to CalPERs then would be
to eventually transfer ownership from CalPERS to an affordable housing developer or the
tenants themselves. CalPERS ultimately chose not to take over the portfolio citing
anticipated litigation expenses.
California legislature is responsible for appointing a portion of CalPERS Board
members who oversee all investment allocations. The legislature may also act in the
public interest to prohibit certain investments and may propose amendments to the
California Constitution to reform pension policy. CalPERS must also disclose to the
legislature investment contractual services, returns, and a wide-range of investment
details for quarterly and annual reviews. However, unlike the California teachers’s
pension fund, CalSTERS, the state legislature cannot leverage contributions to pressure
CalPERS or raid the fund for budget needs. The CalPERS fund has exclusive authority
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over the amount of member and employer contributions to the fund; the current member
plans cannot be changed without change to the California constitution.
Tenants and SEIU pressured the state legislature to use its statutory power to limit
CalPERS’ real estate investment. The legislature proposed an anti-speculation, antipredatory-equity prohibition on CalPERS’ real estate investment through a bill that was
the first prohibition on such investment for a public pension fund in the country. The bill
passed several reviews before dying in committee after CalPERS and CalSTERS coopted the policy by instituting their own anti-predatory equity guidelines, which did not
include the bill’s reporting and enforcement provisions.
Through state public information guidelines a secondary, indirect, tenant tactic
was to pressur CalPERS to disclose all details of the fund to the public. CalPERS had a
direct interest in withholding this information in part to conceal its stake in the fund, and
in part to not establish a precedent for other investment funds concerned with protecting
trade secrets and exposing themselves to the public scrutiny. Tenants won full disclosure
only after suit by the First Amendment Coalition and after the portfolio went into
foreclosure.
Lastly, tenants attempted to target federal regulators to pressure Wells Fargo to
break-up the portfolio and identify a preservation purchaser. The tenants cited the
Community Reinvestment Act, but Wells Fargo was not investigated for this fund. An
untapped point of vulnerability for the lender included the state Attorney General’s
potential to investigate the portfolio and potential fiduciary imprudence by CalPERS’
investment committee board members. Another untapped area of leverage that would
become part of the debate around foreclosure response in the state was the potential of
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the Attorney General to deploy eminent domain to seize and purchase foreclosed
properties. Such an option would have turned the foreclosure crisis into an opportunity to
directly target the state with demands for renters’ security of home in East Palo Alto.
Notwithstanding these roads not taken, renters did prevent the rent-controlled properties
from being included in redevelopment plans that would otherwise decimate the rent
control program, and the renter households, in their city.
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Chapter 7. Conclusion
In multiple key moments in the history of how East Palo Alto became East Palo
Alto, residents attempted to assert their control in ways that practiced and furthered the
possibility of a right to the city through local, and democratic action. At the beginning of
the last century, small farmers attempted to maximize a separatist socialized economy.
Japanese horticulturalists subverted xenophobic exclusion laws through collectivized land
holdings before and following World War II. Then, beginning in the late 1950s, Black
workers claimed the city as their own, developed urban garden plots over the grids of past
small farms, forged community-controlled schools and a university, and in large numbers
came to own their homes. In the post civil rights era, a Black and Brown alliance
organized in coalition and mobilized votes to create and take city power, asserting the
political voice of people of color in a regional economy known for white affluence,
dominance, and discrimination. They premised the Black-Brown alliance and
incorporation campaign on the need for city power for rent control.
Yet from the very onset of the city’s incorporation, East Palo Alto struggled to
maintain its activist legacy of forging the security of home and city for people of color.
East Palo Alto had become a majority minority city in an era of federal abandonment of
urban infrastructure, recession, regressive state tax reforms, deregulation, privatization,
heightened drug trafficking, state disciplining of Black bodies by criminalization and
incarceration, and an increase number of poor, immigrants arriving for refuge after U.S.support of right wing military dictatorships and free trade dislocation. By the 2000s, a
cash-strapped city government sought the promise of a certain kind of entrepreneurial
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placemaking attractive to capital. The city promoted the fiscalization of its land for lack
of other tax revenue, and rezoned parcels for commercial development.
At this same time, out of the federal and state racial housing policies that had
mapped risk, exclusion, and containment, there emerged new opportunity for real estate
speculation in the enduring tying of capital and race: predatory lending and securitization.
What’s more, in 1995, the state signaled new opportunities for investment in residential
multifamily real estate through the stripping of California rent control protections. In suit,
the state’s largest public pension fund, California Public Employees’ Retirement System
(CalPERS) took advantage of low interest rates and the urgency of placing capital to
create portfolios of the very communities where the fund’s municipal and state
contributors called home. The real estate opportunistic fund sought returns from
gentrification, or extraction from “capital-poor” communities, and expanded the
opportunistic real estate fund with the highest level of debt risk and the lowest level of
CalPERS oversight. In so doing throughout the period leading up to the Great Recession,
CalPERS borrowed off its fund of funds, invested debt as equity in the securities of
borrowed funds, and in the portfolios of overleveraged homes, buildings and
communities. As CalPERS brokered global finance to enter California, CalPERS
continued to broker and invest California workers’ capital in world-wide markets.
Notwithstanding immense housing pressure, just before and in the midst of the
housing crash of 2007/2008, East Palo Alto tenant leaders and city officials stood up to
global capital actors to re-assert the city’s commitment to rent control and its future as a
majority minority city. After having survived, or survived in fragments, the trauma of
drug trafficking violence and organized abandonment, East Palo Alto city officials and
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renters took a stand at the cross roads of capital and neoliberal governance, and the
movements of the city’s founders. Renters and the city aligned against the remaking of
their city by the public pension-backed corporate landlord Page Mill. Local organizers
were at the heels of a victory having shut down the toxic Romic plant. The relatively new
organization of youth and adults responsible for that victory, the Youth United for
Community Action (YUCA), had grown out of broader Bay area left organizing network
and the East Palo Alto radical tradition. They organized for and with an East Palo Alto of
their own image: young, Latino, Black and Polynesian.
YUCA first catalyzed tenants to organize against the corporate landlord and
demand action from the city. Page Mill had crystallized the class and racial dimensions of
inequality that had produced a region in which East Palo Alto was now made vulnerable
to gentrification and displacement after decades of abandonment. The pension fund’s
investment exposed the mechanisms by which investors had created a portfolio out of
their homes. Tenants questioned the role of the state, unions, and the city’s own
inhabitants in financing their own displacement. The very question that had arisen from
the Romic plant closure would become the question posed by organizers through the
city’s participatory planning process that followed the Page Mill portfolio foreclosure:
what did our collective action and demands make possible? What powers of the city did
this organizing make clear?
Renters with their city won specific policy changes and organizing outcomes that
amplified the renters’ and the city’s voice and protected renters in the face of this
corporate landlord assault:
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•

The East Palo Alto city council mandated a temporary rent freeze in an
urgency order in response to the mobilization and testimony of hundreds
of Page Mill tenants.

•

The Rent Stabilization Board activated as the ‘first line of defense’ and
won eviction stops and rent increase reprieves.

•

Tenants exposed how this corporate landlord restructured its portfolio to
create smaller LLCs in an attempt to bypass rent control obligations;
tenants mobilized and won their preliminary class-action suit.

•

Residents voted for a referendum for stronger rent control and protections
for just cause and against harassment.

•

The city defended its incorporation and city zone of influence in the face
of Page Mill attempt to secede the Westside from East Palo Alto.

•

The city passed disincentives for landlords to invoke the Ellis Act.

•

New tenant leaders were elected to city’s Rent Stabilization Board.

•

The Rent Stabilization Board organized for the successful dismissal of an
anti-tenant city manager.

•

The city passed a temporary rezoning moratorium and ultimately passed a
residential preservation zoning to maintain Westside rental units.

•

A committee of the state committee initially passed state legislation
against state public pension investment in predatory equity.

•

CalPERS and CalSTERS approved investment guidelines against
predatory equity allocations based on proposed legislation.
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•

First Amendment Fund transparency win of full disclosure of CalPERS’
opportunistic investment in the Page Mill II real estate venture capital
portfolio.

In addition, as shown herein and below, East Palo Alto tenant organizers forged new
alignments with unions and the statewide tenant organizing outfit, Tenants Together.
This chapter distills several key findings and lessons from the dissertation to
suggest forward moves of action and research for housing justice and secure futures.
Absent movements of scale, and what Gilmore (2008) refers to as the “stretch” of
question,59 demands for housing justice in the U.S. may only translate to the status quo
policies upholding existing architecture of inequalities. Piven and Cloward (1968)
warned decades ago of an over-emphasis on procedural, technocratic reforms, “Liberals
and ‘good government’ groups, for their part, are satisfied with perennial reforms of the
housing codes, to which political leaders acquiesce, knowing that cumbersome
procedures of legal redress will do little except to satisfy the reformers.” (168). This
conclusion heeds such caution and offers recommendations for housing justice from the
perspective of “non-reformist reforms,” (Gorz, 1968; Gilmore in Loyd, 2013) or
frameworks and policy changes that position tenants and movements to expand and
embolden their demands by changing power relations, and stretching the questions of
strategy.
In one respect even radical demands of non-reformist reforms may become
reformist. The distinction however, is most useful in envisioning possibility, and how a
59

Gilmore (2008) calls this stretch one of perspective and interface, from “Why… this development
project?” to “What is development?” (37-28).
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demand translates to implementation. The question for Gorz is whether a policy demand
provides a means of democratic control of decision-making and, in this case, the housing
itself by those most affected. The risk is as to whether the outcome, a purported win, reconcentrates and centralizes capital.60 For example, Gorz (1968) in his now canonical
work Strategy for Labor gives the example of the French workers’ demand for 500,000
additional housing units (7). If these units were created through state subsidies to private
corporations, or private landlords as in the more recent mechanism of Section 8 vouchers
in the U.S., or developed on expropriated land that displaced existing workers, or
developed with subpar quality, or for the poorest of the poor exclusively, etc., this reform
would maintain the “neo-capitalist” structuring of a speculative economy. Although more
than a million people would be housed (no small feat, Gorz!), the economy that produced
the very poverty conditions that warrants an urgent need for workers’ housing would
continue to operate, and even benefit from the state subsidies given to ameliorate the
experience of impoverishment.
On the other hand, however, the realization of such a demand would in effect
signify the radically simple idea of state intervention for the right to remain. Whether
such a hypothetical reform creates the strategic framework for sequenced non-reformist
reforms that alter the market and remove the housing permanently from speculation, or
whether the housing returns to the speculative market is a question of ongoing, sustained
struggle.

Examples of questionable housing reforms abound from early 20th century slum clearance initiatives and
early 21st century Hope VI projects, to state subsidized nonpermanent affordability scattered site programs
designed to catalyze a neighborhood’s gentrification.
60
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What are the non-reformist reforms for housing security in the era of increasing
financialization? In order to arrive at this question of strategic reforms, this dissertation
asks broadly in the preceding chapters, how through this case might we understand how
financialization operates in the every day realm of rental housing? What are the nexuses
between tenants, workers, finance actors, and the state? How have workers and renters
become financial subjects? How are modes of risk, including race, produced and
mobilized for financial speculation? What are the strategic leverage points of power for
renters and the city to assert their demands and intervene in the structuring of
speculation? Some of these relationships presented in the dissertation require an
elaborated and honed research agenda for greater clarification and generalizability. The
relationship of workers’ capital to gentrification, or the pension funding of displacement,
is the salient work of this dissertation, and the starting point of the findings, lessons, and
areas of non-reformist reforms considered in this conclusion.

Dissertation Findings and Lessons for The Post-Crisis Crisis

Financialization runs on workers who are tenants who are investors; align labor
strategies with housing justice strategies.
This dissertation takes an expansive view of capital’s contradictions in an era of
increasing financialization. The financialized terrain of residential real estate presents a
strategic point of contradiction that exposes the relationship between capital’s
organization of space and the dispossession of workers who produce and inhabit place. A
central finding from this study is that workers’ capital has financed the serial
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displacement of communities and workers, including the very people to whom pension
fund managers and investors are under fiduciary obligation to serve by securing
retirement futures. The case study demonstrates that the systemic risks of housing finance
are socialized risks, not simply market investor risks; these risks are carried and
experienced by residents, communities, and cities. In East Palo Alto, the returns
stipulated by the debt leverage and expectations of renter returns from this portfolio
resulted in the eviction of approximately 1,500 residents (See Chapter 4).
Institutional investment funds such as CalPERS do not simply adhere to market
structures; large institutional investors shape market structures, and investment chances.
Institutional investors such as CalPERS aggregate U.S. homes, single or multifamily, and
create a bridge from the extraction of value from those homes to the global securities
markets, in which pension funds such as CalPERS are also major investors. At the time
of this writing, CalPERS had a target allocation of 20% investment in global debt
securities. This involves the purchasing of securities or paper of the U.S. government,
foreign governments, corporations, residential and commercial backed mortgages,
student debt loans, credit cards, and other forms of direct loans (CalPERS, 2015: 52). The
fundamental question of CalPERS’ investment model then is not only whether the
investment fund realizes returns on investment despite or in proportion to great leverage,
but how those returns are produced through the production and circulation of debt, and
the extent to which returns fundamentally and irrevocably rely on dispossession. In the
dissertation case example, CalPERS expected to profit off housing through the
exploitation of the California workers, cities, and residents who produced the value of
place. This was also done to the benefit of the portfolio principals and lenders who
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accrued fees at multiple exchange points of capital circulation (see Chapter 5).
Notwithstanding the reputational risks of their eviction campaign and eventual
portfolio losses, Page Mill’s executive stood to gain from even a failing portfolio. Page
Mill’s general manager reaped investors’ fees and had accrued $7,137,000 in fees from
the commingled investment fund (Squar Milner Real Estate Services, 2008: 7). The
general principal was also well positioned to discount eventual real estate losses against
federal taxes, benefit from potential carried interest tax credits for any returns, and had
put comparatively little of his own “skin in the game” to lose. Despite taking
comparatively less risk than the larger investors, Page Mill’s principal controlled the
governance structure of the portfolio. Even so, there was opportunity for CalPERS to
have a say in the portfolio management, and this did not go unnoticed by the tenant
organizers.
An interrelated and key finding of this dissertation is that CalPERS proved to be a
more strategic target than the corporate heads of the Page Mill portfolio fund. Despite
statements to the contrary by the Page Mill principal and CalPERS, CalPERS real estate
officers had a voice in the management of this portfolio, and ultimately made key
decisions that ushered forward the portfolio’s foreclosure (see Chapter 6). CalPERS
sought to close the portfolio at a loss rather than continue to deal with the relentless
media, tenant, union and state legislator inquiries, and their evidence of deferred
maintenance, and eviction. Despite the limited partnership structure of the limited
liability company (LLC), and CalPERS’ standard reliance on external management, this
case demonstrates that a large institutional investor such as CalPERS had opportunity to
restructure this corporate portfolio and provide new equity to save the otherwise failing
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fund. CalPERS established a third-party investigation by a consulting firm to examine the
portfolio, and audited the fund when Page Mill executives in email after email cautioned
against the optics of such an inquiry. CalPERS ultimately made a choice to lose its full
investment rather than move to dissolve the governance structure and take-over the
portfolio, or infuse new dollars.
Tenants recognized that a distinctive feature of the majority investor in this
portfolio was the institutional investor’s affiliation with the state and with unions. Union
trustees elected to CalPERS (see Chapter 6) are responsible for protecting labor’s capital
by seeking greater investment profits, and via those investments, may also advocate for
expanding union employment prospects in CA industries. However, the “triple bottom
line” of investing in areas of environmental, social and worker protections while aiming
to also increase returns for workers’ retirement security raises tension and contradictions.
For one, this case study demonstrated the contradiction of the worker-, union-, city- and
state-backed pension’s role in “developing” communities by accelerating displacement
and gentrification for retirement returns.
Before “tripling” their concern, CalPERS had first established a “double bottom
line” that considered social responsibility a tenet of investment returns. In 2000 when
CalPERS released the “double bottom line” framework, real estate of all forms of
speculation was still considered a neutral investment of moral value, and therefore
socially responsible. This assessment, as Chapter 5 demonstrates, would ultimately be left
to external managers who increasingly managed CalPERS’ real estate investment
holdings, and received greater power to increase risks through opportunistic funds that
involved the highest debt ratios and lowest likelihood of stable returns. External
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managers had incentives of reaping fees paid out by investors before the period of
investment returns would be realized. CalPERS managers also were incentivized through
payoffs by placement agents, but also by the tie-in of their compensation bonuses to
investment returns. Managers internal and external to CalPERS sought out greater
leverage to create greater fees through greater exchange points of capital, and to improve
the prospect of higher returns and bonuses for those returns.
An additional finding of this study demonstrates that labor support of tenant
organizing added traction to tenant demands when targeting CalPERS. New alignments
between labor and organizing against housing speculation are necessary to ensure
workers’ control of both their own retirement futures and homes. In the Page Mill case,
tenant organizers succeeded to align with SEIU local 521. The union local protested
CalPERS’ funding of this portfolio, and ultimately supported state legislation to ban
public sector pension funds from predatory investment in speculative real estate. As the
CalPERS disclosure demonstrates, union leaders had direct lines of communication with
CalPERS officials. Labor is a necessary coalitional partner with housing organizers and
advocates seeking to affect investment priorities (for a New York City example and
critique of the potential of labor to become incorporated into the urban gentrifying
regime, see MacDonald [2011]).
In the Bay Area and Silicon Valley, where housing demand continues to outpace
supply, there are signs of growing union and tenant organizing affinities against
gentrification, even, at times, involving the building and trades unions known to support
high-end development. For example, in 2015 the building trade unions agreed to support
the San Francisco Jobs with Justice campaign to tighten Just Cause, and in turn housing

248

justice organizations allied with trade unions against nonunion development projects
(personal communication, June, 25, 2016)61. Strategic housing and labor coalitional work
gained momentum in part at a pragmatic and personal level involving the crossover of
organizers years ago in the activist-oriented Bay Area. When the non-profit Tenderloin
Housing Clinic became a union shop, a tenant staff organizer there became a political
leader of the union local and in the political realm of the labor council (Ibid.). These
cross-relationships helped to catalyze work with SEIU in particular around strategic antidisplacement efforts involving housing for teachers, and lower-income workers. At the
rank and file level, tenant organizers have attended shop-steward meetings to conduct
trainings around housing issues with union memberships.
In addition to exerting influence over city and state rent policy, development
plans, pension funding, and individual landlord fights, unions can expand the conceptual
framework of collective bargaining for strategic aims. In the area of pension funds, some
unions have activated their members to hold their respective funds accountable to the
needs of their contributors, including and beyond household futures. In the case of
California, the same SEIU local 521 that worked with East Palo Alto tenants to stop
CalPERS rent hikes and evictions formed a Retirement Security for All committee. The
committee mobilizes members around pension reform changes and argues that changes to
pension funds for current union workers should be negotiated through collective
bargaining, not by the whim of the state legislature (personal communication, June 5,
2012; Pham, 2012). These committees can potentially activate union workers to hold
accountable their union representatives who have seats on pension boards, such as

61

For an overview of the rise and fall of unionized construction in residential market see Rabourn (2008).
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CalPERS trustees. The committees can also serve as vehicles to develop rank and file
union members for the pension questions of collective bargaining.
A more expansive view of collective bargaining takes into account what
McAlevey calls the “whole worker” that affords the highest level of worker participation
in the bargaining process (2012; 2016). Expansive collective bargaining sets forth
demands addressing the context in which labor is reproduced, and labor’s capital
expropriated, or the processes of financialization (see Bhatti and Lerner, 2016), such as in
the case of worker and state-subsidized pension funding of evictions. Collective
bargaining for the whole worker might include principles of investment dollars, and
specific outcomes for socially controlled housing production. The bottom line for such
retirement security committees cannot be a narrow vision of protecting wages and
retirement payouts; it must be in ensuring pension investments secure rather than
undermine stable and stronger economies, at the community, state, national and global
scale.
Strategic union organizers have identified the intersection of housing and labor
demands in past collective bargaining campaigns, such as when the Stamford Organizing
Project at the same time mobilized workers to save public housing from demolition, won
inclusionary zoning, and organized 4,500 workers into a union contract (Clawson, 2003;
for a more recent update see Botein, 2007). More recently, for teachers in SEIU in the
Bay Area, collective bargaining provided an opportunity to calculate housing as a
component of rising costs of living in the workers’ contract demands (personal
communication, June 25, 2016). Yet, as this dissertation shows, housing as a wage
supplement is a limited view of the question of housing affordability, and by extension
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limits the possibilities of collective bargaining. Unions and housing organizers may find
strategic targets in private equity corporations themselves, such as Blackstone, as Bhatti
and Lerner (2016) suggest. For one, they point out, as unions organize Blackstone
workers, unions must bargain also to freeze the rents of properties across the Blackstone
portfolios at rates affordable to those workers.
To aim big, and to aim strategically at the sources and structures of corporate
finance, however, transparency matters. In order to look upwards at the funding sources,
and identify the investors that control the corporations (that strip states of tax dollars,
fight unionization and invest in tenant harassment, deferred maintenance and serial
displacement), legislation must require corporate public reporting, beginning with statefinanced investment portfolios. The Page Mill tenant organizing strategy to target
CalPERS was due to investigative community lawyering and committed tenant leaders
who traced the financial actors involved in the portfolio based on court disclosures that
identified CalPERS role in the portfolio.
CalPERS’ largest disclosure surrounding Page Mill was court mandated, and
became the central data source of this dissertation. The court had ruled against CalPERS
because the fund did not identify the venture capital operating firm Page Mill as an
alternative investment vehicle in their pension reporting (see Chapters 5 and 6). Instead,
Page Mill was firmly listed by CalPERS as a real estate fund. Blackstone funds, on the
other hand, are reported by CalPERS as alternative assets, and do not require portfoliolevel specific reporting even when investment assets may be real estate such as
Blackstone IV rental housing. CalPERS is exempted from public reporting of details of
alternative assets. Although CalPERS vigorously fought the Page Mill disclosure in court
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and described as a protected asset, the First Amendment Coalition’s lawsuit prevailed due
to the fund’s original real estate classification.
Public pension funds can circumvent public information requests on the specific
portfolios of private equity alternative assets investments. Moreover, private equity
prospectus and memoranda of agreement are not reported to the Security and Exchange
Commission (SEC). Efforts to identify investors, amounts, and agreement provisions
prove challenging for strategic researchers seeking to find points of vulnerability without
such data points. In other words, CalPERS can deny requests for specific Blackstone
funds’ portfolio listings, and these would not be found by the parent corporation’s name
in public databases (see Chapter 5).
In New York City, at the time of this writing, the city council recently introduced
a legislation that would pressure landlords through transparency measures by mandating
the city’s Housing Preservation Department (HPD) to create a public watch list of
overleveraged landlords with high debt to income ratios. Tenants alleging harassment in
those watch-list buildings would receive expedited action in housing court (Zimmer,
2016). HPD officials have reported to news outlets that creating such a list would be
burdensome, saying debt ratios fluctuate, and that they did not necessarily have access to
this data at this time.
Instead of relying on public transparency measures, over the last several years,
tenant organizers such as those at California’s Tenants Together have looked for new
ways to identify corporate investors. They do this through savvy strategic research and
the investigative navigation of web-based individual rental property listings. For
example, Tenants Together identified rental homes of Wall Street investor corporate
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parent companies such as Blackstone by finding first individual properties and then the
properties’ limited partner owners. Once researchers identified the subsidiary limited
partners, they were able to identify the number of rental properties (such as 5,000 for
Blackstone/Invitation Homes in the Bay Area) listed with these specific portfolio partners
to begin outreach to those renters (Inglis n.d.). These listings were made possible through
the publicly available county assessor-records aggregated through propertysharks.com or
Property Radar.
Unmasking these relations is not enough. In the case of Tenants Together,
identifying rental units owned by corporate landlords is a first step to tenant outreach and
organizing. An advocacy platform that targets corporate landlords on behalf of those
tenants without the tenants themselves in leadership positions will likely limit the
strategic, sequenced possibilities of tenant and broader-based action.

Race is a mode of risk that structures speculation; racial justice and housing justice are
inextricably linked.
This case study began with an historical overview of the federal and local
dimensions that produced speculative housing regimes legitimated through race (Chapter
3). Race is a mode through which boundaries of place have been drawn and re-drawn for
the purposes of segregation, containment, and gentrification. A finding of this case
study’s historical tracing is that boundary making around and between people by race and
class creates axes of difference mobilized for financialized risks and returns, or
valorization by devalorization. Redlining, exclusionary zoning, restrictive covenants,
Alien Land laws, Proposition 14 are all examples of how this was practiced through
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government agencies including HOLC, state-sponsored realtors, and voter mandated
policies.
This dissertation presented a regional and historical view of racial containment.
The value of homes as commodities, grounded in places, has been historically linked to
ideas of racial occupancy and settlement, involving in the U.S. stolen lands and stolen
peoples. Moreover, home is the site of the most intimate sphere of social reproduction,
including the reproduction of stratification at the level of household by age, gender roles,
and in the reproduction of familial identity through race and ethnicity relational to the
identities of other family units.
In the early 1980s, East Palo Alto’s city founders viewed the threat of
gentrification as both consequence and cause of potential political fragmentation in their
majority minority city. Two decades following cityhood, corporate landlord evictions
made visible the gender, race, and class contours of an embattled and predominantly
immigrant and Black renter population “fighting to stay put” (Chapter 4) after nearly 40
years of federal disinvestment. The renewed opportunity for capital there relied in part
on the historicized racial differentiation of the city’s people in the regional context of
white affluence, and the raced policies of organized abandonment and expropriation.
Organizing with racial justice at the center requires a shift from demands for increasing
“access” to affordable housing, to asking who is defining the value and risks of housing
markets, and who is expanding and controlling those markets for whom, and by whom.
Organizing with racial justice at the center involves leading by and for people of color.
Youth United for Community Action has demonstrated intersectional analysis and
action that lifts queer, people of color, feminist, and eco-perspectives. YUCA youth
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organizers mobilized through a racial justice and intergenerational strategy in their
campaign to save renters’ homes in East Palo Alto. While the GI Bill was creating a
university boom for largely white beneficiaries at Palo Alto’s Stanford University next
door, and venture capital grew in innovation to back their technological products, East
Palo Alto was becoming predominantly a toxic waste site for the chemicals used to
manufacture Silicon Valley’s computers. YUCA elevated the question of race from this
historical understanding of how East Palo Alto went from the Silicon Valley’s toxic
dump where people of color were in effect considered disposable, to a place of value
where people of color were in effect considered displaceable.
The California based Anti-Eviction Mapping Project is another forward strategy
project that reflects a racial analysis of corporate real estate control; this group became
especially active in the post-crisis renters’ crisis. The project uses spatial visualization to
make clear not only where evictions are happening, but also the speculator investors
behind these evictions. Working with Tenants Together the project identified Blackstone
private equity and other corporate landlord properties in northern California to calculate
the scale and sites of increased speculation in communities of color based on geographic
concentration. Spatial visualization allows for the multi-layered view of demographic
profiles within clusters of speculation. In their “Mapping Market Power” analysis, the
Anti-Eviction Mapping Project teamed with Tenants Together to identify the single
family rentals of Blackstone/Invitation Homes, Colony Financial (Colfin), and Waypoint
that now form the large corporate rental portfolios of previously home owner-occupied
housing in post-crisis crisis California (See
www.antievictionmappingproject.net/wallstreet.html).

255

Other Bay and Peninsula area housing organizations such as Just Cause / Causa
Justa also develop on-going analysis of demographic shifts and involve the people most
affected by those shifts in regional strategy. For this group, foregrounding a racial justice
analysis meant creating a dedicated space and platform, the Black Priorities Project, for
development without displacement. Building a city where Black lives matter involves a
re-centering from demands of access to affordable housing to demands of accountability
for how the conditions of state violence and gentrification were produced through the
racial disciplining of labor, removal of union jobs, boundary-making of segregation, and
post-1960s disinvestment in urban infrastructure.
Labor not only has a vested interest in the structuring of housing speculation
through financialization, but also the racial contours of that structuring. For those who
posit that the central aim of labor is the decommodification of workers an analysis of
racial capitalism is necessary in strategy to address the ways in which racial valorization
acts as a mode in the commodification of bodies, land, and housing.
Unions have a direct stake in how gentrification works as racial political
redistricting. Gentrification results in fragmentation of sustained relationships and
political networks through displacement. Geographic shifts in union memberships,
particularly in the service industry, may indicate foreclosure or opening in local political
strategy.
For decades, people of color have disproportionately rented, and continue to do so
(Joint Center for Housing Studies at Harvard University, 2016). The foreclosure crisis
that robbed African-American households of wealth disproportionately resulted in a postcrisis crisis for renters that again, hit people of color the hardest (Ibid.; Henry, Reese and
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Torres, 2013). This crisis of enduring crises for Black Americans in particular, and
political fragmentation by gentrification, is partly why “Black Lives Matter” as cry and
demand remains so broadly effective. The decentralized form of the BLM organizing
defies this fragmentation and speaks to people directly within and across place, whether
urban and suburban, where people find themselves all too often gentrified out, and, or
segregated-in by race and class.

Organization in place still matters; targeting corporate landlords stretches local
campaigns to greater scale for potentially greater impact and opens translocal strategy.
Within and outside the far-reaching call of movements are people organizing,
disrupting, and changing local politics. Another finding of this dissertation is the
continuing significance of urban politics in shaping speculative financial real estate
regimes. Since the 1970s entrepreneurial cities have allowed for much of the transfer of
public policy decisions to private interests, but this case presents the example of a city
intervening for social interests within the incomplete processes of hyper-financialization.
This dissertation demonstrates the attempts by the city to mitigate and even resist
gentrification in the face of this large corporate landlord and the institutional investor
(Chapter 6). City officials in East Palo Alto, including key rent board members, city
council members, and planners responded to the high participation by renters in city
meetings. The city targeted the corporate landlord directly and froze Page Mill rents. The
Rent Stabilization Board ruled against evictions, and the City sued and counter-sued the
litigious corporation around a myriad of issues, including the form in which it announced
and held meetings. City officials leveraged capacities to support renters by proposing and
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passing a new stronger rent control ordinance, protecting the properties from demolition
or conversion in its land use planning, and investigated and fired a city manager and,
more recently, removed a rent board member deemed anti-tenant.
City officials also went after CalPERS. The city council passed a unanimous
resolution calling for CalPERS divestment from the portfolio fund. Officials representing
the city appeared and spoke at CalPERS Board meetings, and to the media. The city also
supported and pursued legislation against pension funding of predatory landlords, and
city council members and the mayor discussed their expectations for a restructured
portfolio with the lender.
Localities continue to test their capacities. The city of Richmond, CA put forth a
plan to use eminent domain there to seize bank loans of foreclosed housing, and
restructure the loans to be affordable to original home owner occupants or for potential
conversion to affordable units. Although this plan did not materialize, the local
government’s pursuit of this proposal was an immediate threat to investment capital, and
even more so if ever brought to scale throughout California or across the U.S.62 There
and elsewhere banks cited pension funds, or workers, as the losers in such deals due to
pension investments in the securitization of many of these loans (Dewan, 2014).
In California, rent control ordinances reflect a popular demand for renter
protections, if not an actual salve in light of the restrictions of Costa Hawkins. In
November 2016, four new rent control initiatives were slated for localities in the Bay
Area and Silicon Valley by local California referenda, including in Richmond,
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A housing justice critique of the Richmond eminent domain plan was the city’s use of a profit-motivated
firm that would generate fees for its mortgage restructuring services. This critique further demonstrated the
need for state-funded REO transfer mechanism and social housing conversion.
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Mountainview, San Mateo, and Burlingame (Inglis, 2016). New taxes were also proposed
in East Palo Alto specifically for affordable housing revenue; also on the ballot were
proposals to strengthen eviction controls in both East Palo Alto and Oakland.
Although movements gain traction through bold demands, a necessary stretch of
question applies especially to the local policy reforms that can make a difference when
brought to scale. Corporate landlords by sheer economy of scale would influence
prevailing rents if entire portfolios were deemed rent controlled, regardless of rental unit
size. Page Mill had attempted to use the “mom and pop” provision of exempting smaller
multi-family holdings from East Palo Alto’s rent regulation and to obscure its singleentity principal. Page Mill attempted this by registering a network of LLCs as subsidiary
owners of their otherwise rent regulated smaller holdings. Corporate landlords that seized
the capital opportunity of investing in scattered site portfolios comprised of single family
REOs were also exempted from local rent ordinances because these assets are single
units. In California, due to the small landlord protections of Costa Hawkins, these single
family homes cannot be covered by rent regulation, despite the portfolio’s overall asset
value and the aggregate number of assets leveraged by a singular portfolio. Corporate
landlords of multi-holdings, single family and greater, should not be exempted by CostaHawkins’ small landlord protections.
The elimination of Costa Hawkins is a labor and housing coalitional campaign
that can be launched at the state level. First and foremost, Costa-Hawkins must be
eliminated to end vacancy decontrol and to allow for statewide rent control provisions.
Yet, a stretch of question challenges organizers to seek beyond the perpetual changing of
housing legislation and finance regulation to questions of who controls the housing to be
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legislated and the capital to be regulated? Massive federal spending remains necessary to
produce new social housing, and to support the conversion of private REO housing to
social housing.
The foreclosure crisis was a missed opportunity for affordable housing conversion;
notwithstanding city rent regulatory capacities in places such as California, the 2010
federal Dodd-Frank mortgage regulatory capacities, and municipal and state tools for
bank owned to social housing conversion, new social housing production and
maintenance requires massive federal investment.
The housing crisis of 2007/2008 hit East Palo Alto in relentless waves. By the last
quarter of 2008, East Palo Alto held the distinction of having the highest rate of
foreclosures in San Mateo County (Federal Housing Finance Agency, 2008). The
succession of single-family foreclosures further exacerbated the existing affordability
crisis for many low-income renters. These renters compete with new renters in a
narrowing market of supply further shaped by exploitative landlord speculators seeking
higher rents for debt servicing and returns. By 2015, renter demands had outstripped
rental supply across the country.
In East Palo Alto, the one period of anomaly of increased housing unit vacancy in
this tightening market was during the period of the Page Mill portfolio evictions.
Although evictions would create availability of a unit for rental, tenant organizing and
media attention on the problematic landlord kept would-be tenants away (personal
communicaiton, January 7, 2014). The combination of Page Mill evictions and singlefamily foreclosures exacerbated the crisis for renters in this small city. The crisis further
reflected a generalized crisis for renters throughout the country.
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The present rentership society was catalyzed by a number of causes that resulted
from both the housing crash, and demographic shifts. Between 2008-2014, more than 9.5
million foreclosed or distressed sale homes led to both increases in rental units and renter
growth (Kusisto, 2015). Less than a third of these foreclosed and stress sale households
are expected to become homeowners again, according to the National Association of
Realtors (Ibid.). An early indicator of the shift of owner to renter was the tripling of
single-family rentals from 2005-2010, compared with the first half of that ten year period;
a neutral effect on vacancy rates for single-family units over the same period signifies the
likelihood of foreclosed owners turned renters of those same foreclosed units (Joint
Center for Housing Studies at Harvard University, 2012). The sheer number of
foreclosures at first indicated that that the supply might offset the new demand. Yet rental
vacancy rates have steadily decreased and by late 2016 were the lowest rate in 20 years
(US Census, 2016). Despite foreclosures, rental supply options were circumvented by
the recession due to empty foreclosed properties awaiting resale, a narrowing of credit
opportunity for homeownership, and a decrease, or stalling, of both single family and
multifamily new construction (Freddie Mac, 2012). Although younger people were more
likely to remain in place with parents as a result of the failing economy than of the same
age cohort in the previous decade, demographic shifts of immigrants, and increasing
number of renters in all age groups between 30-70s as well as the number of foreclosed
or distressed sale households contributed to the eventual renter demand upsurge.
Moreover, rental demand grew in this period as incomes fell. Between 2000-2010
U.S. household incomes fell by 7%, while rents rose by 12% (Woo, 2016). Rents
outpaced inflation resulting by 2015 in the highest rental burden ever in the recording of
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rental burdens, established in 1981 at more than 30% of household income (Schwartz,
2006), and in other measures of rent burdens recorded since 1960 (Woo, 2016). Rental
burdens continue to hit the poorest the hardest. In the critical period of crisis and postcrisis, in the ten years between 2005-2015, more than half of all new rental growth was
among households earning less than $25,000; a third of all U.S. renter households fall in
this income bracket (Joint Center for Housing Studies at Harvard University, 2016:26).
The foreclosure crisis was a giant missed opportunity for the conversion of
foreclosures to social housing. In this case example, the foreclosure of Page Mill
properties represented opportunity for the city, tenants, and labor allies actively seeking
renter protections. There was no viable strategy in place, however, for the city or a thirdparty organization to seize the bank loan and devise a community-control structure of the
portfolio’s land and housing units. Instead, there were marginal victories that bought
valuable time and secured the city’s existing rent control (see Chapter 6). These were
nominal short-term wins: the receiver called off litigation against the city; and the city
halted zoning changes and strengthened rent control and eviction protections. Still,
Equity Residential, owned by the financier of anti-rent control referenda in California,
Sam Zells, acquired the entire Page Mill portfolio. This occurred before the Richmond
and earlier San Bernandino proposals of eminent domain use. Yet, even if a mechanism
existed for eminent domain and a third-party transfer, funding for mitigating deferred
maintenance alone would require significant sourcing. Funding and technical assistance
for the conversion of the foreclosed Real Estate Owned (REO) private corporate portfolio
to a social housing structure could have allowed the former Page Mill tenants to become
controllers, if not owners, of their housing futures.
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Housing control versus ownership is an important distinction for potential
conversion of any REO housing to social housing. Indeed, the foreclosure crisis
challenged the myth of ownership as a symbol of self-reliance or the actualization of the
American dream. As detailed above, owners by the millions, including many small
landlords, became renters, and an increasing number of stable paying renters, such as the
remaining renters in the Page Mill properties, found themselves in unstable, foreclosed
buildings. Foreclosed owners and renters alike became “bank tenants” paying rent as debt
service, often at a leverage point beyond the asset value. The trope of the ownership
society became subverted by the reality of the “renter nation” (see Samara, 2014)
described above, or debt nation.
Ultimately, the findings of this dissertation beget questions of alternative housing
models operating outside the speculative market. What does democratically controlled
social housing look like? What are the models of limited equity, land trusts, and public
financing that can help to envision the conversion of foreclosed or predatory landlord
properties, single or multifamily, to an outcome of sustained social housing?63 How
might we expand the pool of residential real estate that can be taken off the speculative
market? How much federal funding is required for new social housing production? What
are other sources of revenue for housing conversion, maintenance and production?
A lesson and impetus of the foreclosure crisis has been the need to bring
homeowners and renters together to identify the current financialization processes that
structure the economy, unmask the illusion of ownership, and invert the socialized effects
of finance and debt risks to allow for conversion of any housing stock targeted by
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For an overview of existing models of limited-equity and land trust formations see (Emmeus Davis,
2006a; 2006b)
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speculative portfolio structures. The foreclosure crisis has brought organizers to
reevaluate ownership, and by extension landlordism of any form, as a tenet of housing
security (see examples of alternative housing models, Baiocchi, et. al. 2016).

A Research Agenda, Forward Moves

Develop and Echo a Framework of Housing Security

In the aftermath of the foreclosure crisis, the Right to the City Alliance64 brought
to its organizing membership the question, what is housing security? The group had put
forth study papers on the concept of transformative demands, and “non-reformist
reforms” recognizing the need to distinguish transitional and technical policy changes
versus bold, provocative vision of possibilities in the midst of the foreclosure crisis
(Brady and Romano, 2012). The need to reconsider the very framework of the alliance’s
organizing campaigns and terms of housing justice grew out of what was revealed then as
a crisis of crises. This was a crisis that was quickly spurring new opportunity for greater
theft of wealth and equity from households across the U.S. to corporate investors,
particularly and disproportionately impacting people of color. The historical, ongoing
adaptation of capital and finance capital to innovate and prosper from crisis made evident
the need to define fundamental tenets of alternative housing models.
Right to the City developed of a five-point framework for evaluating housing
models around the following pillars: affordability (cost), tenure (sustained occupancy),
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The translocal U.S. network of membership-based organizing groups that formed in 2007 in response to
gentrification and public housing demolition.
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access (fair by opportunity and location), sustainability (environmentally sound,
habitability), and control (democratic decision making by affected residents and
occupants) (Samara, 2014). The framework rejects a right to fair or greater returns as the
central measure of housing policy, and explicitly rejects speculation as a business model.
Future research around this framework might address the question of scale and
further define equity measures for the hardest hit groups. Moreover, these umbrella
pillars might spur a detailed research agenda to consider indices of housing security. In
this direction, future research might consider the application of these pillars to existing
housing demands, such as rent control. The strengthening and protection of rent control
was a concrete win from the East Palo Alto tenant organizing against Page Mill. Yet,
Costa Hawkins circumscribed this win. What might a rent-control future look like? Is rent
control an aim to be obtained through the tool of state regulation, or renter-control of rent
as maintenance to support alternative models such as land trusts, limited equity, or other
collective resident control structures? On the one hand, each of these pillars could be
discussed in relationship to city or state regulated rent control (see Figure 7-1). The Right
to the City Alliance’s framework provides a vantage point to consider areas to strengthen
state-based regulatory capacities.
Another research trajectory unexplored herein and that engages a framework of
housing security would be to situate rent control within an evaluation of its transitional,
non-reformist reform capacities relative to and interrelated with other demands. To what
extent does rent control change market conditions by lowering the regional rent floor, or
widening the rent gap, and at what scales? How might rent control, as a regulatory tool of
the state, perpetuate endless “good government” advocacy on the loopholes, mechanisms
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of implementation, and enforcement of landlords? In this way how might rent control and
advocacy around regulatory details maintain or reinforce the power dynamics of status
quo or accountability at a municipal, regional, or national scale? Does rent control merely
remove regulated residential real estate from the speculative economy or can rent control
potentially produce prevailing rent ceilings? (See Chapter 6) What must be anticipated,
such as rent gap future speculation following the piecemeal stripping and weakening of
politically vulnerable regulatory controls? These are questions to consider in future
research from the vantage point of housing security, and reformist-reforms versus nonreformist reforms.

Table 7.1. Analysis of Tenants Together Rent Control Tool Kit (2016), and Berkeley and
East Palo Alto rent control ordinances (2015) through the application of the RTTC
housing security framework.
Five Pillars

Affordability

Moderate (Typical, Existing)

Strong(er)

Locked increase measure can
permit fluctuating affordability /
profits

Discretionary increases to established maximum
allowable rent maintains affordability, caps profit

Ties base rent to what market can
bear.
Ties maximum rents to Consumer
Price Index increase.
Allows for individual landlord
adjustments based on hardship
claims.

City, multifamily, aging stock
Accessibility

Local scale;
Excludes new construction;
Limits neighborhoods impacted

Ties base rent to Net Operating Income for fair
return.
Ties maximum rent increases to percentage of
Consumer Price Index based on annual RB discretion
to maintain or increase renter affordability (i.e., 1%100% of total Consumer Price Index increase);
Prohibits landlords’ rent banking;
Strict individual landlord adjustment provisions;
Rent freeze (no new annual increase) for seniors
60+;
Emergency hardship grants to tenants for rent.
Emergency hardship grants to landlords for capital
repairs.
Anti-speculation tax (tax on turn-over of the property
within certain time period).
County, state, national, varied new and older stock
National scale;
Includes new construction;
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based on type and age of rental
stock.
Decontrol

Long Term
Stability

Vacancy and rehabilitation
decontrols induce landlord
harassment, unwarranted and
costly (even if amortized) Major
Capital Improvements (MCIs),
and result in tenant turn over/
displacement and permanent loss
of affordable unit.
Passive
Renters must report code
violations; passive if any
inspections; no landlord
rehabilitation inducements.

Health &
Sustainability

Passive

Community
Control

Rent Control Board dominated by
appointments and representatives
of real estate interests; Landlords
put on record the base rent at time
of purchase only; onus on tenants
to petition erroneous rent
increases or code violations; little
oversight on building demolition
or conversions or MCI approval.

No zoning restrictions (includes Single Resident
Occupancy units [SROs], mobile home parks, garage
rental conversions, single family rentals, at four or
more rental properties of any unit size)
Control, Just Cause, Replacement and Relocation
Just cause eviction;
Vacancy control /
Prohibitive vacancy decontrol;
Conversion (to condo, single family) requires 1:1
rent control unit replacement and significant
relocation payment;
No rehabilitation decontrol;
Punitive fees for overcharging.
Active
Rehabilitation subsidies available as grants and liens
if landlord hardship or inaction;
Housing inspection reports and maximum allowable
rent rolls must be included in all bank appraisals and
at underwriting review;
Municipal liens placed on properties with code
violations must be cleared for sale, acquisition;
Third party transfers and social housing conversion
in cases of continued deferred maintenance, liens;
Landlords cannot raise rents to maximum allowable
with open violations; rental write-offs;
City administration pro-actively inspects, monitors,
and enforces all provisions; criminal proceedings
against landlords for certain code violations and
harassment.
Active
Rent Control Board includes appointed and elected
tenant union/organizational representatives, tenants,
and landlord representatives;
Tenant rights included in all lease agreements;
Free representation for tenant petitions;
Landlords file base rent and rent increase
information with administration every year and with
every vacancy; Revenue produced through
registration fees plus real estate transfer tax, other
tax, not only rental registration (re: resources and
economy of scale);
Major Capital Improvement (not code violation
related) must be approved by majority of buildings’
tenants;
Rent board review of demolition or conversion
permits;
Rent board can decrease rent increase percentage
each year based on their own discretion to maintain
affordability.
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Rent control ordinances approved by popular
referendum (California) to not allow for regulatory
changes at the whim of city officials.

Research to Evaluate Real Estate Holdings

An essential research agenda going forward to extend this case study would
include a housing security evaluation of CalPERS residential real estate investments
originated over the last ten years of the crisis and “post-crisis” crisis. Such an analysis
would seek to recalibrate systemic risk measures to account for housing security. For
example, considering the Right to the City Alliance’s tenet of control, securitization of
mortgage or rent would imply the further removal of control from those who occupy and
live in and produce the value of places that have become financial portfolios.
Securitization developed by and for private interests, regardless of whether guaranteed by
federal funds, invites global financial actors, and individual investors, to gamble on the
risks of whether value can be extracted from the residents and producers of place for
revenue payout in the case of rental securities or debt repayment in the case of mortgage
backed securities.
A research agenda to clarify the relationship of public pension funds to
financialization and gentrification would take stock of pension investment in Residential
and Commercial Mortgage Backed (RMB & CMB) securities and single-family rental
(SFR) securities, as well as in the funds that spawned the latest innovation of the latter.
Single family rental securities, a market invention to finance the creation of large scale
portfolios from single family homes turned rentals, was in development in 2011 when
Fannie Mae announced its plan to transfer huge pools of single family REOs to private
equity funds (Moody’s Investors Service, 2014). Between 2011 and 2014, investors
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purchased more than 200,000 single-family homes at more than $20 billion (Perlberg and
Gittelsohn, 2014). The securitization of these portfolios began in 2014 based on the
pooling of not only mortgages, but also rental payments. The general principal of the
investment fund thereby spreads the risk to securities holders and originating investors;
lenders in turn receive new cash infusion from the creation of the securities bond to
purchase new assets and establish new funds. The rental income, not the borrower’s
income becomes the basis for the loan, and thus a driver for increasing rent (See for
example, Olick, 2016; Beswick, Alexandri, et. al., 2016; Edelman, 2014; Bond-Graham,
2014).
Ultimately, many of these portfolios may become transferred again into Real
Estate Investment Funds (REIT) structures that would allow for new debt access if
brought to the scale for a public offering (Colomer, 2013). These developments also
signify the renter as embedded financial subjects; individual renters who are 401k
investors could become direct stockholders of their own homes, securing investment
returns in part through their own, and their neighbors’ and fellow workers’ rents. Most
concerning, the model is based on high rents to formulate the mortgage debt ratio.
Analysts are skeptical of the loan to value ratios of these pools given that appraisals are
not necessary in the valuing of the assets (Yalamanchili, 2016:17). New political actors in
housing policy such as private equity mortgage issuers may intervene in financing antirent control campaigns if such proposed controls would cover these scattered site assets.
Researchers and organizers can find which rental properties became securitized as
rental securities and mortgage backed securities using the same SEC inquiry methods to
search trusts and pooling and service agreements that this study employed to find that the
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largest loans of the Page Mill portfolio did not in fact become securitized (See Chapter
5). Tenants Together found 1,786 rental homes in the state that were included in a
Blackstone securitization package (Inglis, u.d.). A closer look at the SEC findings can
detail the purchasers of these securities, such as institutional investors like CalPERS.
Through an expansive search and comparative study, strategic researchers can look at
whether and how tenant affordability and maintenance conditions for securitized rental
homes versus nonsecuritized rentals differ (Ibid.).
Examples of additional pension fund investments in rent regulated multifamily
housing should be added to research agendas. One such investment was $250 million in
2012 by the Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association College Retirement Equities
Fund (TIAA-CREF) at 8 Spruce Street in Manhattan. The exemplary 2016 case remains
the largest purchase by Blackstone Group to-date: Stuyvesant Town and Peter Cooper
Village. Forty-percent of this $5.3 billion dollar deal was backed by Canadian pension
fund investments managed by the Quebec-based real estate firm Ivanhoe Cambridge.
The city negotiations of the deal ensured 5,000 of the original 11,000 units that were
(nearly all) rent stabilized in 2000, would remain stabilized or relatively affordable for 20
years from the 2015 purchase. These terms all but give up on long-term affordability for
this massive real estate holding.
CalPERS presents a key subject for public pension fund research because it is the
largest public pension fund in the U.S. and as such often sets policy precedents for other
funds. Also, CalPERS abides by relatively stronger California public transparency
provisions, and has a legacy of shareholder activism and social responsibility policy. For
one, in 2010 CalPERS and CalSTERS in suit established a commitment to ban
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investment in predatory real estate across its funds, a direct outcome of the East Palo Alto
organizing efforts.
Another component of an elaborated research agenda would further clarify the
terms and enforcement of this 2010 commitment. Since few prospectuses make explicit
strategies to subvert existing rent control laws (illegally or otherwise), or demolish the
housing stock, CalPERS must develop a standard measure of predatory-ability based on
debt ratios, net operating income, and development fees, to determine whether investment
returns rely on future rent increases and, or, displacement. This would be akin to the
criteria of New York City council’s proposal of a “predatory equity” watch list.
A related area of strategic research would be to identify CalPERS and unions
pension contributor households throughout the CalPERS California real estate portfolios.
Unions in turn should use strategic research to identify the real estate holdings of
corporate targets, identify union household members of those holdings, as well as identify
pension investment dollars and pension contributors households linked to those holdings
or securities of those holdings. Strategic researchers might take the lead of journalists
following the money behind Blackstone real estate investment funds. Based on a review
of annual pension reports, more than 30 local and state public pensions were found to
have invested $3.2 billion in the single-family foreclosure to rental portfolios of Black
Stone Real Estate Investments VII (Burns, 2015).

Research for Transfer and Conversion Programs
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Moreover, additional research is needed to identify and evaluate transfer and
funding mechanisms for converting large portfolios of private housing to social housing.
Once a mechanism becomes established for municipalities, or the federal government, to
seize corporate and bank-held housing via eminent domain of foreclosed assets,
criminalization of predatory rental exploitation, or deferred maintenance, the housing
should be converted to social housing. Research is needed to identify the number of
potential corporate portfolios that should be targeted to remove from the speculative
market, and the details of the remaining 72,783 (4Q 2015) Real Estate Owned (REO)
properties (foreclosed properties) held by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac that could be
transferred from the Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs) for social housing
conversion (Federal Housing Finance Administration, 2016:3).
The federal government transferred much of Fannie Mae REO’s most optimal
bulk holdings directly to corporate bidders in monopoly sales. This additional transfer of
wealth from the a quasi state entity to corporate interests, involving loans paid at below
the dollar, accelerated the current terms of rental financialization, including through the
invention of rental securities. An alternative response by the federal government to
foreclosures would have secured a transfer and restructuring of the REO mortgages, and
allowed for the conversion of the housing stock to community-controlled social housing.
Additional research is needed to identify areas to strengthen and reintroduce the
National Tenant Protection and Private Rental Housing Conversion Act (HR 4727, 19871988) with federal funds (see for example Black Lives Matter 2016 reparations and
redistribution platform). Research should look to existing and past models of third party
transfer intermediaries, such as in the case of the Division of Alternative Management
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(DAMP) and Housing Development Finance Corporation (HDFC) structures in New
York City to understand the potentials and pitfalls of transfer structures, as well as the
finance and governing structures of a variety of social housing forms. In the fall 2016
session, city council introduced a legislative seeks to expand the HPD third-party
preservationist transfer programs for distressed buildings owned by predatory equity
(overleveraged portfolio-based) landlords. Researchers can look to these models to
consider economies of scale, and evaluate existing and envisioned programs through the
tenets of housing security.

Final Note

This dissertation demonstrated one case through which financial actors attempted
to displace the poor by using the municipal, state, and California public workers’ own
capital. The case also demonstrated how the threat of this corporate landlord backed by
the nation’s largest pension fund catalyzed intergenerational and Black, Brown, citizen,
immigrant, and allied organizing from their buildings and unions to city hall to pension
fund board meetings to the state assembly, and to the streets. This presence of people
collectively organizing led to greater renter voice in the city as demonstrated by a popular
referendum that strengthened rent control and eviction protections there. The city did not
manage the renters’ discontent into hesitant consent or disappearence by displacement,
but instead took action through the local referendum, city zoning policy, the rent board,
legal suits, and before CalPERS and the state assembly.
The most well researched reports, pithy tweets, and Facebook posts echoing our
despair are but a simulacrum of struggle. There is no strategic research on corporate
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entities that can win fights against capital, only engaged struggle by people most affected
by the historical development of today’s present can win the non-reformist reforms and
dream the visions beyond them. When in a period in which little federal intervention to
preserve affordability or convert bank holdings to social housing seems plausible, states,
the city, and community control are the first lines of defense and strategy for housing
affordability. A right to the city as call and as demand against gentrification in the U.S. at
the urban intersection of people, land and housing is an outcome of and response to the
cojoining of anti-racism and class struggle. By definition this call must be a practice of
tactics and strategy congruent with the aims of collectivized, socially sustained futures
envisioned and realized by the leadership of people whose very “right to place” has been
historically targeted through extractive disposession.
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